DocketDrift

Real-time tracking of state judicial trends.

Outcomes

Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Schrader v. Kriesel, 45 N.W.2d 395.

93 citing documents.

  • Rudd v. Lyceum Dramatic Productions, Inc. 85 N.W.2d 61 Minn. 1957
    2 The manager of the theater estimated the distance between the extreme downspouts located at each end of the comice to be 70 feet, whereas the city building inspector testified that the lower comice was “about 50 feet wide.” 3 Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 .
  • Hanson v. Bailey 83 N.W.2d 252 Minn. 1957
  • Hanson v. Bailey 83 N.W.2d 252 Minn. 1957
    9 Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 .
  • Strong v. Shefveland 81 N.W.2d 247 Minn. 1957
  • Strong v. Shefveland 81 N.W.2d 247 Minn. 1957
    Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 .
  • Anderson v. Jennie 80 N.W.2d 41 Minn. 1956
  • Anderson v. Jennie 80 N.W.2d 41 Minn. 1956
    1 See, also, Voller v. Schmitz, 236 Minn. 155 , 52 N. W. (2d) 289 , where it was held that the new trial was granted as an exercise of discretion by the trial court, and the appeal was dismissed notwithstanding that the order granting the new trial stated that the motion was granted “exclusively for errors of law occurring at the trial and upon no other ground.” 2 Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 .
  • McDonough v. Newmans Cloak & Suit Co. 77 N.W.2d 59 Minn. 1956
  • McDonough v. Newmans Cloak & Suit Co. 77 N.W.2d 59 Minn. 1956
    In Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 243 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395, 398 , relied on by the dissent, the court stated that the evidence showed “that defendant knew of these conditions and had done nothing to change or improve them.” On this basis the Schrader case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case as no such evidence of knowledge on the part of
  • Zuber v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. 74 N.W.2d 641 Minn. 1956
  • Zuber v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. 74 N.W.2d 641 Minn. 1956
    This court in distinguishing between assumption of risk and contributory negligence held that “Assumption of risk is to be distinguished from contributory negligence in all cases save where an assumption of risk is so unreasonable that it also constitutes contributory negligence.” Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 239 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395, 396 .
  • Vosbeck v. Lerdall 72 N.W.2d 371 Minn. 1955
  • Vosbeck v. Lerdall 72 N.W.2d 371 Minn. 1955
    Swenson v. Slawik, supra; Nubbe v. Hardy Continental Hotel System, supra; Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co. 235 Minn. 20 , 49 N. W. (2d) 1 ; Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 .
  • Schneider v. the Texas Co. 69 N.W.2d 329 Minn. 1955
  • Schubitzke v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad 69 N.W.2d 104 Minn. 1955
  • Schneider v. the Texas Co. 69 N.W.2d 329 Minn. 1955
    As noted in Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 248 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395, 400 , assumption of risk may be but a phase of contributory negligence in certain cases.
  • Schubitzke v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad 69 N.W.2d 104 Minn. 1955
    2 Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 ; Lemke v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (8 Cir.) 195 F. (2d) 989; 13 Dunnell, Dig.
  • Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad 68 N.W.2d 873 Minn. 1955
  • Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad 68 N.W.2d 873 Minn. 1955
    In Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 247 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395, 400 , we said: “* * * Notice or knowledge and appreciation of the danger are indispensable to an assumption of risk.
  • Standafer v. First National Bank 68 N.W.2d 362 Minn. 1955
  • Standafer v. First National Bank 68 N.W.2d 362 Minn. 1955
    The fundamental and important distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk in its broader sense has been stated with clarity in Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 , and need not be repeated here.
  • Harris v. Campbell Cereal Co. 67 N.W.2d 824 Minn. 1954
  • Harris v. Campbell Cereal Co. 67 N.W.2d 824 Minn. 1954
    See, Johnson v. Brand Stores, Inc. 241 Minn. 388 , 63 N. W. (2d) 370 ; Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 ; Theisen v. Minnesota Power & Light Co. 200 Minn. 515 , ; Duffy v. Stratton, 169 Minn. 136 , ; Ober v. The Golden Rule, 146 Minn. 347 , .
  • Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co. 66 N.W.2d 892 Minn. 1954
  • Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co. 66 N.W.2d 892 Minn. 1954
    Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 .
  • Iverson v. Iverson 66 N.W.2d 549 Minn. 1954
  • Iverson v. Iverson 66 N.W.2d 549 Minn. 1954
    In answering the objections of the father to the amended decree we said ( 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. [2d] 385) : “Defendant also appeals from that part of the order of December 9, 1949, amending the judgment and decree so as to permit plaintiff to have the child live with her in Idaho, continuing the custody in her, and requiring defendant to pay for the support of the child as specified in the judgment an
  • Jurgensen v. Schirmer Transportation Co. 64 N.W.2d 530 Minn. 1954
  • Jurgensen v. Schirmer Transportation Co. 64 N.W.2d 530 Minn. 1954
    It is elementary that on this appeal defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence (Moore v. Kujath, 225 Minn. 107 , 29 N. W. [2d] 883, 175 A. L. R. 1007; Schra *162 der v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. [2d] 395) and that the determination of the jury must stand unless manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to defendant.
  • Mayzlik v. Lansing Elevator Co. 63 N.W.2d 380 Minn. 1954
  • Mayzlik v. Lansing Elevator Co. 63 N.W.2d 380 Minn. 1954
    Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 ; Bartley v. Fritz, 205 Minn. 192 , ; Turner v. N. P. Ry.
  • Ryan v. Griffin 62 N.W.2d 504 Minn. 1954
  • Ryan v. Griffin 62 N.W.2d 504 Minn. 1954
    5 Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 ; Landeen v. DeJung, 219 Minn. 287 , 17 N. W. (2d) 648 ; Nees v. Minneapolis St.
  • Messner v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 57 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 1953
  • Messner v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 57 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 1953
    Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co. 235 Minn. 20 , 49 N. W. (2d) 1 ; Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 ; Ober v. The Golden Rule, 146 Minn. 347 , ; Albachten v. The Golden Rule, 135 Minn. 381 , .
  • Damrow v. Zauner 53 N.W.2d 139 Minn. 1952
  • Damrow v. Zauner 53 N.W.2d 139 Minn. 1952
    2 Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 242 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395, 397 .
  • Swenson v. Slawik 53 N.W.2d 107 Minn. 1952
  • Swenson v. Slawik 53 N.W.2d 107 Minn. 1952
    Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 ; Hubenette v. Ostby, 213 Minn. 349 , 6 N. W. (2d) 637 .
  • Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co. 49 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 1951
  • Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co. 49 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 1951
    2 E. g., Ober v. The Golden Rule, 146 Minn. 347 , ; Albachten v. The Golden Rule, 135 Minn. 381 , ; Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. (2d) 395 .
  • Yeager v. Chapman 45 N.W.2d 776 Minn. 1951
  • Yeager v. Chapman 45 N.W.2d 776 Minn. 1951
    tions open, obvious, and assumed by plaintiff * * Whether we regard defendants’ allegation of assumption of risk by plaintiff as merely a phase of the defense of contributory negligence, or, as a separate and distinct defense based on an alleged intentional choice or willingness by plaintiff to encounter a condition which she appreciated and knew was fraught with danger (see, Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238 , 45 N. W. [2d] 395), the evidence here, for the same reasons which indicate that ther