Cited by

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, * * *.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, * * *.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the proximate cause of an injury which ensues.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all.” This rule, so lucidly stated, has been cited, followed, and applied in numerous cases, one of the latest being Pep

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , adopted this test of causation.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a, particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all.” The order of the trial court is reversed with directions to enter judgment for defendant Shanedling notwithstandi

Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; Schus v. Powers-Simpson Co. 85 Minn. 447 , , 69 L. R. A. 887; Sundvall v. Interstate Iron Co. 104 Minn. 499 , ; Christmann v. G. N. Ry.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , 69 * after discussing the distinction between negligence and proximate cause: “If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all.” We are in accord with the plantiffs’

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 98 , , 642: “The mere fact that a man has made a poor bargain is no ground for setting it aside.” Affirmed.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , to this effect: “If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then * * * the act would not be negligent at all.” Peterson had no reason to anticipate injury to himself from the position he had taken.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , after pointing out the distinction between “negligence” and “proximate cause,” states the following rule: “If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act Avould or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all.” An exam

Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; State v. James, 123 Minn. 487 , ; Turner v. Minneapolis St.

Co. 67 Minn. 94 , , not involving an injury coming through the use of electricity, but stating the fundamental principle upon negligence and proximate cause, is cited and discussed by counsel.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , statements that in order to find that negligence is the proximate cause of an injury it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, and such as might or ought in the light of attending circumstances to have been anticipated, are mere obiter.

Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , is applicable: “If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act Avould or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act Avould not be negligent at all; but, if the act itself is negligent, then the person guilty of it is equally Hable for all its nat

Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; Kowatch v. Pittsburgh Const. Co. 130 Minn. 174 , ; McDonnell v. C. M. & St.