Cited by

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218 , for the proposition that primary coverage is to be determined in light of the total policy insuring intent, as determined by the primary policy risks upon which each policy’s premiums were based and as determined by the primary function of each policy.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 231 , but cf. Illinois Farmers Ins.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 231 , we stated that the better approach is to allocate respective policy coverages in light of the total policy insuring intent, as determined by the primary policy risks upon which each policy’s premiums were based and as determined by the primary function of each policy.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 229-30 , compare Integrity Mutual, 307 Minn. at 175 , d at 446-47 (three-step analysis applied to allocate liability in case involving private passenger vehicles, rather than commercial vehicles).

See Federal Insurance Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 229-30 , -37 (1967).

The Minnesota Supreme Court set forth the criteria for determining which policy is closest to the risk in Federal Insurance Company v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 229

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 231-32 , (insurer of accident-involved vehicle was the primary insurer and the insurer of the driver was an excess insurer).

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218 , that the respective policy coverages should be allocated “in light of the total policy insuring intent, as determined by the primary policy risks upon which each policy’s premiums were based and as determined by the primary function of each policy.” 307 Minn. at 175 , d at 446 .

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 231 , we stated that the better approach is to allocate respective policy coverages in light of the total policy insuring intent, as determined by the primary policy risks upon which each policy’s premiums were based and as determined by the primary function of each policy.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218

The Universal policy language is substantially different from that involved in Federal Insurance Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218 , where we held that the phrase “any other person or organization to whom the named insured furnishes automobiles for their regular use” was sufficiently ambiguous to include garage customers, under the well-established rule that insurance contracts are to be construed against the insurer.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 231 , we stated that the better approach is to allocate respective policy coverages in light of the total policy insuring intent, as determined by the primary policy risks upon which each policy's premiums were based and as determined by the primary function of each policy.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 231 , we stated that the better approach is to allocate respective policy coverages in light of the total policy insuring intent, as determined by the primary policy risks upon which each policy’s premiums were based and as determined by the primary function of each policy.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218 , 153 N. W. (2d) 429 , should not be given retroactive effect.

Co v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 228 , 153 N. W. (2d) 429 , 435: “* * * jn absence of an accepted lexicon of insurance words and phrases, one insurance company cannot anticipate that all other insurance companies will intend that a given word or phrase should mean practically the same thing always and under precisely the same circumstances.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218 , 153 N. W. (2d) 429 , is not authority for invalidating the clause under the circumstances of the instant case since Prestemon dealt with two insurance policies which were mutually repugnant to each other— one policy containing an “excess insurance” clause and the other policy containing a “no liability” clause.

Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218 , 153 N. W. (2d) 429 .