Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Gronquist v. Olson, 64 N.W.2d 159.

68 citing documents.

Rebecca A. Niebuhr v. Jacob Sieberg, Timothy Sieberg Minn. 2026
See Release, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining release as the “[l]iberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced”); see also, –64 (Minn. 1954) (defining “release” as “a relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right, claim, or privilege, by the person in whom it exists, to the person against whom it might have been enforced” (emphasis added)); Booth, d at 702 (describing agreement bet
Marjorie Gowan v. The Estate of Robert E. Pape Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Marjorie Gowan v. The Estate of Robert E. Pape Minn. Ct. App. 2016
See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125, (“A release may, dependent upon its terms, have the effect of extinguishing a right of action, and if so, it may be pleaded as a defense to any suit on the action.”).
Guava LLC, Judgment Debtors, Paul Hansmeier v. Spencer Merkel, Qwest Communications Corporation, Judgment Creditors, John Doe 173.19.225.244 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Guava LLC, Judgment Debtors, Paul Hansmeier v. Spencer Merkel, Qwest Communications Corporation, Judgment Creditors, John Doe 173.19.225.244 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 127-28, (stating that if an injured party has accepted full satisfaction of a judgment, the law will not permit double recovery).
Stephen Ballard v. City of Duluth, Professional Golf Management, Inc. Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Stephen Ballard v. City of Duluth, Professional Golf Management, Inc. Minn. Ct. App. 2015
But in Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126, the Minnesota Supreme Court modified the bright-line rule and concluded that when an injured party receives part of the damages from one tortfeasor, but “the receipt [is] not [] understood to be in full satisfaction of the injury,” then the release does not discharge the other join
Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc. 813 N.W.2d 891 Minn. 2012
Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc. 813 N.W.2d 891 Minn. 2012
(citing Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125 , -64 (1954)).
Booth v. Gades 788 N.W.2d 701 Minn. 2010
Booth v. Gades 788 N.W.2d 701 Minn. 2010
See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125 , -64 (1954) (defining a “release” as a “relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right, claim or privilege, by the person in whom it exists, to the person against whom it might have been enforced”).
Dykes v. Sukup Manufacturing Co. 781 N.W.2d 578 Minn. 2010
Dykes v. Sukup Manufacturing Co. 781 N.W.2d 578 Minn. 2010
In Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 128 , we considered whether the release of one joint tortfeasor operated to discharge the other from liability.
Booth v. Gades 771 N.W.2d 69 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Booth v. Gades 771 N.W.2d 69 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
ed “because there can be no claim of vicarious liability....” But Booth did not fully release firefighter, so there has not been a “release of the servant.” See Thompson v. Brule, 37 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir.1994) (rejecting a similar argument where a partial release of the driver-tortfeasor was held not to release the vicarious liability of the owner of the involved vehicle); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 128-29 , -66 (1954) (holding that partial satisfaction from one joint tortfeasor does
Dykes v. Sukup Manufacturing Co. 761 N.W.2d 892 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Dykes v. Sukup Manufacturing Co. 761 N.W.2d 892 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
But in Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119 , the Minnesota Supreme Court retreated from the broad and indiscriminate application of this rule.
Kunza v. St. Mary's Regional Health Center 747 N.W.2d 586 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Kunza v. St. Mary's Regional Health Center 747 N.W.2d 586 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125 , -64 (1954) (citations omitted).
Nuessmeier Electric, Inc. v. Weiss Manufacturing Co. 632 N.W.2d 248 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Nuessmeier Electric, Inc. v. Weiss Manufacturing Co. 632 N.W.2d 248 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126 , (stating that if injured party has accepted full satisfaction for injury suffered by him, he should not be permitted to recover again for the same injury).
Smith v. American States Insurance Co. 586 N.W.2d 784 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Smith v. American States Insurance Co. 586 N.W.2d 784 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
As support for its position that a plaintiff cannot recover *787 twice for the same injury, American States cites Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126 , and Strand v. Illinois Farmers Ins.
Wall v. Fairview Hospital & Healthcare Services 584 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 1998
Wall v. Fairview Hospital & Healthcare Services 584 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 1998
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 128-29
Wall v. Fair View Hospital & Healthcare Services 568 N.W.2d 194 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Wall v. Fair View Hospital & Healthcare Services 568 N.W.2d 194 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that approach to satisfactions in Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126
Epland v. Meade Insurance Agency Associates, Inc. 545 N.W.2d 401 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
Epland v. Meade Insurance Agency Associates, Inc. 545 N.W.2d 401 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125-26 , (injured party can still pursue remaining tortfeasors, even if claims based on same acts or circumstances, where injured party released one joint tort-feasor with no intention to release others).
Liberty Mut. Ins. v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUT. 463 N.W.2d 750 Minn. 1990
Liberty Mut. Ins. v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUT. 463 N.W.2d 750 Minn. 1990
See also Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 424 , , 100 *757 (1958); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126
Johnson v. Brown 401 N.W.2d 85 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Johnson v. Brown 401 N.W.2d 85 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. *89 119, 127
Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen 392 N.W.2d 520 Minn. 1986
Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen 392 N.W.2d 520 Minn. 1986
See also Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119
Reedon of Faribault, Inc. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. 387 N.W.2d 441 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Klimek v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Agency 348 N.W.2d 103 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
Klimek v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Agency 348 N.W.2d 103 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119
Balderrama v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. 324 N.W.2d 355 Minn. 1982
Balderrama v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. 324 N.W.2d 355 Minn. 1982
Furthermore, as we stated in Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119 , “a release has been defined as a relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right, claim, or privilege, by the person in whom it exists, to the person against whom it might have been enforced.” Id.
Danelski v. King 314 N.W.2d 818 Minn. 1981
Danelski v. King 314 N.W.2d 818 Minn. 1981
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119
Frey Ex Rel. Frey v. Snelgrove 269 N.W.2d 918 Minn. 1978
Frey Ex Rel. Frey v. Snelgrove 269 N.W.2d 918 Minn. 1978
E. g., Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc. 258 N.W.2d 762 Minn. 1977
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc. 260 N.W.2d 548 Minn. 1977
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc. 260 N.W.2d 548 Minn. 1977
As we stated in Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119 , agreements of settlement, no matter what form they take, act to discharge all joint tortfeasors only if it appears to be the intention of the parties that sums paid under an agreement constitute full compensation to the plaintiff for the damages sustained; if there is only partial compensation
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc. 258 N.W.2d 762 Minn. 1977
Cf. Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119
Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries 257 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 1977
Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries 257 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 1977
We also expressed agreement with the rule previously adopted in Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126 , a case involving joint tortfeasors, where we said: “* * * The just and true rule should be, and we believe is, that, if the injured party has accepted satisfaction in full for the injury suffered by him, the law will not permit him to recover again for the same injury; but if he has n