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Courts should consider “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” Bakken, d at 271 ().

Rather, each robbery included a separate victim and motive unrelated to Radel’s controlled-substance possession resulting in “a divisible series of incidents rather than a single behavioral incident.” (concluding that the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, simple robbery, simple assault as to one defendant, and aggravated assault as to the other defendant were not a single behavioral incident and therefore was not the same course of conduct).3 We agree with the district court’s determination t

The question is “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” Barthman, d at 267 ().

Regarding single criminal objective, we consider “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” ().

Conduct is motivated by a single criminal objective if the “acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” Barthman, d at 267 ().

See, e.g., Degroot, -66 (affirming that a 45-minute break be tween communications is a sufficient 5 difference in time to suppo rt multiple convictions); (holding that two criminal acts occurring five hours apart were not part of single behavioral incident); State v. Schevchuk , (holding that several crimes were not part of single behavi oral incident when offenses occurred over a period of two and one-half hours).

d 719, 720 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that two incidents of sexual contact with the victim five hours apart were not part of single behavioral incident); State v. Schevchuk , d 772, 776 (Minn. 1968) (holding that several crimes wer e not part of single behavioral incident when offenses occurred at clearly separate times over a period of two and one-half hours); Bookwalter, d at 297 ( determining that sexual assault and attempted murder that took place in single evening nevertheless o

B. Single criminal objective Next we must address “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” Barthman, d at 26 7 (quoting State v. Krampotich , ).

19 hours); State v. Krampotich , (holding that several crimes were separate offenses and not part of a single behavioral incident even though both offenses were committed against the same victim, occurred in or by the same automo bile, and spanned 2.5 hours).

Instead, we ask “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.”

Stangvik v. Tahash , 281 Minn. 353 , , 672 (1968) ; see also State v. Prudhomme , 303 Minn. 376 , , 245 (1975) (explaining that "a different application of [ section 609.035 ] is appropriate where there are multiple victims"); State v. Krampotich , 282 Minn. 182 , , 776 n.7 (1968) (explaining that section 609.035 does "not apply where the conduct constituted separate crimes intentionally committed against more than one individual").

Whether there was a single criminal objective depends on “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” 2 “For example, when arson is the means by which the defendant commits a murder, the defendant may not be sentenced both for the murder and for the arson, because the time and place of the o ffenses coincide and because the defendant is motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal ob

See Bookwalter, d at 295 (holding that sexual assault and attempted murder were not part of a single behavioral incident where they occurred in or near the victim’s vehicle at two distinct times and places, and that a single common criminal objective failed to underlie both offenses); see also Stevenson, d at 720; State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182, 187-88, (holding that several crimes were not part of a single behavioral incident where, although all the crimes 5 occurred during the same evening

We consider “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182, 186-87

We must determine if “all of the acts performed were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that crime.” State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182, 186-87

282 Minn. 182, 184-86, -76 (1968).

282 Minn. 182 , 187, , 776 (1968).

State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182, 186-87 , see also Bookwalter, d at 295-96 (stating that although focus primarily is on defendant’s conduct rather than elements of crimes committed, “it is meaningful to recognize that the two crimes involve separate intents”).

See also State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182, 187 , (holding that offenses of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, simple robbery, simple assault and aggravated assault did not arise out of a single behavioral incident because, in contrast to the situation in which each crime is part of a “prearranged program of events,” the defendants committed the offense

State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182, 187

See State v. Shevchuck, 282 Minn. 182 , 186, , 775-6 (1968).

See, State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182

See, State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182

In State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182 , this court found a waiver of the right to challenge a jury panel where that panel was aware of a *220 related prior conviction.

(per curiam); State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182

See, State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182

While the two assaults arguably were divisible — see, State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182 , — we do not need to decide this point because it is apparent that there is no merit to defendant’s contention that he was prejudiced by a joint trial.

4 See, e. g., State v. Prudhomme, 303 Minn. 376 , (rape, indecent liberties, and assault); State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182 , (assault, robbery, and unauthorized use of motor vehicle); State v. Murphy, 277 Minn. 355 , (drunkenness and unauthorized use of motor vehicle).

Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353 , State v. Fleck, 281 Minn. 247 , State v. Shevchuck, 282 Minn. 182 , State v. Boucher, 286 Minn. 475 , State v. Kooiman, 289 Minn. 439 , State v. Carlson, 291 Minn. 368 , State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520 , State v. Wheat, 296 Minn. 97

State v. Annis, 291 Minn. 552 , State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182

Absent any showing of actual bias, State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182 , or real likelihood of prejudice, cf. State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385 , we do not hesitate to affirm the trial court’s exercise of its judicial discretion.

Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353 , wherein we concluded that multiple sentences were proper for separate crimes intentionally committed against more than one individual; State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182 , where this court affirmed the findings that the defendants’ actions in terrorizing and robbing a victim were a divisible series of incidents rather than a “single behavioral incident”; and State v. Boucher, 286 Minn. 475 , where *380 in the defendant’s conviction of reckless driving in