Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Childs v. Standard Oil Co., 182 N.W. 1000.

33 citing documents.

  • State v. Boettcher 931 N.W.2d 376 Minn. 2019
  • State v. Boettcher 931 N.W.2d 376 Minn. 2019
    Legion No. 600 , , 37 (Minn. 1992) (quoting Childs v. Standard Oil Co. , 149 Minn. 166 , 182 N.W 1000 , 1001 (1921) ).
  • Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc. 749 N.W.2d 367 Minn. 2008
  • Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600 494 N.W.2d 35 Minn. 1992
  • Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600 494 N.W.2d 35 Minn. 1992
    In Childs v. Standard Oil Co., 149 Minn. 166, 170 , 182 N.W.
  • Tandeski v. Barnard 121 N.W.2d 708 Minn. 1963
  • Tandeski v. Barnard 121 N.W.2d 708 Minn. 1963
    Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , ; 13B Dunnell, Dig.
  • Goede v. Rondorf 43 N.W.2d 770 Minn. 1950
  • Goede v. Rondorf 43 N.W.2d 770 Minn. 1950
    What we said in Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166, 170 , , applies here.
  • Robinson v. Butler 33 N.W.2d 821 Minn. 1948
  • Robinson v. Butler 33 N.W.2d 821 Minn. 1948
    In Peterson v. Martin, 138 Minn. 195, 198 , , we said: “* * * if; subsequent to the original negligent act, a new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury, the original negligence is too remote.” In Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166, 170 , , we said: “The fact that damage would not have happened but for defendant’s tortious act does not, as a matter of law, necessitate the conclusion that such act was the proximate cause of the damage.
  • Eichten Ex Rel. Eichten v. Central Minnesota Cooperative Power Ass'n 28 N.W.2d 862 Minn. 1947
  • Eichten Ex Rel. Eichten v. Central Minnesota Cooperative Power Ass'n 28 N.W.2d 862 Minn. 1947
    Defendants cite in support of their contentions Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , ; Goneau v. M. St.
  • Johnson v. Evanski 22 N.W.2d 213 Minn. 1946
  • Johnson v. Evanski 22 N.W.2d 213 Minn. 1946
    Co. 218 Minn. 532 , 16 N. W. (2d) 758 ; Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166, 170 , ; Shuster v. Vecchi, 203 Minn. 76 , ; Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , ; Brady v. Southern Ry.
  • Nees v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. 16 N.W.2d 758 Minn. 1944
  • Nees v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. 16 N.W.2d 758 Minn. 1944
    But causation, like negligence, is a fact issue and for the determination of the jury, except “when the facts are undisputed and are susceptible of but one inference.” Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166, 170 , ; Shuster v. Vecchi, 203 Minn. 76 , ; Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , ; Brady v. Southern Ry.
  • Arnold v. Northern States Power Co. 297 N.W. 182 Minn. 1941
  • Arnold v. Northern States Power Co. 297 N.W. 182 Minn. 1941
    In this respect the facts here are wholly unlike Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , , and Goar v. Village of Stephen, supra.
  • Johnson v. Sunshine Creamery Co. 274 N.W. 404 Minn. 1937
  • Johnson v. Sunshine Creamery Co. 274 N.W. 404 Minn. 1937
    The situation here is not like that in Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , 182 N.W.
  • Ferraro v. Taylor 265 N.W. 829 Minn. 1936
  • Ferraro v. Taylor 265 N.W. 829 Minn. 1936
    We see a clear distinction between such cases as Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , , and Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .
  • Guile v. Greenberg 257 N.W. 649 Minn. 1934
  • Guile v. Greenberg 257 N.W. 649 Minn. 1934
    Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166, 170 , .
  • Edblad v. Brower 227 N.W. 493 Minn. 1929
  • Edblad v. Brower 227 N.W. 493 Minn. 1929
    e testimony of defendant’s witnesses is true, Avas simply one of a series of antecedent events without which the accident would not have happened, and was not in a legal sense the proximate cause of the injury.” In support of the contention that it appears as a matter of law that TAvet’s negligence Avas the sole proximate cause of the collision, appellant also relies on Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , , and Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76 , .
  • Kennedy v. Hedberg 198 N.W. 302 Minn. 1924
  • Kennedy v. Hedberg 198 N.W. 302 Minn. 1924
    The doctrine was applied in Peterson v. Martin, 138 Minn. 195 , , and in Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , , cases in point here.
  • Alling v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 194 N.W. 313 Minn. 1923
  • Alling v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 194 N.W. 313 Minn. 1923
    To the same general effect are Banner Laundry Co. v. Great Eastern Casualty Co. 148 Minn. 29 , ; and Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , .
  • Goneau v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. 191 N.W. 279 Minn. 1922
  • Goneau v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. 191 N.W. 279 Minn. 1922
    There, the violation of an ordinance was involved, and the necessity of showing a causal connection between its violation and the accident was plainly declared, and in Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , , it was held that the fact that plaintiff would have suffered no damage but for defendant’s tortious act did not necessitate the conclusion that such act was the proximate cause of the damage; and, in Schaar v. Conforth, 128 Minn. 460 , , that the inj ury must be the direct result of th