Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 103 N.W.2d 131.

48 citing documents.

Susan Neegard, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
5, 2003); (“It is elementary that ‘nuisance’ denotes the wrongful invasion or infringement of a legal right or interest and comprehends not only such invasion of property but of personal rights and privileges and includes intentional harms and harms caused by negligence, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.
Glacier Park Iron Ore Properties, LLC, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
It is true that “there must be some kind of conduct causing the nuisance harm which is ‘wrongful.’” Highview, d at 70 (quoting Randall v. Village of Excelsior , ).
Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC 922 N.W.2d 185 Minn. 2019
Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC 922 N.W.2d 185 Minn. 2019
of Excelsior , 258 Minn. 81 , , 134 (1960).
Randall Norman v. Crow Wing Cooperative Power & Light Company Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Explained Randall Norman v. Crow Wing Cooperative Power & Light Company Minn. Ct. App. 2016
In support of its position, and Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 86
Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc. 749 N.W.2d 367 Minn. 2008
Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc. 749 N.W.2d 367 Minn. 2008
We have said that the general purpose of the Dram Shop Act is “‘to punish an offending vendor and deter others from making illegal sales of liquor, and to compensate those who would under ordinary circumstances or other tort principles obtain no recovery for their injuries.’” (quoting Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 84 , ).
Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc. 662 N.W.2d 546 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc. 662 N.W.2d 546 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
of Excelsior, , 258 Minn. 81, 85 (1960)).
Sather v. Woodland Liquors, Inc. 597 N.W.2d 295 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Sather v. Woodland Liquors, Inc. 597 N.W.2d 295 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
The general purpose of the Dramshop Act, is “to punish an offending vendor and deter others from making illegal sales of liquor, [and] it also serves to compensate those who would under ordinary circumstances or other tort principles obtain no recovery for their injuries.” (quoting Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 84 , ).
Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc. 581 N.W.2d 855 Minn. 1998
Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc. 581 N.W.2d 855 Minn. 1998
Co. v. Williams, 265 Minn. 333, 337 , (tortfeasor’s insurance company does not qualify as "other person" due to application of subrogation principle); Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83-84 , (voluntarily intoxicated minor is not “other person” under the Act).
Line Construction Benefit Fund (Lineco) v. Skeates 563 N.W.2d 757 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Line Construction Benefit Fund (Lineco) v. Skeates 563 N.W.2d 757 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
at 337 , d at 583 ; see also Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83 , (holding that the Act does not create cause of action in favor of one injured by his or her own intoxication).
Englund v. MN CA Partners/MN Joint Ventures 555 N.W.2d 328 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Englund v. MN CA Partners/MN Joint Ventures 555 N.W.2d 328 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
1 (1994); (quoting Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83 , ).
State Ex Rel. Woyke v. Tonka Corp. 420 N.W.2d 624 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State Ex Rel. Woyke v. Tonka Corp. 420 N.W.2d 624 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 86
Herrly v. Muzik 374 N.W.2d 275 Minn. 1985
Herrly v. Muzik 374 N.W.2d 275 Minn. 1985
Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83
Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc. 340 N.W.2d 338 Minn. 1983
Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc. 340 N.W.2d 338 Minn. 1983
See also, Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81
Hannah v. Chmielewski, Inc. 323 N.W.2d 781 Minn. 1982
Hannah v. Chmielewski, Inc. 323 N.W.2d 781 Minn. 1982
We have emphasized that “[i]t is the fact [of the intoxicated person’s] voluntary intoxication which bars recovery.” Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 84
Highview North Apartments v. County of Ramsey 323 N.W.2d 65 Minn. 1982
Highview North Apartments v. County of Ramsey 323 N.W.2d 65 Minn. 1982
Yet there must be some kind of conduct causing the nuisance harm which is “wrongful.” See Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , *71 85
Jones v. Fisher 309 N.W.2d 726 Minn. 1981
Jones v. Fisher 309 N.W.2d 726 Minn. 1981
Although one who voluntarily becomes intoxicated cannot recover for his own injury under the Dram Shop Act, see, e. g., Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83 , a spouse may recover for loss of support under that act notwithstanding the injured party’s or decedent’s voluntary intoxication.
Robinson v. Lamott 289 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1979
Robinson v. Lamott 289 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1979
Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360 , Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. 552
Martinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors 209 N.W.2d 902 Minn. 1973
Martinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors 209 N.W.2d 902 Minn. 1973
Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322
Heveron v. Village of Belgrade 181 N.W.2d 692 Minn. 1970
Heveron v. Village of Belgrade 181 N.W.2d 692 Minn. 1970
Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474 , ; Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322 , 37 N. W. (2d) 368 ; Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , 103 N. W. (2d) 131 .
Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corporation 166 N.W.2d 95 Minn. 1969
Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corporation 166 N.W.2d 95 Minn. 1969
In Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83 , 103 N. W. (2d) 131, 133 , we held a minor who is a member of a group which sends a representative to a liquor store to purchase liquor could not recover for injuries sustained as a result of his own intoxication in consuming part of the liquor.
Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc. 159 N.W.2d 903 Minn. 1968
Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc. 159 N.W.2d 903 Minn. 1968
2 Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474 , ; Mayes v. Byers, 214 Minn. 54 , 7 N. W. (2d) 403 , 144 A. L. R. 821; Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322 , 37 N. W. (2d) 368 ; Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , 103 N. W. (2d) 131 .
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Village of Hewitt 143 N.W.2d 230 Minn. 1966
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Village of Hewitt 143 N.W.2d 230 Minn. 1966
In that decision we relied on Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , 103 N. W. (2d) 131 , where we held that an intoxicated automobile driver could not recover against the seller of liquor to minors for injuries to himself for the reason that ( 258 Minn. 83 , 103 N. W. [2d] 133) “[t]he Civil Damage Act does not create a cause of action in favor of one injured by his own intoxication.
Empire Fire & Marine Insurance v. Williams 121 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1963
Empire Fire & Marine Insurance v. Williams 121 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1963
In the case of Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , , the Minnesota Supreme Court said: “ ‘The Civil Damage Act does not create a cause of action in favor of one injured by his own intoxication.
Dahl v. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL BANK MINNEAPOLIS 121 N.W.2d 321 Minn. 1963
Dahl v. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL BANK MINNEAPOLIS 121 N.W.2d 321 Minn. 1963
See, Murphy v. Hennen, 264 Minn. 457 , 119 N. W. (2d) 489 ; Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , 103 N. W. (2d) 131 ; Ritter v. Village of Appleton, 254 Minn. 30 , 93 N. W. (2d) 683 ; Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, supra; Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc. 249 Minn. 376 , 82 N. W. (2d) 365 ; Adamson v. Dougherty, supra; Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414 , 72 N. W. (2d) 609 ; Hahn v. City of Ortonville
Scott v. Village of Olivia 110 N.W.2d 21 Minn. 1961
Scott v. Village of Olivia 110 N.W.2d 21 Minn. 1961
ular bit of ice had remained on the sidewalk before it threw the plaintiff; it was sufficient to show the conditions, arid the city’s knowledge of them, which in freezing weather, would make the condition of the sidewalk dangerous to a pedestrian lawfully using it; the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on that point.” That court also observed, as we did in Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81 , 103 N. W. (2d) 131 , that nuisance may presuppose negligence and does so when the omi