Cited by

5 Perine v. Grand Lodge, 48 Minn. 82 , ; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , ; Towle v. Sherer, 70 Minn. 312 , ; *66 Pitzl v. Winter, 96 Minn. 499 , , 5 L.R.A.(N.S.)

See Perine v. Grand Lodge, 48 Minn. 82 , ; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , ; Kells v. Webster, 71 Minn. 276 , ; Noesen v. M. St.

*569 In Towle v. Sherer, 70 Minn. 312 , , the distinction between a party and a witness who was not a party bnt interested in the event of the action was made, and the Perine case and Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , , were commented upon.

Grant that this was error under the decisions of Redding v. Godwin, 44 Minn. 355 , ; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , ; and other cases cited in Theodore Wetmore & Co. v. Thurman, 121 Minn. 352, 354 , , it should not reverse, because it relates only to the consideration, an immaterial issue, the verdict, demonstrably being predicated wholly upon misrepresentation inducing the making of the contract.

Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , .

In Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , , in which a party had been permitted to testify as to the price and terms of payment under an oral contract of sale, the court said: “They could not make an oral contract for the sale of real estate, fix on the price, terms of payment and time for the making and delivery of the deed, without talking.

Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , .

*244 In Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , , it was held that the wife of a party was a competent witness to a conversation with the deceased relative to the issue, which was the title to real estate, she not being interested in the event of the action within the meaning of the statute.

Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , .

Co. 40 Minn. 152 , ; Redding v. Godwin, 44 Minn. 355 , ; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , ; Babcock v. Murray, 69 Minn. 199 , ; Robbins v. Legg, 80 Minn. 419 , ; Reeves v. Sawyer, 88 Minn. 218 , ; Veum v. Sheeran, 88 Minn. 257 , .

The suggestion that this amounted to no more than a statement of fact, and did not necessarily refer to a conversation, is covered by Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , , where it was held not permissible to state, in the form of conclusions of fact, the result of a *503 conversation, for the reason that it would be indirectly a statement of what the parties said.

Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , ; Dayton v. Corser, 51 Minn. 406 , .

The statement was but the conclusion of the witness, and the result of a conversation with the deceased relative to the sale of the land in question, and within the case of Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , , was clearly inadmissible.

Redding v. Godwin, 44 Minn. 355 , ; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , .

This gives to a husband an interest and right altogether different from that held by a wife in his lands, and places the former outside of the rule laid down in Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , , in which it was announced that a wife was a competent witness for the purpose of showing admissions made by a deceased person concerning the sale of land to her husband.

Redding v. Godwin, 44 Minn. 355 , ; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , .

1894, is as follows: “It shall not be competent for any party to an action, or interested in the event thereof, to give evidence therein of or concerning any conversation with, or admission of, a deceased or insane party or person, relative to any matter at issue between the parties.” It was held by this court in Perine v. Grand Lodge, 48 Minn. 82 , , and again in Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37 , , that, in order to disqualify a witness who is not a party to the action, his interest must be legal