Thaleaha McBee v. Team Industries, Inc.

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A23-1879

Court of Appeals McKeig, J.
Took no part, Hennesy, J.
Thaleaha McBee,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: October 29, 2025
Office of Appellate Courts
Team Industries, Inc.,

Respondent.

________________________

Daniel G. Leland, Ryan T. Conners, Leland Conners, PLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
appellant.

John A. Kvinge, Daniel J. Ballintine, Paige K. Clark, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren
Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Stephen M. Premo, Premo Frank, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Christopher J. Moreland, MSB Employment Justice LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
amicus curiae the Minnesota Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association.

Leslie L. Lienemann, Celeste E. Culberth, Culberth & Lienemann, LLP, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for amicus curiae Employee Lawyers Association of the Upper Midwest.
________________________

SYLLABUS

As used in Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), the phrase

“absolutely privileged” provides immunity from liability in civil actions for which

information submitted to the Department of Employment and Economic Development, in
order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits, forms the subject

matter or basis of the claim.

Affirmed.

OPINION

MCKEIG, Justice.

Appellant Thaleaha McBee was terminated from employment at Team Industries,

Inc. (Team) after she reported to Team staff that she was experiencing back problems.

McBee sued Team under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), alleging failure to

provide reasonable accommodations and disability discrimination. Minn. Stat.

§§ 363A.01–.50. Before trial, Team moved to exclude from evidence a questionnaire that

it had completed and submitted to the Department of Employment and Economic

Development (DEED) so that DEED could determine McBee’s entitlement to

unemployment benefits. 1 The district court excluded the questionnaire (DEED

Questionnaire), relying on Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), which

provides: “Information obtained under the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law, in

order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits, are absolutely

privileged and may not be made the subject matter or the basis for any civil proceeding,

administrative, or judicial.” The district court reasoned that the DEED Questionnaire

1
The Department of Employment and Economic Development is the agency that
oversees and administers the Unemployment Insurance program in Minnesota. Cf. Minn.
Stat. § 268.035, subd. 8a (defining Commissioner in the context of the Minnesota
Unemployment Insurance statutes as “the commissioner of employment and economic
development”).

2
should be excluded because it was “information created or generated solely” for purposes

of an application for unemployment insurance benefits. The court of appeals affirmed,

holding that “information submitted to DEED for processing an unemployment-benefits

claim is absolutely privileged and thus inadmissible in another civil, administrative, or

judicial proceeding.” McBee v. Team Indus., Inc., 9 N.W.3d 592, 599 (Minn. App. 2024).

We disagree with the court of appeals’ interpretation. We conclude that the phrase

“absolutely privileged,” as used by the Legislature in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), is

an immunity from liability, which in the context of the statute, shields an employer from

liability for information it has communicated to DEED when that information is obtained

by DEED “in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits” and

later “made the subject matter or the basis for” a civil proceeding. Section 268.19,

subdivision 2(c), does not state an evidentiary rule of general inadmissibility. Because the

DEED Questionnaire is not the subject matter or basis of McBee’s employment

discrimination claim, the district court erred by excluding the document from evidence at

trial. Even so, McBee is not entitled to a new trial because the exclusion did not constitute

prejudicial error. We therefore affirm the court of appeals, though on different grounds.

FACTS

Appellant McBee began working at a foundry operated by respondent Team

Industries, Inc. in Detroit Lakes in September 2014. 2 In early 2015, McBee began

2
For a more complete recitation of the background facts of this case, see our opinion
in McBee’s first appeal before us. See McBee v. Team Indus., Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222, 224–
27 (Minn. 2019).

3
experiencing back problems with nerve-related symptoms, including numbness and limited

mobility in her hands. Based on these symptoms, a doctor placed McBee on a 10-pound

lifting restriction to avoid additional injuries. Shortly after McBee notified Team of this

lifting restriction, Team terminated McBee’s employment without attempting to provide

her with accommodations.

After her termination, McBee filed a claim for unemployment benefits with DEED.

DEED sent Team an Unemployment Insurance Request for Information form (the DEED

Questionnaire) to determine whether McBee qualified for unemployment benefits. The

DEED Questionnaire included questions about McBee’s employment, disability, and

termination. One of these questions asked: “If you (the employer) were aware of the

illness, injury, or medical condition, did you try to make accommodations for the

applicant’s situation?” Team checked a “No” box in response. Team further explained:

Due to potential for paralysis (stated by [Employee] to supervisor, HR and
several co-workers) and the unwillingness of her doctors to take her out of
work, she claimed she could be paralyzed simply by looking up. We did not
want to be liable for aggravating her injury and being subject to a work comp
claim.

Team responded to several other questions on the form. Team then returned the DEED

Questionnaire to DEED for its assessment of McBee’s claim.

In June 2015, McBee filed a complaint against Team alleging, among other things,

that Team violated the MHRA when it failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.

During discovery, Team moved for a protective order to exclude the DEED Questionnaire

from both discovery and admission at trial. The district court ruled that the DEED

Questionnaire was discoverable but reserved its decision as to admissibility, expressly

4
stating: “Admissibility of these records at trial is NOT determined herein” and that

admissibility was “an unresolved issue.”

In July 2016, Team moved for summary judgment. The district court granted

Team’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed that dismissal. We granted review,

identified two genuine issues of material fact, and reversed and remanded for trial. McBee

v. Team Indus., Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222, 233 (Minn. 2019). Those issues of material fact

were (1) whether McBee could perform the “essential functions” of her job with reasonable

accommodation, see Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6; and (2) whether her continued

employment posed a serious threat to her health or safety (a defense to a claim of disability

discrimination by an employer under Minn. Stat. § 363A.25). McBee, 925 N.W.2d at 230–

33.

On remand, Team filed a motion in limine to exclude the DEED Questionnaire from

evidence at trial. McBee filed an affirmative motion to admit it. Following a hearing, the

district court granted Team’s motion and excluded the DEED Questionnaire. In relevant

part, it concluded that Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), renders

“information created or generated solely” for the purpose of assessing an application for

unemployment insurance benefits inadmissible for any purpose in any civil proceeding

held outside of that administrative case. 3 After a bench trial, the district court entered an

3
In addition, the district court concluded that the DEED Questionnaire is
inadmissible pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 268.105, subdivision 5(b), which
governs the use of hearing testimony obtained upon referral for a direct hearing or during
an appeal from the commissioner’s determination of eligibility or ineligibility for
unemployment benefits. In reaching its decision, the district court characterized the DEED
Questionnaire as “testimonial in nature.”

5
order resolving all disputed issues in Team’s favor, ordered judgment for Team, and

dismissed McBee’s claim. McBee appealed.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 603.

It reasoned that the DEED Questionnaire is inadmissible in McBee’s employment

discrimination suit because the document is “absolutely privileged” under section 268.19,

subdivision 2(c). 4 McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 599. We granted review on the issue of whether

Minnesota Statutes section 268.19 prohibits the admission of documents like the DEED

Questionnaire in a disability discrimination case filed under the employment provisions of

the MHRA.

ANALYSIS

Minnesota Statutes chapter 268 establishes Minnesota’s unemployment insurance

program, which is intended to promote the public good “by providing workers who are

unemployed through no fault of their own a temporary partial wage replacement to assist

the unemployed worker to become reemployed.” Minn. Stat. § 268.03. Section 268.19

governs how information gathered under the administration of the Minnesota

Unemployment Insurance Law may be disclosed or used. Concerning information

submitted to DEED by employers, section 268.19, subdivision 2, states in part:

4
Because the court of appeals read the district court order as relying on
section 268.19 and because it concluded that statute is dispositive, the court of appeals did
not address McBee’s argument that the district court erred by concluding that the DEED
Questionnaire is also inadmissible under Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 5(b). McBee,
9 N.W.3d at 597–98 n.4.

6
 (a) Regardless of any provision of law to the contrary, an employer may
provide the commissioner with information on an applicant so that the
commissioner can determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment
benefits under the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law.
....
(c) Information obtained under the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance
Law, in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment
benefits, are absolutely privileged and may not be made the subject matter or
the basis for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.

(Emphasis added.).

The issue presented in this case is one of statutory interpretation. The parties

advance different interpretations of the words “absolutely privileged” as used in Minnesota

Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c). McBee argues “absolutely privileged” is a legal

term that means an actor has “complete immunity against defamation claims.” McBee

interprets subdivision 2(c) as codifying a commonly recognized rule of immunity by

prohibiting employees from filing defamation claims against employers based upon the

information they submit to DEED in connection with unemployment benefit applications.

According to McBee, the district court erred by excluding the DEED Questionnaire

because her lawsuit does not include defamation claims.

Team disagrees. It identifies “privileged” as an adjective that is independently

modified by the adverb “absolute.” It argues the word “privileged” is a legal term that

means “inadmissible” and that “absolutely privileged” information is always inadmissible.

Team interprets subdivision 2(c), as stating an evidentiary rule of inadmissibility that

precludes employees from offering into evidence any information that employers submit

to DEED in connection with unemployment benefits applications, regardless of the type of

7
claim an employee brings. According to Team, the district court correctly excluded the

DEED Questionnaire.

The court of appeals agreed with Team’s broad interpretation. It held: “[U]nder

section 268.19, subdivision 2 information submitted to DEED for processing an

unemployment-benefits claim is absolutely privileged and thus inadmissible in another

civil, administrative, or judicial proceeding.” McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 599. Below, we first

interpret the meaning of “absolutely privileged” as it is used in the statute, considering

whether it is a reference to immunity from liability or inadmissibility, as well as if it is

limited to the defamation context, as McBee argues. Next, we apply that interpretation to

the facts presented in this case, determining whether the DEED Questionnaire was

appropriately excluded under section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), and if not, whether the

exclusion of that evidence prejudiced McBee.

A.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Poehler

v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 899 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 2017). When interpreting a statute,

our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r

of Revenue, 931 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 2019). The first step is to determine whether the

challenged statutory language is unambiguous, that is, whether there is only one reasonable

way to read the text. In re Est. of Ecklund, 20 N.W.3d 351, 355 (Minn. 2025). If there is

only one reasonable way to read the statutory text, its meaning is plain. Walsh v. State,

975 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 2022). We give effect to the plain meaning because we

presume plain and unambiguous statutory language expresses the Legislature’s intent.

8
Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016). “If, however, there is more

than one reasonable interpretation, then the statute is considered ambiguous” and further

analysis is required. Ecklund, 20 N.W.3d at 355. In this case, we must assess the

reasonableness of each party’s interpretation of the meaning of “absolutely privileged” as

that phrase is used in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c).

When assessing the reasonableness of a statutory interpretation, “we analyze ‘the

statute’s text, structure, and punctuation’ and use the canons of interpretation.” Hagen v.

Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Minn. 2021) (quoting State v. Pakhnyuk,

926 N.W.2d 914, 921 (Minn. 2019)); see also State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682–83

(Minn. 2015) (discussing pre-ambiguity “canons of interpretation” and post-ambiguity

“canons of construction”). We read “words and phrases . . . according to rules of grammar

and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1). Phrases

that have “acquired a special meaning . . . are construed according to such special meaning

or their definition.” Id.; see also State v. Cannady, 727 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Minn. 2007)

(“ ‘When terms of art or peculiar phrases are used, it must be supposed they are used in the

sense as understood by persons familiar and acquainted with such terms.’ ” (quoting

Minnesota & P.R. Co. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 13, 19 (1858))). When the Legislature has not

defined a statutory term, we may consider dictionary definitions to determine the term’s

common usage, and when legal terms are referenced in statutes we often look to legal

dictionaries. See Getz v. Peace, 934 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Minn. 2019) (“Because the phrase

‘pursuant to’ frequently appears as a legal phrase in statutory references, we may look to

legal dictionaries to define it.”); Billigmeier v. Hennepin County, 428 N.W.2d 79, 82

9
(Minn. 1988) (defining “collection” in the tax law context by reference to Ballentine’s Law

Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary). Here, the Legislature has not defined “absolutely

privileged” in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), and we look to legal dictionaries for

evidence of the legal term’s meaning.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “absolute privilege” as “[a] privilege that

immunizes an actor from suit, no matter how wrongful the action might be, and even though

it is done with an improper motive. Cf. qualified privilege.” Absolute Privilege, Black’s

Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (first emphasis added). 5 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary

similarly defines “absolute privilege” as conferring protection from liability, but

specifically addresses this in the defamation context. Absolute Privilege, Ballentine’s Law

Dictionary (10th ed. 2010) (“The privilege which exists in the law of defamation when by

reason of the occasion on which a defamatory communication is made or the matter in

reference to which the communication is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action.”

(emphasis added)). Likewise, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law also expressly

associates “absolute privilege” with immunity and notes that it frequently arises with

respect to defamation, but does not limit the term exclusively to the defamation context.

Absolute Privilege, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (2016) (“a privilege that

5
Black’s directs the reader to compare “absolute privilege” with “qualified
privilege,” which it defines as “[a] privilege that immunizes an actor from suit only when
the privilege is properly exercised in the performance of a legal or moral duty. . . . Cf.
absolute privilege.” Qualified Privilege, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). This
comparison highlights a common quality shared by the doctrines of “absolute privilege”
and “qualified privilege,” which is that they both confer immunity from liability in certain
circumstances.

10
exempts a person from liability esp. for defamation regardless of intent or motive” and

“specif. : a privilege that exempts high public officials (as legislators) from liability for

statements made while acting in their official capacity without regard to intent or malice”

(emphasis added)). All of these definitions describe “absolute privilege” as conferring

protection from liability, and, in this sense, they strongly support McBee’s argument that

subdivision 2(c) states a rule of immunity, not a rule of inadmissibility.

Moreover, both the Legislature and this court consistently employ the phrase

“absolute privilege” to express a rule of immunity. In particular, the Legislature has

established “absolute privilege” as a defense to the offense of criminal defamation. See

Minn. Stat. § 609.765, subd. 3(1) (false and defamatory communication is justified if

“absolutely privileged”). And for well over 100 years, we have articulated a definition for

“absolute privilege” that is in accordance with those stated in the dictionaries above. See,

e.g., Sherwood v. Powell, 63 N.W. 1103, 1103 (Minn. 1895) (considering whether

statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely privileged” and may not “be made

the basis of an action for libel or slander”); Matthis v. Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn.

1954) (statements made by participants in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged

and “will not support a civil action for defamation”); Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d

215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (high-level agency official “has an absolute privilege, in the

performance of . . . official duties, to communicate defamatory material”); Carradine v.

State, 511 N.W.2d 733, 736–37 (Minn. 1994) (state trooper had “absolute immunity from

a civil suit in defamation for the statements made in the written police report”); Zutz v.

Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 2010) (“Two categories of privilege exist as defenses

11
against defamation claims—absolute privilege and conditional or ‘qualified’ privilege.

Both types of privilege are broadly recognized across the United States, and generally

‘result[] from the court’s determination that statements made in particular contexts or on

certain occasions should be encouraged despite the risk that the statements might be

defamatory.’ ” (quoting Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889

(Minn. 1986)); Harlow v. State Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 569–70 (Minn.

2016) (same). Based on the “common and approved usage” of the legal term “absolute

privilege,” we conclude that McBee’s interpretation of in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c)

as a rule of immunity is consistent with the plain language of the statute and thus

reasonable.

On the other hand, Team’s assertion that “absolute privilege” under subdivision 2(c)

precludes employees from offering into evidence any information that an employer submits

to DEED in connection with unemployment benefits applications in any future claim,

regardless of type, is unreasonable for several reasons. Team has not cited, and we are

unaware of, any Minnesota statute or case in which the phrase “absolute privilege” is

ascribed a meaning other than the “acquired special meaning” discussed above as an

immunity from liability. Although Team argues that the Legislature often uses the word

“privileged” to mean “inadmissible,” none of the statutes Team points to in support of its

argument employ the phrase “absolutely privileged.” Compare Minn. Stat. § 268.19, subd.

2(c) (“absolutely privileged” information “may not be made the subject matter or the basis

for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial”), with Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd.

13(b) (stating reports made to the commissioner of public safety concerning certain motor

12
vehicle accidents are “not discoverable” and “must not be used as evidence in any trial”),

and Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (describing certain information as “privileged” and identifying

individuals who may enforce a “privilege”). Nor has Team cited to any dictionary

describing “absolute privilege” in reference to “admissibility” rather than “immunity.”

Team instead encourages this court to interpret section 268.19, subd. 2(c), in accordance

with the Black’s Law Dictionary entry for the word “privilege,” standing alone. Because

Team’s interpretations do not fully reflect the language used by the Legislature in

section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), we find them to be unpersuasive.

That “absolute immunity” under section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), refers to

immunity from liability rather than inadmissibility is further confirmed when the language

of the subdivision is considered as a whole. “Because the meaning of a phrase often

depends on how it is being used in the context of the statute, we examine words and phrases

in context.” State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020); see also Bd. of Regents

of Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994) (“The sense

of a word depends on how it is being used; only if more than one meaning applies within

that context does ambiguity arise.”). Team’s broad interpretation is inconsistent with the

text of section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), as a whole, which expressly imposes a more

limited restriction on use of the information. Specifically, subdivision 2(c) states that the

“absolutely privileged” information “may not be made the subject matter or the basis for

any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.” Minn. Stat. § 268.19, subd. 2(c)

(emphasis added). Team’s interpretation is inconsistent with this text because information

submitted to DEED may be relevant to a civil claim without being “the subject matter or

13
the basis for” that claim. Reading the phrase “absolutely privileged” to mean the

information is inadmissible in a later civil proceeding for any purpose whatsoever nullifies

this limiting language and violates the canon against surplusage, as well as the whole-

statute canon of interpretation. See In re Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 716

(Minn. 2024) (stating the canon against surplusage “directs us to avoid interpretations that

would render a word or phrase superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683 (stating the whole-statute

canon directs the court to “construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give

effect to all of its provisions.”).

Considering the full language and context of section 268.19, subdivision 2(c),

however, also compels the conclusion that, contrary to McBee’s argument, immunity from

liability under this subdivision is not exclusively limited to defamation claims. Again,

section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), states: “Information obtained under the Minnesota

Unemployment Insurance Law, in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to

unemployment benefits, are absolutely privileged and may not be made the subject matter

or the basis for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.” Grammatically, the

phrase “absolutely privileged” describes the legal status of “information” that an employer

submits to DEED so that DEED may “determine an applicant’s entitlement to

unemployment benefits.” The phrase “may not be made” places a restriction on the way

“information” having that status may be used—it “may not be made the subject matter or

the basis for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.” Id. (emphasis added). Read

together, the two phrases operate to shield employers from civil liability for information

14
provided to DEED in order to determine an applicant’s eligibility for unemployment

insurance benefits. There is nothing in this statutory language specifically limiting

subdivision 2(c) to defamation claims. Rather, such an interpretation would effectively

ignore the second phrase, which broadly applies to “any civil proceeding,” not only claims

of defamation.

Applying the plain meaning of the legal term “absolute privilege” consistently with

its “acquired special meaning,” and within the context of section 268.19, subdivision 2(c),

as a whole, we conclude that the Legislature intended the phrase “absolutely privileged” to

state a rule of immunity rather than admissibility, and not one narrowly limited only to

defamation claims. As used in Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), the

phrase “absolutely privileged” shields employers from civil liability in proceedings for

which information submitted to DEED, in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to

unemployment benefits, forms the subject matter or basis of the claim.

B.

Having interpreted Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), we now

apply it to the facts of this case. Here, McBee filed an employment discrimination suit

under the MHRA in which she alleged that Team failed to reasonably accommodate her

disability. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.08 (describing unfair discriminatory practices relating

to employment). The dispositive issues before the district court at trial were (1) whether

McBee was a “qualified disabled person” for purposes of the MHRA; (2) if so, whether

Team could demonstrate that providing accommodation would impose an undue hardship

on its business; and (3) alternatively, whether McBee’s continued employment posed a

15
serious threat to her own health or safety. See McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 597. McBee sought to

admit the DEED Questionnaire as evidence that Team did not attempt to accommodate her

disability before discharging her from employment. McBee’s claim stems from Team’s

alleged conduct in the workplace—failing to reasonably accommodate her disability and

terminating her employment. The DEED Questionnaire is arguably relevant to McBee’s

employment discrimination claim and may support that claim, but the employment

discrimination claim does not arise out of Team’s completion and submission of the DEED

Questionnaire, and it exists independent of that communication. 6 For this reason, the

DEED Questionnaire is not the “subject matter or the basis for” McBee’s civil suit and its

admission is not barred by section 268.19, subdivision 2(c). We therefore conclude that

the district court erred by excluding the DEED Questionnaire under Minnesota Statutes

section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), at trial.

6
In contrast, although our holding here is not limited to defamation claims,
defamation is an example of a claim in which communicated information forms the subject
matter or basis of the suit. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Powell, 63 N.W. 1103, 1103 (Minn.
1895) (considering whether statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely
privileged” and may not “be made the basis of an action for libel or slander”); Larson v.
Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 130–31 (Minn. 2020) (defining the elements of a
defamation action); see also Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 310
(Minn. 2007) (extending absolute privilege to claims “frame[d]” as breach of confidences,
invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy because the factual allegations supporting those
claims “sound[ed] in defamation,” stating “[r]egardless of the label, appellant’s claims are
in essence defamation claims; they are claims that arise as a consequence of Newgard’s
purported defamatory statements”).

16
 C.

Having determined that the district court erred by excluding the DEED

Questionnaire under Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), we must next

determine whether the exclusion of that evidence prejudiced McBee. See Minn. R. Civ. P.

61 (requiring courts to disregard harmless error). When an error exists at trial, it is not

grounds for reversal unless the error is prejudicial. Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d

92, 98 (Minn. 1987). “An error in the exclusion of evidence is grounds for a new trial if it

appears that the evidence ‘might reasonably have changed the result of the trial if it had

been admitted.’ ” Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 214 (Minn. 2007) (quoting

Poppenhagen v. Sornsin Constr. Co., 220 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1974)). “Where

excluded evidence is merely corroborative of other evidence admitted in the case,

prejudicial error does not result.” Hornof v. Klee, 106 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn. 1960); see

also Poppenhagen, 220 N.W.2d at 285. We do not assume error, and “the burden of

showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr.,

Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, McBee sought to introduce the DEED Questionnaire to show that Team did

not attempt to reasonably accommodate her disability before terminating her employment.

After reviewing the evidence presented in the case, we conclude that the DEED

Questionnaire is cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial. During trial, witness

testimony established that Team management was concerned about aggravating McBee’s

injury and the potential for a workers’ compensation claim if she were injured.

Additionally, witness testimony from a Team manager established that Team did not try to

17
implement any accommodations after learning of McBee’s 10-pound lifting restriction. 7

Thus, Team’s failure to accommodate McBee prior to her termination was amply called to

the attention of the factfinder through witness testimony such that the DEED Questionnaire

could not reasonably have changed the result of the trial had it been admitted. Accordingly,

we conclude that the error committed by the district court in excluding the DEED

Questionnaire under Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), was not

prejudicial. 8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, though

on other grounds.

Affirmed.

HENNESY, J. took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

7
At trial, Mark Kiser, a Team plant manager, testified as follows:

Q: Did you try to implement any accommodations of Miss McBee after you
learned of these restrictions and the paralysis risk?
A: If I understand the word implement by actually asking her to attempt to
perform it physically, no.
Q: Why not?
A: We couldn’t come up with a scenario that would fit the ten pound [lifting
restriction].
8
Team also argued for the exclusion of the DEED Questionnaire under Minn. R.
Evid. 403. Because we conclude that exclusion of the DEED Questionnaire was a harmless
error, we need not reach this argument.

18