Cited by

Most of the rules as to the duty to look are now fairly well settled in this state especially since the decision in the Moore case which laid down the rule that before directing a verdict under what was theretofore known as the plain-sight rule in Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , ; and Hermanson v. Switzer, 188 Minn. 455 , , the court must look to the surrounding circumstances and must take into account such consider

While it is true that this court held in effect in such cases as Hermanson v. Switzer, 188 Minn. 455 , ; DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , ; and Sorenson v. Sander- *64 son, 176 Minn. 299 , , that the driver of a motor vehicle who looks and does not see that which is in plain sight and which he ought to have seen was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, that doctrine was overruled in Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 , and Ahraham v. Byman, 214 Minn. 355 , 8 N. W. (2

Defendants rely upon Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , ; and Hermanson v. Switzer, 188 Minn. 455 , , in support of their contention that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, basing their contention upon the proposition that one who fails to see that which is plain

350 , of Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , 223 N.W.

They cite Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31, 35 , , and Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , to the effect that “A verdict cannot be permitted to rest upon testimony of a party having good eyesight that he did not see a moving automobile then in plain sight at a place to which his vision is specially directed.” It should be noted that “both cases have been limited, distinguished, and explain

Finally and “mainly,” said the court, “the ‘look and see not’ theory of the case of Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 [ ],” was determinative against Iver.

He bases that claim largely upon plaintiff’s failure to see his automobile before entering the intersection and relies upon such cases as Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , ; Hermanson v. Switzer, 188 Minn. 455 , ; and Dreyer v. Otter Tail Power Co. 205 Minn. 286 , , .

Defendant relies on Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , , and similar cases.

The distinction is plain between this case and Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , cited by appellant, where plaintiff in daylight was attempting a left turn in the face of the obvious defendant’s car, oncoming at five times his rate of speed.

This case is distinguishable from such cases as Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , wherein the road was one of clear visibility for a considerable distance.

Defendant cites and relies on the decisions in such cases as Chinander v. DeLaittre, 171 Minn. 11 , ; Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , where the accident happened in daylight, and not cases where a pedestrian had entered and was well advanced on a proper crosswalk before the car of defendant entered the intersection.

It is true that in some of our cases, such as Rosenau v. Peterson, 147 Minn. 95 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; and DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , , some expressions have occurred which may lend some color to a contrary doctrine, and a distinction has been drawn between the care required of a driver avIio sees and misjudges the speed of an approaching vehicle and one Avho, though having th

Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; Hermanson v. Switzer, 188 Minn. 455 , .

As was said in Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299, 300 , , 146: ‘A driver frequently and quite naturally observes the absence of approaching vehicles within a reasonable distance rather than tries to see what he may discover in the harmless distance.’ * That * * [is what] in this case is shown by the fact that the plaintiff had entirely cleared the west

The trial judge in his memorandum attached to the order granting defendants’ motion for judgment said: “Such decisions of our supreme court as Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; and DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , ; require a trial court to order judgment for the defendant on such a record as Ave have here.

In Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299, 300 , , Chief Justice Wilson well states how.

If plaintitff had been driving an automobile and had come onto the intersection with the same absence of precaution as appears so indisputably now, he would have been guilty of contributory negligence under the rule of such cases as Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , and DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , .

This is a much more flagrant case of contributory negligence than was Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , where the collision occurred at a street intersection, not at a driveway.

Co. 147 Minn. 118 , ; Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , ; Hermanson v. Switzer, 188 Minn. 455 , .

The facts in Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , we regard as not at all similar to those the jury could find true in the case at bar.

Like Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , and DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , , this is not a case where plaintiff saw an approaching vehicle and misjudged its location or speed.

A quite full statement of the facts has been necessary because the cases of DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , ; Chandler v. Buchanan, 173 Minn. 31 , ; and Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , , are relied upon by appellants.

See Sorenson v. Sanderson, 176 Minn. 299 , ; DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , .

*284 Sorenson v. Sanderson, 17C Minn. 299, , and DeHaan v. Wolff, 178 Minn. 426 , , were cases of collisions between automobiles in both of which due care on the part of the plaintiffs required them to yield the right of way to the defendants.