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Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Chapman v. Davis, 45 N.W.2d 822.

55 citing documents.

  • State v. Decker 916 N.W.2d 385 Minn. 2018
  • State v. Decker 916 N.W.2d 385 Minn. 2018
    Minn. Stat. § 645.16 ; see also Chapman v. Davis , 233 Minn. 62 , , 825 (1951) (same).
  • State v. Basal 763 N.W.2d 328 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
  • State v. Basal 763 N.W.2d 328 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
    We “presume that a statutory enactment applies to the future and not to the past.” Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65
  • Sletto v. Wesley Construction, Inc. 733 N.W.2d 838 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
  • Sletto v. Wesley Construction, Inc. 733 N.W.2d 838 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
    Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65
  • O'SELL v. Peterson 595 N.W.2d 870 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
  • O'SELL v. Peterson 595 N.W.2d 870 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
    But for service of process, “residence” means “something more than mere physical presence and something less than domicile.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1308-09 (6th ed.1990) (defining residence, distinguishing residence from domicile, and defining “reside” as to “[l]ive, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain,' lodge”); see also Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 69 , (concluding “actual residence” is less permanent than domicile but more than mere temporary abode for purposes of 1941 Safety Responsibilit
  • Baron v. Lens Crafters, Inc. 514 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
  • Baron v. Lens Crafters, Inc. 514 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
    Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65
  • Rural American Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff 485 N.W.2d 702 Minn. 1992
  • Rural American Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff 485 N.W.2d 702 Minn. 1992
    Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65 , Minn.Stat.
  • Dear v. Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Ass'n 481 N.W.2d 69 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • Dear v. Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Ass'n 481 N.W.2d 69 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
    § 645.21 (1990); Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62 , see In re Estate of Breole, 298 Minn. 116 , (court did not allow person to benefit from change in paternity statute regarding inheritance even though person was clearly entitled under new law); Spurck v. Civil Service Bd., 231 Minn. 183 , (if amendment
  • In Re Estate of Edhlund 444 N.W.2d 861 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
  • In Re Estate of Edhlund 444 N.W.2d 861 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
    See also Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 369 , Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65
  • State v. Traczyk 421 N.W.2d 299 Minn. 1988
  • State v. Traczyk 421 N.W.2d 299 Minn. 1988
    e previously stated “it is immaterial in this state whether a law alters procedural or substantive rights; the legislature still must express its intention to make it [the statute in question] retroactive.” In re Estate of Murphy v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 293 Minn. 298, 308 , , (1972); Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 369 , Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65
  • Keating v. Philip Morris, Inc. 417 N.W.2d 132 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • Keating v. Philip Morris, Inc. 417 N.W.2d 132 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    Id.; Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65
  • In Re Wage & Hour Violations of Holly Inn, Inc. 386 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • In Re Wage & Hour Violations of Holly Inn, Inc. 386 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
    However, in Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62 , the court refused to apply the Tompkins ruling, indicating that at the time of Tompkins Minn.Stat.
  • Lee v. Industrial Electric Co. 375 N.W.2d 572 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • Lee v. Industrial Electric Co. 375 N.W.2d 572 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
    “Generally, it is immaterial in this state whether a law alters procedural or substantive rights; the legislature still must express its intention to make it retroactive.” Estate of Murphy v. State, Department of Public Welfare, 293 Minn. 298, 308 , (citing Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65 , ).
  • Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc. 372 N.W.2d 706 Minn. 1985
  • Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc. 372 N.W.2d 706 Minn. 1985
    See Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 66
  • Haluptzok v. Peyton 355 N.W.2d 751 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • Haluptzok v. Peyton 355 N.W.2d 751 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 369 , Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 64
  • Kahn v. State, University of Minnesota 327 N.W.2d 21 Minn. 1982
  • Kahn v. State, University of Minnesota 327 N.W.2d 21 Minn. 1982
    Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62
  • Zahler v. Manning 295 N.W.2d 511 Minn. 1980
  • Zahler v. Manning 295 N.W.2d 511 Minn. 1980
    Cf. Hinton v. Peter, 238 Minn. 48 , Hughes v. Lucker, 233 Minn. 207 , Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62
  • Parish v. Quie 294 N.W.2d 317 Minn. 1980
  • Parish v. Quie 294 N.W.2d 317 Minn. 1980
    Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (1978); Brugger v. Brugger, 303 Minn. 488 , Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362 , Ekstrom v. Harmon, 256 Minn. 166 , Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62 , George Benz Sons, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 227 Minn. 249
  • Brugger v. Brugger 229 N.W.2d 131 Minn. 1975
  • Brugger v. Brugger 229 N.W.2d 131 Minn. 1975
    Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62
  • In RE ESTATE OF MURPHY v. State Dept. of Pub. Welfare 198 N.W.2d 570 Minn. 1972
  • In RE ESTATE OF MURPHY v. State Dept. of Pub. Welfare 198 N.W.2d 570 Minn. 1972
    See, Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65
  • Cooper v. Watson 187 N.W.2d 689 Minn. 1971
  • Cooper v. Watson 187 N.W.2d 689 Minn. 1971
    In Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 64 , 45 N. W. (2d) 822, 824 , where the effective date of L. 1949, c. 582, came under consideration, this court said: “The question arises, however, whether the 1949 amendment (L. 1949, c. 582, § 1) of § 170.55 (1945) is to be construed as retroactive in its application to accidents arising in 1943.
  • Hunt v. Nevada State Bank 172 N.W.2d 292 Minn. 1969
  • Hunt v. Nevada State Bank 172 N.W.2d 292 Minn. 1969
    Even though language in the following cases cited by defendants made no such distinction, it is demonstrable that, with one exception, the cases distinguishably involved either the construction of a “consensual” long-arm statute or a situation in which the retroactive application of a statute would substantially affect the outcome of the action on the merits: a. Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62 , 45 N. W. (2d) 822 .
  • O'DONNELL v. Continental Casualty Co. 116 N.W.2d 680 Minn. 1962
  • Beck v. Spindler 99 N.W.2d 670 Minn. 1959
  • Beck v. Spindler 99 N.W.2d 670 Minn. 1959
    Section 645.21 reads as follows: “No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legisature.” In Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62 , 45 N. W. (2d) 822 , and Ekstrom v. Harmon, 256 Minn. 166 , 98 N. W. (2d) 241 , we held that § 645.21 applies equally to procedural laws and substantive rights.
  • Ekstrom v. Harmon 98 N.W.2d 241 Minn. 1959
  • Ekstrom v. Harmon 98 N.W.2d 241 Minn. 1959
    It is unnecessary for us to determine whether the presumption established by § 602.04 involves a law of procedure or a substantive law since this *168 court in Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65 , 45 N. W. (2d) 822, 824 , after quoting the presumption against retroactive application of statutes in § 645.21, held: “* * § 645.21 applies to all laws without making any distinction between laws relating to procedure and those pertaining to substantive rights.” This case has since been followed at lea
  • Grier v. Estate of Grier 89 N.W.2d 398 Minn. 1958
  • Grier v. Estate of Grier 89 N.W.2d 398 Minn. 1958
    See, Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62 , 45 N. W. (2d) 822 .
  • Marsolek v. Miller Waste Mills 69 N.W.2d 617 Minn. 1955