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“In the context of general tort liability, such as negligence actions, we long ago defined a proximate cause of a given result as ‘a material element or a substantial factor in the happening of that result.’ ” Osborne v. Twin Bowl, Inc., ( ).

In the context of general tort liability, such as negligence actions, we long ago defined a proximate cause of a given result as “a material element or a substantial factor in the happening of that result.” Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 364 , 256 N.W.

and Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 365 , 256 N.W.

Co. 154 Minn. 1 , ; Sporna v. Kalina, 184 Minn. 89 , , 76 A. L. R. 1280; Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , ; Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548 , ; Wedel v. Johnson, 196 Minn. 170 , ; Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352 , 19 N. W. (2d) 788 .

6 Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 364 , ; Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548, 551 , ; Nees v. Minneapolis St.

The substantial-factor rule adopted in Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , , from Restatement, Torts, is paragraph (a) of § 431 thereof, to the effect that the negligence charged must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

This is as much true of alleged contributory neglig.ence, Fitzgerald v. International F. T. Co. 104 Minn. 138, 149 , , as of alleged negligence, Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , .

But causation, like negligence, is a fact issue and for the determination of the jury, except “when the facts are undisputed and are susceptible of but one inference.” Childs v. Standard Oil Co. 149 Minn. 166, 170 , ; Shuster v. Vecchi, 203 Minn. 76 , ; Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , ; Brady v. Southern Ry.

Draxton v. Katzmarek, 203 Minn. 161, 164 , ; Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , ; 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19 ; Restatement, Torts, § 431.

The jury should have been instructed that, whatever the speed, if it was not a proximate cause, that is, if it did not contribute as a “substantial factor” (Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , , following Restatement, Torts, § 431; see, for additional cases, Dunnell, Minn. Dig.

Co. 108 Minn. 100, 101 , : “ ‘Theorize as -we may on the subject of proximate cause, it is in its last analysis a question of good common sense, to be solved by a practical consideration of the evidence in each particular case.’ ” Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 364 , .

Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , ; 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19 ; Restatement, Torts, § 431.

This is as much true of alleged contributory negligence, Fitzgerald v. International F. T. Co. 104 Minn. 138, 149 , , 479, as of alleged negligence, Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360 , .