Cited by

Such acquiescence or neglect becomes the proximate cause of the injury, Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , , and is unlike the mere negligent failure to discover a concealed hazard as in Fidelity & Cas.

The law on that issue is summarized in Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 235 , , where we said: “The case must be decided by rules of negligence.

It is the contention of defendant that if he was negligent, the city’s failure to inspect and correct the defect was an intervening, superseding cause which insulates him from liability, citing Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .

Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , ; Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N. Y. 198 , 199 N. E. 56 .

In the case of Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , , a householder was injured as a result of a short occurring outside of the building brought about by the action of the elements.

As this court stated in Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 241 , , 176: “* * * where there has been such a lapse of time as we have here, and there is a duty, clear and affirmative, on the part of the purchaser, to inspect and maintain as against that sure deterioration which is bound to follow from ordinary use, and a complete failure of the performance of tha

Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , ; Lawrence v. Scranton City, 284 Pa.

For the latter contention, reliance seems to be placed upon the principles of such cases as Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , , and Peterson v. Martin, 138 Minn. 195 , , to the effect that negligence as proximate cause is precluded by the intervention of an efficient, independent force.

Inaction where duty requires action is just as potent a factor in the chain of causation as action “where legal duty requires no action, * * * There is no difference in law or morals between the effects attending the two.” Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 237 , ; Taylor v. Northern States Power Co. 196 Minn. 22, 27 , .

Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 233, 234 , .

On this aspect of the case, the principle expressed in Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 233 , , leaves no doubt as to the propriety of instructing as to res ipsa, loquitur.

W. 679, 680 , 24 A. S. R. 194, is, in principle, equally applicable here: “One may owe two distinct duties in respect to the same thing, — one of a special character to one person, growing out of special relations to him; and another, of a general character, to *533 those who would necessarily be exposed to risk and danger from the negligent discharge of such duty.” In Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , , by dictum it was said, p. 235: “There is no difficulty in reaching the conclusion

We see a clear distinction between such cases as Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166 , , and Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .

This rule is clearly established in Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 237 , .

See, generally, Gilbert v. Duluth G. E. Co. 93 Minn. 99 , , 106 A. S. R. 430; Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , ; Fitch v. City of Blue Earth, 180 Minn. 125 , ; Stark v. Badger P. S. Co. 176 Wis.

980, 136 A. S. R. 503; Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .

Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , , is not opposed.

For a fuller statement of the facts see Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .

503; Goar v. Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .

In contrast, see Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .

Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228 , .