Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 159 N.W.2d 903.
- Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC 900 N.W.2d 162 Minn. 2017
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Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC
900 N.W.2d 162
Minn. 2017
Both cases arose in the context of the Civil Damages Act, and addressed the judicially created complicity bar to recovery under that Act, See Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438 , (holding that the plaintiff’s complicity in purchasing alcohol for the driver who injured him barred his recovery under the Act).
- K.R. v. Sanford 605 N.W.2d 387 Minn. 2000
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K.R. v. Sanford
605 N.W.2d 387
Minn. 2000
280 Minn. 438, 442 , see also Martinson v. Monticello Mun.
- K.R. v. Sanford 588 N.W.2d 545 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
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K.R. v. Sanford
588 N.W.2d 545
Minn. Ct. App. 1999
complicity barred recovery where plaintiff furnished drinks to person he knew or should have known was intoxicated); Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 400-01 , (holding that plaintiffs could not recover under CDA where they actively participated in furnishing liquor to minor without knowing or making inquiry as to his age); Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 441-42 , -06 (1968) (holding that injured party who purchased alcohol for minor tortfeasor could not recover und
- Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc. 581 N.W.2d 855 Minn. 1998
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Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc.
581 N.W.2d 855
Minn. 1998
-55 (Minn. 1980) (on-duty police officer does not qualify as "other person” due to application of Fireman's rule); Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438 , -06 (1968) (injured party who purchased alcohol for the tortfeasor minor is not "other person” under the Act); Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
- Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600 481 N.W.2d 98 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
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Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600
481 N.W.2d 98
Minn. Ct. App. 1992
The court, however, has repeatedly stated the Act is intended solely to protect “innocent third persons.” See, e.g., Herrly, d at 278 (quoting Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, 280 Minn. 438, 442 , ).
- Spragg v. Shuster 398 N.W.2d 683 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
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Spragg v. Shuster
398 N.W.2d 683
Minn. Ct. App. 1987
The trial court found that appellant was barred from recovery under the doctrine of complicity under Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, 280 Minn. 438 , rehearing denied (Minn. Oct.
- Herrly v. Muzik 374 N.W.2d 275 Minn. 1985
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Herrly v. Muzik
374 N.W.2d 275
Minn. 1985
Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, 280 Minn. 438
- Herrly v. Muzik 355 N.W.2d 452 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
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Herrly v. Muzik
355 N.W.2d 452
Minn. Ct. App. 1984
eeping with that purpose, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted an older, pre-comparative fault version of the statute to bar recovery by one who “voluntarily and affirmatively participate^] in inducing the intoxication of a person 4 * Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 401 , see Martinson, 297 Minn. 48 , ; Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438 , see also Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corp., 283 Minn. 1 , (passive participation does not bar recovery).
- Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc. 340 N.W.2d 338 Minn. 1983
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Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc.
340 N.W.2d 338
Minn. 1983
But, see Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395 , (complicity a defense even though plaintiff ignorant of companion’s minority); Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438 , (complicity a defense).
- Robinson v. Lamott 289 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1979
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Robinson v. Lamott
289 N.W.2d 60
Minn. 1979
The decision in Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438 , however, appears to question the correctness of the Mayes holding.
- Martinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors 209 N.W.2d 902 Minn. 1973
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Martinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors
209 N.W.2d 902
Minn. 1973
Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc. 280 Minn. 438
- Heveron v. Village of Belgrade 181 N.W.2d 692 Minn. 1970
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Heveron v. Village of Belgrade
181 N.W.2d 692
Minn. 1970
Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc. 280 Minn. 438 , 159 N. W. (2d) 903 .
- Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corporation 166 N.W.2d 95 Minn. 1969
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Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corporation
166 N.W.2d 95
Minn. 1969
* * * ij: ^4 }]; s}c % “* * * jjad the legislature intended to give a person whose voluntary intoxication is the proximate cause of his injury a remedy unknown to the common law, it may be expected that it would have clearly done so.” In our most recent decision, Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc. 280 Minn. 438 , 159 N. W. (2d) 903 , we held that where an adult who takes a minor to a liquor store and purchases liquor for him is later injured in an automobile accident when the minor is driving, he