23,655 Precedential Affirmed Processed

State v. Nelson

Minnesota Supreme Court · Filed December 14, 1923 · 196 N.W. 279

Cited by

City of St. Paul v. Whidby 203 N.W.2d 823 Minn. 1972
State v. Hoben 98 N.W.2d 813 Minn. 1959
State v. McCabe 87 N.W.2d 360 Minn. 1957
State v. Ketterer 79 N.W.2d 136 Minn. 1956
State v. Wilson 69 N.W.2d 905 Minn. 1955
State v. End 45 N.W.2d 378 Minn. 1950
State v. Siporen 10 N.W.2d 353 Minn. 1943
State v. Jamieson 300 N.W. 809 Minn. 1941
State Ex Rel. Connolly v. Parks 273 N.W. 233 Minn. 1937
City of St. Paul v. Keeley 260 N.W. 357 Minn. 1935
State Ex Rel. Goff v. Minneapolis Brewing Co. 248 N.W. 715 Minn. 1933
Carter v. Duluth Yellow Cab Co. 212 N.W. 413 Minn. 1927

all 14 citing documents »

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

State v. Lee 29 Minn. 445
City of Mankato v. Arnold 36 Minn. 62
State v. Harris 50 Minn. 128
State v. Grimes 83 Minn. 460
State v. Robitshek 60 Minn. 123

Opinion text

PER CURIAM. Defendant was convicted of running a disorderly house in the city of Minneapolis, contrary to an ordinance. She appeals. The errors assigned are: (a) The evidence did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (b) the only evidence of defendant’s connection with the house was her admission that she ran it. *507 This being a quasi criminal prosecution under an ordinance, sections 8462 and 8463, G. S. 1913, are not applicable. In State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 457 , 13 N. W. 913 , it was said of an ordinance against operating a house of ill-fame “this ordinance is satisfied with a less degree or quantity of evidence than is required on the trial of the offense under the general law, (which must be beyond reasonable doubt).” A defendant is not entitled to a jury trial when charged with an offense under a municipal ordinance. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62 , 30 N. W. 305 ; State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128 , 52 N. W. 387, 531 ; State v. Grimes, 83 Minn. 460 , 86 N. W. 449 . In State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123, 124 , 61 N. W. 1023 , 33 L. R. A. 33, it is said: “It has repeatedly been decided by this court, as it has elsewhere, that municipal ordinances are not criminal statutes; that violations thereof are not crimes, nor are such violations governed by the rules of the criminal law, save in certain specified exceptional particulars.” The evidence clearly established the house in question to have been a disorderly house. Its reputation was bad; it was frequented at all hours of the night by men and also women; drunken persons would issue therefrom; revelry and profanity were heard by passers on the street until the small hours of the morning; and when, after midnight, on the date the arrest was made, the officers entered, 5 persons were found drinking and carousing in one room, with defendant in an adjacent room, the door being open, lying on a bed, almost wholly undressed kicking, cursing and swearing in a maudlin way. Defendant’s counsel seem to argue that there was no proof of the corpus delicti except by defendant’s admission. He is in error. The corpus delicti was the existence of a disorderly house. And, as to defendant being the one concerned in its operation, her admission, corroborated by the fact that she was found therein under the condition stated, was amply sufficient to support the conviction. Judgment affirmed.