Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Ogren v. City of Duluth, 18 N.W.2d 535.

64 citing documents.

  • Conga Corporation, d/b/a Conga Latin Bistro v. Commissioner of Revenue, Relator. 868 N.W.2d 41 Minn. 2015
  • Conga Corporation, d/b/a Conga Latin Bistro v. Commissioner of Revenue, Relator. 868 N.W.2d 41 Minn. 2015
    When a taxpayer presents substantial evidence that the Commissioner’s assessment order is invalid or incorrect, the presumption of validity is overcome, and the case is “decided by the trier of fact the same as if the presumption had never existed.” See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221, 228, (quoting Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 563, ); accord Minn. R. Evid.
  • Schmitz v. United States Steel Corp. 831 N.W.2d 656 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
  • Schmitz v. United States Steel Corp. 831 N.W.2d 656 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
    Sobczyk v. City of Duluth, 245 Minn. 569, 572 , (stating that “the law is well settled that knowledge of the occurrence of an injury to an employee gained by a foreman or superintendent is imputed to the employer”); Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 557-58 , (holding that “[ajctual knowledge by an officer or agent standing in the employer’s place ...
  • Bey v. Oxford Properties, Inc. 481 N.W.2d 40 Minn. 1992
  • Bey v. Oxford Properties, Inc. 481 N.W.2d 40 Minn. 1992
    See Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 560
  • In Re Wage & Hour Violations of Holly Inn, Inc. 386 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • In Re Wage & Hour Violations of Holly Inn, Inc. 386 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
    at 65 , d at 824 (citing Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , ).
  • In Re Estate of Beecham 378 N.W.2d 800 Minn. 1985
  • In Re Estate of Beecham 378 N.W.2d 800 Minn. 1985
    See Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 564 , Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 206 Minn. 562, 567 , 289 N.W.
  • Jerabek v. Teleprompter Corp. 255 N.W.2d 377 Minn. 1977
  • Jerabek v. Teleprompter Corp. 255 N.W.2d 377 Minn. 1977
    It is, rather, “a rule of law dictating decision on unopposed facts.” Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 564 , Jensen v. City of Duluth, 269 Minn. 241, 245
  • Schwartz v. Talmo 205 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 1973
  • Schwartz v. Talmo 205 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 1973
    Co. v. District Court, 132 Minn. 249 , [1916] ; Soderstrom v. Curry & Whyte, Inc. 143 Minn. *361 154 , [1919] ; Warner v. Zaiser, 184 Minn. 598 , [1931]; Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 [1945]; Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc. 234 Minn. 517 , 48 N. W. (2d) 735 [1951].
  • Rosso v. City of Minneapolis 204 N.W.2d 214 Minn. 1973
  • Rosso v. City of Minneapolis 204 N.W.2d 214 Minn. 1973
    Co. 292 Minn. 450 , Schwartz v. City of Duluth, 264 Minn. 514 , Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221 , Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , Kellerman v. City of St.
  • Cooper v. Watson 187 N.W.2d 689 Minn. 1971
  • Cooper v. Watson 187 N.W.2d 689 Minn. 1971
    See, Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 .” In 50 Am.
  • Hunt v. Nevada State Bank 172 N.W.2d 292 Minn. 1969
  • Hunt v. Nevada State Bank 172 N.W.2d 292 Minn. 1969
    Chapman cited Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 , as authority for its sweeping pronouncement against retroactive application of statutes effecting either procedure or substantive rights.
  • Fitch v. FARMERS UNION G. TERM. ASS'N (AMBER MILL. D.) 143 N.W.2d 192 Minn. 1966
  • Fitch v. FARMERS UNION G. TERM. ASS'N (AMBER MILL. D.) 143 N.W.2d 192 Minn. 1966
    See, Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221 , 103 N. W. (2d) 397 , and Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 .
  • Davidson v. Bermo, Inc. 137 N.W.2d 567 Minn. 1965
  • Davidson v. Bermo, Inc. 137 N.W.2d 567 Minn. 1965
    Rinne v. W. C. Griffis Co. 234 Minn. 146 , 47 N. W. (2d) 872 ; Markoff v. Emeralite Surfacing Products Co. 190 Minn. 555 , ; Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 ; Miller v. Peterson Const. Co. supra; Sokness v. City of Virginia, 231 Minn. 215 , 42 N. W. (2d) 551 .
  • Jensen v. City of Duluth 130 N.W.2d 515 Minn. 1964
  • Jensen v. City of Duluth 130 N.W.2d 515 Minn. 1964
    Paul, 211 Minn. 351 , 1 N. W. (2d) 378 ; Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 ; Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221 , 103 N. W. (2d) 397 ; and Schwartz v. City of Duluth, 264 Minn. 514 , 119 N. W. (2d) 822 .
  • Schwartz v. City of Duluth 119 N.W.2d 822 Minn. 1963
  • Schwartz v. City of Duluth 119 N.W.2d 822 Minn. 1963
    The subject of heart conditions as an occupational disease of firemen is discussed in Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 ; Kellerman v. City of St.
  • Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co. 115 N.W.2d 22 Minn. 1962
  • Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co. 115 N.W.2d 22 Minn. 1962
    If the disease results from the employment, it should be compensable no matter when it had its inception.” In Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 , this court held that written notice under the statute is not necessary where the employer has actual notice.
  • Anderson v. City of Minneapolis 103 N.W.2d 397 Minn. 1960
  • Anderson v. City of Minneapolis 103 N.W.2d 397 Minn. 1960
    In discussing the presumption, the commission said: “* * * xhe presumption provides the basis for a permissible inference, and it, of course, may be rebutted by the introduction of substantial proof to the contrary.” The proper use of a presumption is discussed in Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 563 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535, 539 , where we said: “The presumption in question was a mere rule of evidence; it created a rebuttable presumption of causation under the circumstances mentioned that a p
  • Kress v. Minneapolis-Moline Co. 102 N.W.2d 497 Minn. 1960
  • Kress v. Minneapolis-Moline Co. 102 N.W.2d 497 Minn. 1960
    1 Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 ; Roos v. City of Mankato, 199 Minn. 284 , ; Warner v. Zaiser, 184 Minn. 598 , .
  • Sobczyk v. City of Duluth 73 N.W.2d 795 Minn. 1955
  • Distinguished Sobczyk v. City of Duluth 73 N.W.2d 795 Minn. 1955
    *575 The commission relied on the case of Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 585 , in finding that the employer had actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury.
  • Carroll v. State 64 N.W.2d 166 Minn. 1954
  • Carroll v. State 64 N.W.2d 166 Minn. 1954
    Co. v. District Court, 132 Minn. 249 , ; Soderstrom v. Curry & Whyte, Inc. 143 Minn. 154 , ; Warner v. Zaiser, 184 Minn. 598 , ; Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 ; Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc. 234 Minn. 517 , 48 N. W. (2d) 735 .
  • Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler 50 N.W.2d 707 Minn. 1951
  • Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler 50 N.W.2d 707 Minn. 1951
    Co. 206 Minn. 562 , ; Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 ; Donea v. Massachusetts Mut.
  • Rinne v. W. C. Griffis Co. 47 N.W.2d 872 Minn. 1951
  • Rinne v. W. C. Griffis Co. 47 N.W.2d 872 Minn. 1951
    It seems well settled in this state that knowledge of an injury to an employe gained by a foreman or superintendent of the employer is imputed to the employer from our decisions in Markoff v. Emer-alite Surfacing Products Co. 190 Minn. 555 , ; Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 ; Miller v. Peterson Const. Co. 229 Minn. 22 , 38 N. W. (2d) 48 ; Sokness v. City of Virginia, 231 Minn. 215 , 42 N. W. (2d) 551 .
  • Chapman v. Davis 45 N.W.2d 822 Minn. 1951
  • Chapman v. Davis 45 N.W.2d 822 Minn. 1951
    See, Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 .
  • In Re County Ditch No. 1-A, Yellow Medicine County 47 N.W.2d 592 Minn. 1951
  • Schroeder v. Busack 47 N.W.2d 592 Minn. 1951
  • In Re County Ditch No. 1-A, Yellow Medicine County 47 N.W.2d 592 Minn. 1951
    See, Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N.W.
  • Schroeder v. Busack 47 N.W.2d 592 Minn. 1951
    See, Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555 , 18 N. W. (2d) 535 .
  • Spurck v. Civil Service Board 42 N.W.2d 720 Minn. 1950
  • Sokness v. City of Virginia 42 N.W.2d 551 Minn. 1950