Cited by

In construing its provisions, Mr. Justice Mitchell in Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276, 281 , , stated: “* * * so far from being cut down or evaded by construction, [the statute] ought to be favored and liberally construed, so as to effect the purpose of its enactment.” In defining what was intended by liberal construction, this court stated further in Pomerenke v. Farmers Life Ins.

Cf. Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276 , , and Beard v. First Nat.

Co. 207 Minn. 131, 135 , , in construing the statute (§ 595.04) prohibiting parties or persons interested in the event of an action from testifying to conversations with deceased persons, we pointed out that this court in Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276, 281 , , condemned the strict construction of the earlier cases.

See Perine v. Grand Lodge, 48 Minn. 82 , ; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , ; Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276 , ; Noesen v. M. St.

to conversations with deceased persons, disapproved of the strict construction of the earlier cases and held that the statute was entitled to “a fair and reasonable construction to accomplish its purpose — to make it work to the full extent intended by the legislature.” In that case we referred with approval to the language of Mr. Justice Mitchell in Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276 , at page 281, , 964, where it was said: “There is another fact worthy of consideration.

' The strict construction of the earlier cases was condemned and the statute commended as one to be liberally construed in Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276, 281 , , a case overlooked by some later dicta of strict construction, e. g., Finn v. Modern Brotherhood, 118 Minn. 307, 310 , .

Minces v. Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528 , ; City of Duluth v. Marsh, 71 Minn. 248 , ; City of Duluth v. Krupp, 46 Minn. 435 , .

In Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276 , , it was said that a liberal construction should be given; and in Dougherty v. Garrick, 184 Minn. 436 , , 77 A. L. R. 1286, the preceding case is emphasized by a quotation to the effect stated.

.On the other hand, the court, speaking by Justice Mitchell, in Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276, 281 , , said that this statute “is founded on the plainest principles of common justice and fair play, and, so far from being cut down or evaded by construction, ought to be favored and liberally construed, so as to effect the purpose of its enactment.” By force of the statute, evidence relative to conversations with o

City of Duluth v. Marsh, 71 Minn. 248 , .

A similar direct pecuniary interest seems to have rendered the witness incompetent in Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276 , .

t is a legitimate exercise of the police power to impose a license fee large enough to act as a restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in it, even although the sum exacted is greater than the expense of issuing the license and of police supervision of the business.” Mr. Justice Mitchell, in upholding a theater license fee of $125 for six months in City of Duluth v. Marsh, 71 Minn. 248, 249 , , uses this language: “In respect to theatrical exhibitions and amusements of si

City of Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn. 364 , ; In re White, 43 Minn. 250 , ; City of Duluth v. Krupp, 46 Minn. 435 , ; City of Duluth v. Marsh, 71 Minn. 248 , .

City of Rochester v. Upman, 19 Minn. 78 (108); State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312 ; City of Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn. 364 , ; City of Duluth v. Marsh, 71 Minn. 248 , ; State v. Finch, 78 Minn. 118 , .