Cited by

281 Minn. 431, 435-36 , (citing Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649 , 165 A.2d 335, 338 (1960)), overruled in part on other grounds by Anderson, d at 601 .

(stating that the supreme court “has the power to recognize and abolish common law doctrines.”); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 433 , (stating “[t]he court may modify the common law, adopting such of its principles as are applicable and rejecting such others as are inapplicable.”) ().

See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442

1 In Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , this court abrogated the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity subject to the following two exceptions: “(1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental

Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366 , Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419

Inasmuch as interspousal immunity and parent-child immunity, once an absolute defense to tort liability, have been abolished in Minnesota, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366 , Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , it is apparent that if the appellant vendor is liable to these plaintiffs, so also is the respondent husband/father whom the plaintiffs allege was intoxicated.

However, in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , this court restricted the scope of parental immunity to actions for wrongful negligent conduct “(1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; [or] (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretio

See Silesky v. Kélman, 281 Minn. 431, 434

These two appeals raise similar issues regarding the exceptions to the abrogation of parental immunity as adopted by this court in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431

ted the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, with two exceptions: “ * * * (1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care * * * Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442 , see, Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419

Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431

13 Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , dealt only with the abrogation of a defense, and thus is not relevant unless plaintiffs can first show their interest is protected against their mother.

Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431

trial court erred in denying plaintiff-father’s motion for dismissal of the cross-claim, because the doctrine of parent-child immunity, although partially abrogated, still applies where, as here, “the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.” Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442

The appeal in Eicher had beén pending before the Supreme Court contemporaneously with Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , and would most likely have been consolidated and argued together with Silesky had not the hearing of Eicher been delayed on the representation that the parties had agreed that they would be controlled by the ruling in Silesky.

There is no question but that the injury sustained by the *95 child was as a result of an electrical burn from the electrical cord setup.” This court abrogated the general rule of parental immunity for negligent tort actions in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431

It is true that after announcing a like prospective abrogation of parent-child tort immunity in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , 161 N. W. (2d) 631 , we refused to permit the defense of immunity to be interposed in Eicher v. Jones, 285 Minn. 409 , 173 N. W. (2d) 427 , although.the cause of action therein arose prior to the date of the Silesky decision.

The injustice of imposing liability on defendants who have relied on family immunity without notice of a contemplated departure from it is thus avoided.” Other aspects of intrafamily immunity were prospectively overruled in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 443 , 161 N. W. (2d) 631, 638 (parental immunity from suit by a child arising out of á tort action) and Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 , 173 N. W. (2d) 416, 420 (interspousal immunity), in each of which decisions — and based upon the

The sole issue involved is whether an exception should be made to the rule, stated in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , 161 N. W. (2d) 631 , that child-parent tort immunity is abrogated only as to causes of action arising on or after September 27, 1968, and as to that case.

*411 A discussion of Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , 161 N. W. (2d) 631 , is crucial to the disposition of the instant case.

The comprehensive opinion of Mr. Justice Otis, writing for the majority ( 273 Minn. 433 , 142 N. W. [2d] 75), disavowed “intimating the abrogation of tort immunity in actions by a child against a parent or between husband and wife” and acknowledged that “ [t] hese are relationships which may well involve different and distinguishable policy considerations.” 3 Nevertheless, Silesky v. Kelman, *368 281 Minn. 431 , 161 N. W. (2d) 631 , decided September 27, 1968, likewise abrogated parental immunit

In Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , 161 N. W. (2d) 631 , we abandoned the rule that a parent is immune from suit by a child arising out of a tort action, stating certain exceptions; and in Thill v. Modern Erecting Co. 284 Minn. 508 , 170 N. W. (2d) 865 , we adopted the rule that a wife is entitled to recover for loss of consortium.