Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 173 N.W.2d 353.

24 citing documents.

Independent School District No. 281, Robbinsdale, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
“‘Vested’ property rights are those that have ‘become so fixed that it would be inequitable to abrogate [the right] by retrospective legislation.’” 10 ().
Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center 811 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2012
Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center 811 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2012
“Vested” property rights are those that have “become so fixed that it would be inequitable to abrogate [the right] by retrospective legislation.” Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 289
In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation 806 N.W.2d 820 Minn. 2011
In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation 806 N.W.2d 820 Minn. 2011
Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 289
U.S. Home Corp. v. Zimmerman Stucco & Plaster, Inc. 749 N.W.2d 98 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
U.S. Home Corp. v. Zimmerman Stucco & Plaster, Inc. 749 N.W.2d 98 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
An amendment to the statute of limitations is not prohibited because the “passage of time creates no vested right in the exemption from the remedy.” Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 288 , (quotation omitted).
Reinsurance Ass'n of Minnesota v. Dunbar Kapple, Inc. 443 N.W.2d 242 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
Reinsurance Ass'n of Minnesota v. Dunbar Kapple, Inc. 443 N.W.2d 242 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 288 , (quoting Halverson v. Rolvaag, 274 Minn. 273, 275 , ).
Olsen v. Special School Dist. No. 1 427 N.W.2d 707 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
Olsen v. Special School Dist. No. 1 427 N.W.2d 707 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
Cf. Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 288 , *712 (“It is generally held that legislation dealing only with remedies and procedures are not beyond the reach of retroactive legislation.”).
Johnson v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. 414 N.W.2d 425 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Johnson v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. 414 N.W.2d 425 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
In Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282 , the supreme court explained that retroactive statutes are constitutional as long as they do not interfere with vested rights.
Laue v. Production Credit Ass'n of Blooming Prairie 390 N.W.2d 823 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Laue v. Production Credit Ass'n of Blooming Prairie 390 N.W.2d 823 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
“It is generally held that legislation dealing only with remedies and procedures [is] not- beyond the reach of retrospective legislation.” Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 288
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc. 717 P.2d 434 Ariz. 1986
Keefer v. Al Johnson Construction Co. 193 N.W.2d 305 Minn. 1971
Keefer v. Al Johnson Construction Co. 193 N.W.2d 305 Minn. 1971
604.01, the comparative negligence statute, may be disposed of by referring to our decision in Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282 , where it was held that the act applied retroactively and that such application did not abrogate vested rights so as to be constitutionally impermissible.
Springrose v. Willmore 192 N.W.2d 826 Minn. 1971
Springrose v. Willmore 192 N.W.2d 826 Minn. 1971
604.01 was made applicable to any action the trial of which commenced after July 1, 1969 (L. 1969, c. 624, § 2), and in Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282 , the validity of such application was upheld.
Barnes v. Hammerschmidt 182 N.W.2d 875 Minn. 1971
Barnes v. Hammerschmidt 182 N.W.2d 875 Minn. 1971
Following our decision in Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282 , 173 N. W. (2d) 353 , rendered on December 10, 1969, the trial court granted a new trial, reciting as an error of law the court’s failure to submit the question of comparative negligence.
B. F. Griebenow, Inc. v. Anderson 177 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 1970
B. F. Griebenow, Inc. v. Anderson 177 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 1970
That the Weber-Balts-Silesky-Thill concept of prospective overruling was the same, “based on a policy that it would be unfair to apply the new law to cases that have arisen prior to the change,” was noted in Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 286 , 173 N. W. (2d) 353, 356 , where this judicial practice was distinguished *178 from the legislative concept of L. 1969, c. 624, § 2, expressly making the comparative negligence statute retrospectively effective as to “any action the trial