Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Breimhorst v. Beckman, 35 N.W.2d 719.

134 citing documents.

  • Flaherty v. Lindsay 457 N.W.2d 771 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
    Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 434
  • Surf and Sand, Inc. v. Gardebring 457 N.W.2d 782 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
  • Surf and Sand, Inc. v. Gardebring 457 N.W.2d 782 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
    (quoting Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 433 , ).
  • Alton M. Johnson Co. v. M.A.I. Co. 451 N.W.2d 651 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
  • Alton M. Johnson Co. v. M.A.I. Co. 451 N.W.2d 651 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
    Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 433 , (footnotes omitted).
  • Karst v. FC Hayer Co., Inc. 447 N.W.2d 180 Minn. 1989
  • Karst v. FC Hayer Co., Inc. 447 N.W.2d 180 Minn. 1989
    & Eng’g Co., Inc., 312 Minn. 404, 413-14 , *185 (1977); Frank v. Anderson Bros., 236 Minn. 81, 85 , Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 434-35
  • In Re the Occupational License of Haymes 444 N.W.2d 257 Minn. 1989
  • In Re the Occupational License of Haymes 444 N.W.2d 257 Minn. 1989
    See, e.g., Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 433
  • Schmidt v. Modern Metals Foundry, Inc. 424 N.W.2d 538 Minn. 1988
  • Schmidt v. Modern Metals Foundry, Inc. 424 N.W.2d 538 Minn. 1988
    936, 938 (1889), quoted in Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 435
  • DeVries ex rel. DeVries v. Emblom 420 N.W.2d 670 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
  • DeVries ex rel. DeVries v. Emblom 420 N.W.2d 670 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
    First, appellant claims the exception has been “extended from acts that were purely intentional, to acts involving ‘wanton negligence.’ ” She cites Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409 , but that case actually says: We need not here decide whether carelessness, indifference, and negligence of an employer may be so wanton as to warrant a judicial determination that his ulterior intent was to inflict injury.
  • Kleeman v. Cadwell 414 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • Kleeman v. Cadwell 414 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 436 , -36 (1949).
  • Parker v. Tharp 409 N.W.2d 915 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • Parker v. Tharp 409 N.W.2d 915 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 426 , (holding that “such intent may not be inferred from mere negligence, though it be gross”); (worker’s compensation was exclusive remedy when employer allegedly concealed a known workplace hazard, because there was no co
  • Kaess v. Armstrong Cork Co. 403 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 1987
  • Kaess v. Armstrong Cork Co. 403 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 1987
    In Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409 , the plaintiff-employee was injured when she accidentally triggered a spring gun concealed in the workplace.
  • Schmidtbauer v. Commissioner of Public Safety 392 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • Schmidtbauer v. Commissioner of Public Safety 392 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
    Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 433-34
  • Quam v. State 391 N.W.2d 803 Minn. 1986
  • Quam v. State 391 N.W.2d 803 Minn. 1986
    See Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 433 , (legislative grant of adjudicative powers to exclusive workers’ compensation system upheld against separation of powers challenge); -53 (Minn.1983) (legislative delegation to workers' compensation system tribunals of power to determine an
  • Johnson v. Miller 388 N.W.2d 26 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • Johnson v. Miller 388 N.W.2d 26 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
    at 26 , d at 583 (quoting Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 417 , ).
  • Hildebrandt v. Whirlpool Corp. 364 N.W.2d 394 Minn. 1985
  • Hildebrandt v. Whirlpool Corp. 364 N.W.2d 394 Minn. 1985
    *396 Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409 , is the only other Minnesota case to discuss the intent exception to the exclusivity provision.
  • Troupe v. Sunrise Electric, Inc. 360 N.W.2d 633 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • Troupe v. Sunrise Electric, Inc. 360 N.W.2d 633 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
    Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 429 , see also id.
  • Meyer v. Parkin 350 N.W.2d 435 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • Meyer v. Parkin 350 N.W.2d 435 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    See also Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409
  • MacK v. City of Minneapolis 333 N.W.2d 744 Minn. 1983
  • MacK v. City of Minneapolis 333 N.W.2d 744 Minn. 1983
    The later, compulsory form of the act was challenged on separation of powers ground in Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409
  • Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals 288 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 1979
  • Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals 288 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 1979
    In Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409 , we held that the delegation of adjudicatory powers to an administrative agency, in that case the workmen’s compensation commission, was not an encroachment upon the judicial power of the courts ( 227 Minn. 433 , ): “ * * * [T]he vesting by the legislature in the industrial commiss
  • Tracy v. Streater/Litton Industries 283 N.W.2d 909 Minn. 1979
  • Tracy v. Streater/Litton Industries 283 N.W.2d 909 Minn. 1979
    We followed this prevailing approach in Breim-horst v. Beckman, 227 Minn, 409, 436, where we upheld the pre-amendment scheme as an adequate substitute for the employee’s right to sue *915 for all appropriate negligence damages.
  • Smith v. Bailen 258 N.W.2d 118 Minn. 1977
  • Explained Smith v. Bailen 258 N.W.2d 118 Minn. 1977
    We explained that exception to the general rule in Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 434 , : “ * * * In substituting a new, adequate, and fundamentally different remedy upon a cause of action for one for which there was originally at common law a remedy involving the right of trial by jury, the legislature may withhold the right of jury trial.” It is clear, however, that the
  • Spannaus v. Arrowood 230 N.W.2d 33 Minn. 1975
  • In Re Estate of Bush 230 N.W.2d 33 Minn. 1975
  • In Re Estate of Bush 230 N.W.2d 33 Minn. 1975
    Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323 , Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409
  • Spannaus v. Arrowood 230 N.W.2d 33 Minn. 1975
    Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323 , Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409
  • Rice v. Forby 228 N.W.2d 581 Minn. 1975
  • Rice v. Forby 228 N.W.2d 581 Minn. 1975
    of the public, which was either structurally defective, or which was faulty in failing to afford what, in the judgment of reasonable men, would be a proper and adequate protection to persons using it [though out of possession], then he has incurred the risk of being made responsible for occurrences resulting in injury to any one by reason of the faulty construction.” ’ ” In Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 420 , this court provided the following definition of the public purpose exception— *
  • JOHN W. THOMAS COMPANY v. Carlson-LaVine, Inc. 189 N.W.2d 197 Minn. 1971
  • JOHN W. THOMAS COMPANY v. Carlson-LaVine, Inc. 189 N.W.2d 197 Minn. 1971
    Defendant argues that since plaintiff had full knowledge that the condition would exist, it has no cause of action against defendant, citing Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409 , 35 N. W. (2d) 719 ; and Dishington v. A. W. Kuettel & Sons, Inc. 255 Minn. 325 , 96 N. W. (2d) 684 .
  • Carlson v. Hampl 169 N.W.2d 56 Minn. 1969
  • Carlson v. Hampl 169 N.W.2d 56 Minn. 1969
    See, Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409 , 35 N. W. (2d) 719 .
  • Rognrud v. Zubert 165 N.W.2d 244 Minn. 1969