Cited by

See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, d 737 (1976).

State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252

§ 590.01, subd, 4(b)(2) (requiring that newly discovered evidence be "not cumulative to evidence presented at trial"); (providing that if a claim was “raised,” "known,” or "should have been known” on direct appeal, that claim "will not be considered in a subsequent petition for posteonviction relief” (citing State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246 , )).

Citing State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, the State argued that all of Rossberg’s claims, except for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, were procedurally barred because Rossberg knew or should have known of the basis for his claims on direct appeal.

4(a)-(b) (2014), and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

2 The postconviction court summarily denied the petition, concluding that Copeland’s ineffective assistance claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, and rejecting his challenge to the intelligence of his plea.

(extending rule of State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, to subsequent postconviction petitions).

McKenzie filed his first petition for postconviction relief in 2007, and we held that those claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

3 The main thrust of Hentges’s argument is that his claims are not barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, because his appeal was dismissed and not decided on the merits.

State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252

1; see State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 3 (stating that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”); see also Lussier v. State, 853 N.W

The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that appellant’s juror-misconduct claim is procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

The district court summarily denied the petition after determining that Fualefeh’s postconviction claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252

State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, (“The salient feature of 6 petitioner] to the relief requested.” see also Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd.

4 (2014), and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, (stating that a postconviction petitioner is not entitled to relief for claims that he raised in his direct appeal or claims that he did not raise but either knew 6 about or should have known about when he directly appealed).

(holding that a postconviction petition may not raise issues that are “essentially the same” as those raised on direct appeal); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, (stating that all matters raised on direct appeal, or known but not raised, will not be considered in postconviction proceedings).

We concluded that Evans’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, because the claim was known to him but not raised at the time of his direct appeal.

1 (2014) (“A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.”); see also State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, (“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

The postconviction court denied Wayne’s petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that his claims were time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2014) and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252

The state argues that Powell’s petition for postconviction relief is barred pursuant to State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

The court denied Martin’s second petition, concluding that Martin was not entitled to the retroactive benefit of Miller , and therefore the petition was: (1) procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246 , and (2) time-barred under Minn.Stat.

1 The postconviction court also concluded that Brown’s claim was procedurally barred under the rule announced in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, and factually insufficient under Minn. R. Crim.

2 The postconviction court conducted no hearing and held that all but one of Smith’s claims are procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, d 737, 741 (1976).

1 (2014); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252