Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Frankle v. Twedt, 47 N.W.2d 482.

65 citing documents.

Lauren Strahan v. Josh Boone, Prime Comms Retail, LLC, AT&T Mobility II, LLC Minn. Ct. App. 2025
Thus, Popovich has no bearing on Strahan’s claims against AT&T. 7 Strahan also argues that the district court’s order ran afoul of Frankle v. Twedt because “[e]mployment in terms of pay is not necessary to the creation of a master and servant relation.”
Peggy Adegeye v. BB Home Healthcare, Department of Employment and Economic Development Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Peggy Adegeye v. BB Home Healthcare, Department of Employment and Economic Development Minn. Ct. App. 2024
“The determinative right of control is not merely over what is to be done, but primarily over how it is to be done.” ().
Tina Marie Lund, as conservator of the Honorable Fred Karasov v. Calhoun Orange, Inc. d/b/a Orange Theory Fitness … Minn. Ct. App. 2023
Tina Marie Lund, as conservator of the Honorable Fred Karasov v. Calhoun Orange, Inc. d/b/a Orange Theory Fitness … Minn. Ct. App. 2023
“The determinative right of control is not merely over what is to be done, but primarily over how it is to be done.”
Daniel Loftus, et al v. Jeffery Manning, Department of Employment and Economic Development Minn. Ct. App. 2021
11 But the “decisive character” of the right of control “in practical application fades into a twilight of uncertainty by reason of the fundamental differences in the nature of various occupations, by the varying arrangements of the pa rties and the circumstances of each particular case, and by such variable factors as the force of custom.” Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 48
Ahmed Said v. Davin Branwall Minn. Ct. App. 2018
See Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47, (“As applied to automobiles, the difference between a mere bailment relation and that of master and servant is the distinction between a mere permissive use and a use which is subject to the control of the master and connected with his affairs.”).
John Doe 101, et al v. Matthew Feeney, et al., Walden Entertainment a/k/a Samaritan Casting, LLC, Werc Werk … Minn. Ct. App. 2017
“The determinative right of control is not merely over what is to be done, but primarily o ver how it is to be done.” Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47
RK Midway, LLC, et al v. Metropolitan Council Minn. Ct. App. 2017
RK Midway, LLC, et al v. Metropolitan Council Minn. Ct. App. 2017
“The right of control, and not necessarily the exercise of that right, is the test of the relation of [principal and agent].” Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47, 47 N.W.
Susanne M. Glasser v. Butler Liberty Law, LLC, Department of Employment and Economic Development Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Susanne M. Glasser v. Butler Liberty Law, LLC, Department of Employment and Economic Development Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“The determinative right of control is not merely over [w]hat is to be done, but primarily over [h]ow it is to be done.” Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47
Urban v. American Legion Department of Minnesota 723 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2006
Urban Ex Rel. Urban v. American Legion Post 184 695 N.W.2d 153 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Urban Ex Rel. Urban v. American Legion Post 184 695 N.W.2d 153 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47
Neve v. Austin Daily Herald 552 N.W.2d 45 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
Neve v. Austin Daily Herald 552 N.W.2d 45 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
See Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , (“The determinative right of control is not merely over what is to be done, but primarily over how it is to be done.”); see also Hammes v. Suk, 291 Minn. 233, 235 , -81 (1971) (independent contractor remains subject to control over end product).
Peterson v. Colonial Insurance of California 493 N.W.2d 152 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
Peterson v. Colonial Insurance of California 493 N.W.2d 152 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , (emphasis in original), quoted in Ossenfort, d at 676 .
Vieths v. Ripley 295 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 1980
Vieths v. Ripley 295 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 1980
Nicholas v. Hennepin Wheel Goods Co., 239 Minn. 269 , Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42 , Restatement (Second) of Agency § 250, Comment a (1957).
Ossenfort Ex Rel. Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. 254 N.W.2d 672 Minn. 1977
Ossenfort Ex Rel. Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. 254 N.W.2d 672 Minn. 1977
In Corbin v. Commissioner of Revenue, Minn., we reiterated the importance of the “control” factor, 1 citing Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , which described the kind of “control” characteristic of an employer-employee relationship as distinguished from that characteristic of independent-contractor status: “ * * * The determinative right of control is not merely over what is to be done, but primarily over how it is to be don
Corbin v. Commissioner of Revenue 240 N.W.2d 809 Minn. 1976
Corbin v. Commissioner of Revenue 240 N.W.2d 809 Minn. 1976
In Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , we elaborated that— *242 “* * * [t]he determinative right of control is not merely over what is to be done, but primarily over how it is to be done.
Burman Company v. Zahler 178 N.W.2d 234 Minn. 1970
Burman Company v. Zahler 178 N.W.2d 234 Minn. 1970
1 See, Rochester Dairy Co. v. Christgau, 217 Minn. 460 , 14 N. W. (2d) 780 ; Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482 .
Nelson v. Nelson 166 N.W.2d 70 Minn. 1969
Nelson v. Nelson 166 N.W.2d 70 Minn. 1969
In Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 50 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482, 488 , we said: “* * * As a matter of tort law, if a servant in the use of a motor vehicle combines his own business with that of the master and is not using the vehicle exclusively for his own ends, but is using it at the same time for his master’s business in the service for which he was empl
Kasner v. Gage 161 N.W.2d 40 Minn. 1968
Kasner v. Gage 161 N.W.2d 40 Minn. 1968
Co. v. Anderson, 161 Minn. 353 , ; Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482 ; Laurie v. Mueller, 248 Minn. 1 , 78 N. W. (2d) 434 ; Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, Inc. 219 Minn. 14 , 16 N. W. (2d) 906 ; Plotkin v. Northland Transp.
Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. 144 N.W.2d 540 Minn. 1966
Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. 144 N.W.2d 540 Minn. 1966
In Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 45 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482, 486 , we said: “* * * On the basis of an agency relationship, the negligence of an agent is imputed to his principal as a bar to the latter’s right of recovery, in an action which he brings against a third party, only when the *485 nature of the agency relationship is such that the principal w
Ford v. Kline Oldsmobile, Inc. 143 N.W.2d 209 Minn. 1966
Ford v. Kline Oldsmobile, Inc. 143 N.W.2d 209 Minn. 1966
See, also, Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482, 487 , where we declared that “incidental courtesy extended by a bailee to a bailor” will not destroy a bailment relationship.
Boland v. Morrill 132 N.W.2d 711 Minn. 1965
Boland v. Morrill 132 N.W.2d 711 Minn. 1965
Joseph’s Hospital, 212 Minn. 558, 561 , 4 N. W. (2d) 637, 639 , we find the statement: “* * * If the principal cannot control and direct the alleged agent, then he is not his agent.” In Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482, 487 , we said: “* * * The determinative right of control is not merely over what is to be done, but primarily over how it is to be done.
Gackstetter v. Dart Transit Co. 130 N.W.2d 326 Minn. 1964
Gackstetter v. Dart Transit Co. 130 N.W.2d 326 Minn. 1964
6 Under the law governing vicarious liability for torts, we refrain from considering analogous fact situations presenting the issue of whether employee’s injury arose “out of and in the course of employment” under the compensation act because we have previously declared that “compensation acts are sui generis and belong to a fundamentally different field of litigation.” Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 50 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482, 488 .
Simcoe v. Pope 123 N.W.2d 311 Minn. 1963
Simcoe v. Pope 123 N.W.2d 311 Minn. 1963
Co. 233 Minn. 255, 262 , 47 N. W. (2d) 475, 480 ; Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482, 487 .
Lowry v. Kneeland 117 N.W.2d 207 Minn. 1962
Lowry v. Kneeland 117 N.W.2d 207 Minn. 1962
* * * The term [servants] is synonymous with ‘employees.’ The latter may sound more euphonious than ‘servants,’ but there is no necessary distinction or any substantial difference between the two.” In Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482 , we had occasion to consider the question whether the negligence of a driver of a car was imputed to the owner of the car so as to bar his right of recovery under circumstances not too unlike those found in the instant case.
Nadeau v. Melin 110 N.W.2d 29 Minn. 1961
Nadeau v. Melin 110 N.W.2d 29 Minn. 1961
3 See, Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482 .
Conner v. Dreyer 104 N.W.2d 838 Minn. 1960
Conner v. Dreyer 104 N.W.2d 838 Minn. 1960
As stated in Frankie v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482 , 487: “* * * A servant is a person employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of such service is controlled or is subject to the right of control by the master.
Knutson v. Nielsen 99 N.W.2d 215 Minn. 1959
Knutson v. Nielsen 99 N.W.2d 215 Minn. 1959
See, also, Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42 , 47 N. W. (2d) 482 , where it has been pointed out that a master-servant relationship or a joint enterprise relationship of such a character that it would expose the owner of the car to vicarious liability must exist; also that § 170.54 of the Safety Responsibility Act does not of itself make the bailee’s negligence
Burdick v. Bongard 96 N.W.2d 868 Minn. 1959