Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Kremer, 114 N.W.2d 88.

25 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Galen Dale Littlewind Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Galen Dale Littlewind Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191
State of Minnesota v. Tiffaney Diane Hill Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Tiffaney Diane Hill Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(explaining that “regardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act”) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 192, 114 (explaining that no conviction could stand where the trier of fact found that the defendant “was unable to stop because the brakes on his car failed to operate; that he had experienced no prior brake trouble; and that he had no knowle
State v. Fleck 810 N.W.2d 303 Minn. 2012
State v. Fleck 810 N.W.2d 303 Minn. 2012
However, regardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, “a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act.” McCarr & Nordby, supra, § 44.5; see also State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 192 , (explaining that no conviction could stand where the trier of fact found that the defendant “was unable to stop because the brakes on his car failed to operate; that he had experienced no prior brake trouble; and that he had no knowledge that
State v. Al-Naseer 678 N.W.2d 679 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State v. Al-Naseer 678 N.W.2d 679 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
See also State v. Boldra, 292 Minn. 491, 492 , (finding gross negligence where defendant drove through stop, sign); State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 192 , (“[w]hen the driver intends to proceed forward, or is negligent in any way, he can be held liable for his acts.”); (finding gross negligence was shown -by a “sufficient degree of inattention to the road”)” revieiu denied (Minn. Apr.
State v. Loge 608 N.W.2d 152 Minn. 2000
State v. Loge 608 N.W.2d 152 Minn. 2000
Though the dissent acknowledges the authority of the legislature to create criminal statutes without regard to intent or knowledge, it cites to the rule 6 enunciated in Kremer as a limitation: “it is not essential that the wrongdoer should intend to commit the crime to which his act amounts, but it is essential that he should intend to do the act which constitutes the crime.” State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191 , (citations omitted).
State v. Russell 477 N.W.2d 886 Minn. 1991
State v. Miller 395 N.W.2d 431 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
State v. Miller 395 N.W.2d 431 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
In State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191 , the court recognized the power of the legislature to impose absolute liability, making the commission of an act criminal without regard to the intent of the doer to violate the law.
State v. Bjornson 378 N.W.2d 4 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
State v. Bjornson 378 N.W.2d 4 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
for rev. denied, (Minn. July 24, 1984) (quoting State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191 , ).
State v. Duemke 352 N.W.2d 427 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
State v. Duemke 352 N.W.2d 427 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
See State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190
State v. Suter 346 N.W.2d 372 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
State v. Suter 346 N.W.2d 372 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
Substantial case law supports the principle that “the legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal without regard to the intention, knowledge or motive of the doer.” State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191 , State v. O’Heron, 250 Minn. 83, 85
City of Minneapolis v. Altimus 238 N.W.2d 851 Minn. 1976
City of Minneapolis v. Altimus 238 N.W.2d 851 Minn. 1976
State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190
State v. Reps 223 N.W.2d 780 Minn. 1974
State v. Reps 223 N.W.2d 780 Minn. 1974
See, State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190
State v. Fearon 166 N.W.2d 720 Minn. 1969
State v. Fearon 166 N.W.2d 720 Minn. 1969
State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190 , 114 N. W. (2d) 88 ; State v. Quackenbush, 98 Minn. 515 , .