Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737.

850 citing documents.

  • Michael Frederick Schmidt v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    2 Respondent argues that Schmidt’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is barred by State v. Knaffla.1 309 Minn. 246, 252, (holding that when a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”); see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
  • Joseph Anthony Roberson v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    ngs as [a] basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel argument”; Roberson “[did] not allege any facts which, if proven, would have led the Court to reach a different result”; and Roberson “also failed to provide any case law which would suggest the trial court’s rulings were incorrect or that [Roberson]’s appellate attorney’s performance was unreasonable.” Under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, “a petition for postconviction relief raising claims that were raised on direct appeal or th
  • Hughes v. State 851 N.W.2d 49 Minn. 2014
  • Hughes v. State 851 N.W.2d 49 Minn. 2014
    3 (2012), and State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Washington v. State 845 N.W.2d 205 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • Washington v. State 845 N.W.2d 205 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    After a direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Matakis v. State 842 N.W.2d 689 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • Matakis v. State 842 N.W.2d 689 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Erickson v. State 842 N.W.2d 314 Minn. 2014
  • Erickson v. State 842 N.W.2d 314 Minn. 2014
    In doing so, we concluded that most of these claims were barred by our decision in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246 , because they could have been raised on direct appeal.
  • Staunton v. State 842 N.W.2d 3 Minn. 2014
  • Staunton v. State 842 N.W.2d 3 Minn. 2014
    ch. 590 (2012) ].” Deegan, d at 94 (citing State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , ).
  • Frisch v. State 840 N.W.2d 426 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
  • Frisch v. State 840 N.W.2d 426 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
    This limitation was necessary because of the well-established caselaw that, if an offender has had a direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Hooper v. State 838 N.W.2d 775 Minn. 2013
  • Hooper v. State 838 N.W.2d 775 Minn. 2013
    4 (2012); were proeedurally barred under the rule from State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246 , and did not merit relief.
  • Greer v. State 836 N.W.2d 520 Minn. 2013
  • Greer v. State 836 N.W.2d 520 Minn. 2013
    We concluded that the denial of Greer’s petition was not an abuse of discretion because his judicial-bias claim was barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Townsend v. State 834 N.W.2d 736 Minn. 2013
  • Townsend v. State 834 N.W.2d 736 Minn. 2013
    4(a)(2), and procedurally barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Wayne v. State 832 N.W.2d 831 Minn. 2013
  • Wayne v. State 832 N.W.2d 831 Minn. 2013
    Construing Wayne’s motion as his fifth petition for postconviction relief, the postconviction court found the petition was barred under both State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , and Minn.Stat.
  • Sontoya v. State 829 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 2013
  • Sontoya v. State 829 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 2013
    State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Francis v. State 829 N.W.2d 415 Minn. 2013
  • Francis v. State 829 N.W.2d 415 Minn. 2013
    Alternatively, the district court denied the petition as barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Andersen v. State 830 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2013
  • Andersen v. State 830 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2013
    The postconviction court summarily denied Andersen’s petition, explaining that Andersen’s claims are either meritless on their face or barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Berkovitz v. State 826 N.W.2d 203 Minn. 2013
  • Berkovitz v. State 826 N.W.2d 203 Minn. 2013
    See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , (holding that a claim is procedurally barred if it was raised, or could have been raised, on direct appeal); (extending the Knaffla rule to claims for relief that were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior petition for p
  • Martin v. State 825 N.W.2d 734 Minn. 2013
  • Martin v. State 825 N.W.2d 734 Minn. 2013
    The court summarily denied Martin’s remaining postconviction claims, concluding that they were barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Vazquez v. State 822 N.W.2d 313 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
  • Vazquez v. State 822 N.W.2d 313 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
    The *315 district court treated appellant’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief and ruled that it was barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246
  • Wallace v. State 820 N.W.2d 843 Minn. 2012
  • Wallace v. State 820 N.W.2d 843 Minn. 2012
    The court concluded that Wallace’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel and due-process claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , because the claims were raised, or could have been raised, on direct appeal.
  • Jackson v. State 817 N.W.2d 717 Minn. 2012
  • Jackson v. State 817 N.W.2d 717 Minn. 2012
    at *14; see also State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , (stating that all claims raised by a defendant on direct appeal, and all claims which the defendant could have raised on direct appeal but did not, will not be considered in a review of a subsequent petition for postconviction relief by that defendant).
  • Carlton v. State 816 N.W.2d 590 Minn. 2012
  • Carlton v. State 816 N.W.2d 590 Minn. 2012
    See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 251-52 , -41 (1976).
  • Fain v. Andersen 816 N.W.2d 696 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
  • Fain v. Andersen 816 N.W.2d 696 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
    See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , (holding that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief’).
  • Hughes v. State 815 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 2012
  • Hughes v. State 815 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 2012
    1 (2010); see also State v. Knaffla, *605 309 Minn. 246, 252
  • Anderson v. State 811 N.W.2d 632 Minn. 2012
  • Anderson v. State 811 N.W.2d 632 Minn. 2012
    See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246
  • Colbert v. State 811 N.W.2d 103 Minn. 2012
  • Colbert v. State 811 N.W.2d 103 Minn. 2012
    4, and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252-53
  • Roby v. State 808 N.W.2d 20 Minn. 2011
  • Explained Roby v. State 808 N.W.2d 20 Minn. 2011
    We explained that, in the context of the rule announced in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246 , the “interests of justice” exception required the claim to “have substantive merit and the defendant must not have deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Gassler, d at 586 (-94 (Minn.2006)).