Cited by

See Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , 147 N.W.

Paul, 134 Minn. 97 , , L. R. A. 1916F, 1216; Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , .

4 In denying recovery against municipalities for failure to furnish barricades or guardrails, we have noted (Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33, 37 , ): “The reasonable man, then, to whose ideal behavior we are to look as the standard of duty, will neither neglect what he can forecast as probable, nor waste his anxiety on events that are barely possible.” Cities must be prepared for and anticipate ordinary use, but not extraordinary, unusua

The city cites and relies upon Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , ; Callahan v. City of Virginia, 230 Minn. 55 , 40 N. W. (2d) 841 .

In Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33, 36 , , we said: “* * * No principle is better established than that acts or omissions by one person followed by injury to another do not alone give rise to liability.

The question whether defendant was negligent is to be determined solely in the light of the duty he owed plaintiffs (Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , ) and without regard to whether William was negligent.

Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , ; Landru v. Stensrud, 219 Minn. 227 , 17 N. W. (2d) 322 .

Co. 119 Minn. 302 , ; Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , ; National Cash Reg.

There is nothing in Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , , which requires or even suggests any other view of this case.

Moratzky v. Wirth, 74 Minn. 146 , ; Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , ; Whitney v. Kaliske, 131 Minn. 261 , ; Remington v. Savage, 148 Minn. 405 , ; Head v. Hargrave, 105 U. S. 45 , 26 L. ed. 1028; The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110 , 17 Sup.

A high degree of caution might, and perhaps would, guard against injurious consequences which are merely possible; but it is not negligence, in a legal sense, to omit to do so.” Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , .

Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , , and eases there cited.

lty *169 of negligence should be held responsible for all the consequences which a prudent and experienced person, fully acquainted with all the circumstances Which in fact existed, whether they could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence or not, would at the time of the negligent act have thought reasonably possible to follow, if they had occurred to his mind.” In Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , , the doctrine of Stone v. Boston & A. R. Co. 171 Mass. 536 , 51 N. E. 1 , 41 L.R

§ 7008; Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , .

Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33 , .