Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Beck v. Groe, 70 N.W.2d 886.

137 citing documents.

  • Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc. 581 N.W.2d 855 Minn. 1998
    (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34 , ).
  • Ortiz v. Gavenda 574 N.W.2d 764 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
  • Ortiz v. Gavenda 574 N.W.2d 764 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
    Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34 , Cashman v. Hedberg, 215 Minn. 463, 465 , Rugland v. Anderson, 30 Minn. 386, 386 , 15 N.W.
  • Englund v. MN CA Partners/MN Joint Ventures 555 N.W.2d 328 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
  • Englund v. MN CA Partners/MN Joint Ventures 555 N.W.2d 328 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
    See Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 39 , (noting the right to sell alcohol is merely a privilege, which the legislature may revoke at will upon violation of statutory conditions); Dahl , 265 Minn, at 220, d at 324 (recognizing the legislature strictly regulates and controls alcohol industry for public welfare and safe
  • In re the Retirement Benefits of Yetka 554 N.W.2d 85 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
  • In re the Retirement Benefits of Yetka 554 N.W.2d 85 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
    See Ehlert v. Graue, 292 Minn. 393, 397 , Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 41 , 70 NW.2d 886, 895 (1955).
  • Newmech Companies v. Independent School District No. 206 540 N.W.2d 801 Minn. 1995
  • Newmech Companies v. Independent School District No. 206 540 N.W.2d 801 Minn. 1995
    Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34 , Anderson v. Burnquist, 216 Minn. 49 , cf. Muskegon Bldg.
  • Coolidge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 523 N.W.2d 5 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
  • Coolidge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 523 N.W.2d 5 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
    Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court has clearly stated that Minnesota’s Wrongful Death and Civil Damages Acts are “wholly unrelated both as to scope and purpose.” Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34
  • Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600 481 N.W.2d 98 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600 481 N.W.2d 98 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
    22, 22 (1887); see Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34
  • Schoen v. County of St. Louis 448 N.W.2d 112 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
  • Schoen v. County of St. Louis 448 N.W.2d 112 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
    12, 1988) (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 43 , ).
  • Ford v. Emerson Electric Co. 430 N.W.2d 198 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
  • Ford v. Emerson Electric Co. 430 N.W.2d 198 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
    1 (1986); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 41 , Grossman v. Aerial Farm Services, Inc., (more specific statute of limitations controlled over a more general statute of limitations).
  • Kolles v. Ross 418 N.W.2d 733 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
  • Kolles v. Ross 418 N.W.2d 733 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
    See Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34 , Minn.Stat.
  • Bouza v. Gallagher 416 N.W.2d 126 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • Bouza v. Gallagher 416 N.W.2d 126 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    See Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 43
  • Grossman v. Aerial Farm Services, Inc. 401 N.W.2d 676 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • Grossman v. Aerial Farm Services, Inc. 401 N.W.2d 676 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28 , states the canon of statutory construction: [T]hat specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling is well settled.
  • Herrly v. Muzik 374 N.W.2d 275 Minn. 1985
  • Herrly v. Muzik 374 N.W.2d 275 Minn. 1985
    However, as we observed in Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34 , such liberal construction is not without limitation: “Since a civil damage law is one highly penal in its nature introducing a remedy unknown to the common law, it is to be strictly construed in the sense that it cannot be enlarged beyond its definite scope_” (Emphasis added).
  • Tiedeken v. Tiedeken 363 N.W.2d 909 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • Tiedeken v. Tiedeken 363 N.W.2d 909 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
    Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28 , Berghuis v. Korthuis, 228 Minn. 534
  • Knese v. Heidgerken 358 N.W.2d 177 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • Knese v. Heidgerken 358 N.W.2d 177 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    Because the Civil Damages Act is remedial, where its language is clear it must be liberally construed “so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy,” Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34
  • McGuire v. C & L RESTAURANT INC. 346 N.W.2d 605 Minn. 1984
  • McGuire v. C & L RESTAURANT INC. 346 N.W.2d 605 Minn. 1984
    See Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 419 , Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 33-34
  • Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc. 340 N.W.2d 338 Minn. 1983
  • Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc. 340 N.W.2d 338 Minn. 1983
    Kvanli v. Village of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 485, Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 35
  • Wegan v. Village of Lexington 309 N.W.2d 273 Minn. 1981
  • Wegan v. Village of Lexington 309 N.W.2d 273 Minn. 1981
    *279 Because of the definitional change in the 1933 State Beer Act, we noted in Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28 , that the legislature did not intend 3.2 beer to be an intoxicant within the meaning of the Minnesota Dram Shop Act.
  • Ewers v. Thunderbird Aviation, Inc. 289 N.W.2d 94 Minn. 1979
  • Robinson v. Lamott 289 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1979
  • Robinson v. Lamott 289 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1979
    See, e. g., Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414 , Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28 , Swor-ski, supra.
  • Fitzer v. Bloom 253 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 1977
  • Fitzer v. Bloom 253 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 1977
    This court resolved the issue against the parents and held the respective measures of damages under the two acts were not coextensive, stating: “The distinctions between damages recoverable under the Civil Damage Act and the death-by-wrongful-act statute are discussed in Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34 , , 52 A.L.R.2d 875, 883 , where we pointed out: *400 “ ‘By the wrongful death act the surviving spouse and next of kin are given rights within the limits of the statute to recover damages measured
  • Spitzack v. Schumacher 241 N.W.2d 641 Minn. 1976
  • Minn. State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd 241 N.W.2d 624 Minn. 1976
  • Minn. State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd 241 N.W.2d 624 Minn. 1976
    As we said in Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 40 , : “The legislature is in the first instance the judge of what is *33 necessary for the public welfare.
  • Trail v. Christian 213 N.W.2d 618 Minn. 1973
  • Trail v. Christian 213 N.W.2d 618 Minn. 1973
    6 Defendant, in his argument before the trial court and this court, insists that this jurisdiction has steadfastly adhered to the common-law rule of nonliability and cites Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414 , and Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28 , in support of his contention.
  • State v. Kalvig 209 N.W.2d 678 Minn. 1973
  • State v. Kalvig 209 N.W.2d 678 Minn. 1973
    In Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 41 , our court spoke to the question of conflicts between general legislation and specific provisions, stating: “* * * [T]he rule that the provisions of a complete and specific act in and of itself controls a prior and general provision is applicable.
  • State v. Edwards 177 N.W.2d 40 Minn. 1970
  • State v. Edwards 177 N.W.2d 40 Minn. 1970
    The policy of this court in connection with the legislature’s authority to enact police measures has been well expressed by Mr. Justice Nelson in Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 40 , 70 N. W. (2d) 886 , 895: “The legislature is in the first instance the judge of what is necessary for the public welfare.
  • Trail v. Village of Elk River 175 N.W.2d 916 Minn. 1970