Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 96 N.W.2d 195.

41 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
R.R., (holding that error in the district court’s instruction defining proximate cause is one of fundamental law or controlling principle and could be raised for first time in motion for new trial).
RKL Landholdings, LLC v. Seneca Specialty Insurance Company, 1563 University Ave, LLC Minn. Ct. App. 2015
RKL Landholdings, LLC v. Seneca Specialty Insurance Company, 1563 University Ave, LLC Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Co., 255 Minn. 201, 207, (concluding that the district court’s failure to define commonly understood words was not a fundamental error requiring 10 reversal).
H Window Co. v. Cascade Wood Products, Inc. 596 N.W.2d 271 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
H Window Co. v. Cascade Wood Products, Inc. 596 N.W.2d 271 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co. 454 N.W.2d 905 Minn. 1990
Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co. 454 N.W.2d 905 Minn. 1990
R.R., 255 Minn. 201 , between an incorrect instruction, and an omitted instruction, whereby only an incorrect instruction is deemed a “fundamental error” for purposes of Rule 51.
State v. Murphy 380 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 1986
State v. Murphy 380 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 1986
Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 255 Minn. 201, 204-05
Hedlund v. Hedlund 371 N.W.2d 232 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Hedlund v. Hedlund 371 N.W.2d 232 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Co., 255 Minn. 201, 208 , ).
Maanum v. Aust 364 N.W.2d 827 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Maanum v. Aust 364 N.W.2d 827 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Hafner v. Iverson 343 N.W.2d 634 Minn. 1984
Hafner v. Iverson 343 N.W.2d 634 Minn. 1984
Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 255 Minn. 201, 208
Rieger v. Zackoski 321 N.W.2d 16 Minn. 1982
Distinguished Rieger v. Zackoski 321 N.W.2d 16 Minn. 1982
See, e.g., Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 255 Minn. 201 , Sims v. Hallett Construction Co., 247 Minn. 339
Sandhofer v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital 283 N.W.2d 362 Minn. 1979
Sandhofer v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital 283 N.W.2d 362 Minn. 1979
Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R, Co., 255 Minn. 201, 208
American Reliable Insurance v. Modern Homes, Inc. 247 N.W.2d 39 Minn. 1976
American Reliable Insurance v. Modern Homes, Inc. 247 N.W.2d 39 Minn. 1976
In Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201 , we ruled that an erroneous definition of proximate cause as the “dominant” cause constituted an “error of fundamental law” subject to objection in a new trial motion even though it was not otherwise called to the attention of the court.
Hilligoss v. Cross Companies 228 N.W.2d 585 Minn. 1975
Hilligoss v. Cross Companies 228 N.W.2d 585 Minn. 1975
Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201
Bastianson v. Forschen 196 N.W.2d 451 Minn. 1972
Bastianson v. Forschen 196 N.W.2d 451 Minn. 1972
As we said in Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201, 208 , : “* * * Only when there might be a reasonable difference of opinion regarding the foreseeability of the intervening act should the question of intervening cause be submitted to the jury.” See, also, Larson v. Montpetit, supra.
Meurer v. Junkermeier 191 N.W.2d 416 Minn. 1971
Meurer v. Junkermeier 191 N.W.2d 416 Minn. 1971
4 See, Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201
Roberts v. Donaldson 149 N.W.2d 401 Minn. 1967
Roberts v. Donaldson 149 N.W.2d 401 Minn. 1967
ssary: “* * (i) Its harmful effects must have occurred after the original negligence; (2) it must not have been brought about by the original negligence; (3) it must actively work to bring about a result which would not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and (4) it must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.” In Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201, 208 , 96 N. W. (2d) 195,201 , this court said: “* * * Only when there might be a reas
Larson v. Montpetit 147 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1966
Larson v. Montpetit 147 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1966
Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201 , 96 N. W. (2d) 195 .
Staloch v. Belsaas 136 N.W.2d 92 Minn. 1965
Staloch v. Belsaas 136 N.W.2d 92 Minn. 1965
In their motion for a new trial, defendants Belsaas contend that the foregoing instructions were erroneous and since they concern a fundamental question of law, this question is properly before us. See, Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201 , 96 N. W. (2d) 195 .
Kroeger v. Lee 132 N.W.2d 727 Minn. 1965
Kroeger v. Lee 132 N.W.2d 727 Minn. 1965
In Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201 , 96 N. W. (2d) 195 , the foreseeability, from the standpoint of an employer who directed his employee to work on a ladder erected on a bridge used for vehicular traffic, of the negligence of a driver in running into the ladder was considered to be a question for the jury.
Wallinga v. Johnson 131 N.W.2d 216 Minn. 1964
Wallinga v. Johnson 131 N.W.2d 216 Minn. 1964
9 Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201, 208 , 96 N. W. (2d) 195, 201 .
Pluwak v. Lindberg 130 N.W.2d 134 Minn. 1964
Pluwak v. Lindberg 130 N.W.2d 134 Minn. 1964
With respect to intervening cause, we said in Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201, 208 , 96 N. W. (2d) 195 , 201: “* * * intervening cause is a proximate cause concept with the result that if plaintiff’s actions constitute the sole cause (i. e., intervening) , defendant’s negligence can of course not be a proximate cause of the injury.
Wozniak v. Luta 103 N.W.2d 870 Minn. 1960
Wozniak v. Luta 103 N.W.2d 870 Minn. 1960
In Strobel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 255 Minn. 201, 205 , 96 N. W. (2d) 195, 199 , this court said: “The instruction that a proximate cause is the dominant cause was clearly erroneous since a cause is dominant only if it excludes and overshadows all other causes.” While the reference in the instruction as to predominating cause was erroneous, it is not reversible in t