Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite Grapentin v. Harvey, 114 N.W.2d 578.
- Gunderson v. Olson 399 N.W.2d 166 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
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Gunderson v. Olson
399 N.W.2d 166
Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222, 226
- State v. Schaffer 378 N.W.2d 115 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
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State v. Schaffer
378 N.W.2d 115
Minn. Ct. App. 1985
See, e.g., LeMieux v. Bishop, 296 Minn. 372 , Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222
- Sandhofer v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital 283 N.W.2d 362 Minn. 1979
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Sandhofer v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital
283 N.W.2d 362
Minn. 1979
Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222
- State v. Dewey 272 N.W.2d 355 Minn. 1978
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State v. Dewey
272 N.W.2d 355
Minn. 1978
See, e. g., LeMieux v. Bishop, 296 Minn. 372 , Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222
- Bohach v. Thompson 239 N.W.2d 764 Minn. 1976
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Bohach v. Thompson
239 N.W.2d 764
Minn. 1976
In Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222, 224 , the expert witness assumed in his calculation of speed that the highway in question was a “regular concrete highway.” After discussing the significance of an expert’s actual knowledge of the condition of a highway, we concluded ( 262 Minn. 227 , ): *337 “* * * With
- State v. Tereau 229 N.W.2d 27 Minn. 1975
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State v. Tereau
229 N.W.2d 27
Minn. 1975
See, State v. Tinklenberg, 292 Minn. 271 , Sanchez v. Waldrup, 271 Minn. 419 , Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222
- Lemieux v. Bishop 209 N.W.2d 379 Minn. 1973
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Lemieux v. Bishop
209 N.W.2d 379
Minn. 1973
Accordingly, we have consistently held that, although opinion testimony of eyewitnesses is preferred, where such testimony is nonexistent or of little aid to the jury in resolving the issue, a “witness qualified as an expert may give his opinion, based upon the length of skid marks, as to the speed of a motor vehicle involved in an acci *378 dent.” Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222, 226
- State v. Tinklenberg 194 N.W.2d 590 Minn. 1972
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State v. Tinklenberg
194 N.W.2d 590
Minn. 1972
Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222 , and Sanchez v. Waldrup, 271 Minn. 419 , cited by defendant, are not applicable here since in the present case there was sufficient evidence from which the coefficient of friction could be determined.
- Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Company 188 N.W.2d 426 Minn. 1971
- Christy v. Saliterman 179 N.W.2d 288 Minn. 1970
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Christy v. Saliterman
179 N.W.2d 288
Minn. 1970
(3 ed.) § 3337; Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222 , 114 N. W. (2d) 578 .
- Thole v. Noorlun 177 N.W.2d 295 Minn. 1970
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Thole v. Noorlun
177 N.W.2d 295
Minn. 1970
Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222 , 114 N. W. (2d) 578 .
- Stibbs v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 152 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 1967
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Stibbs v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
152 N.W.2d 318
Minn. 1967
There is no evidence that the solvents used could have influenced the coronary disease.” While we have held that an expert’s opinion must rest on facts in evidence or inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom, and that if material factual premises are invalid the conclusion must fall, Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222 , 114 N. W. (2d) 578 , the opposite is also *252 trae; and when there is a factual basis for the inference, the conclusions drawn by the finder of fact must stand.
- Sanchez v. Waldrup 136 N.W.2d 61 Minn. 1965
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Sanchez v. Waldrup
136 N.W.2d 61
Minn. 1965
The case is not unlike Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222 , 114 N. W. (2d) 578 .