Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Simmons, 258 N.W.2d 908.
- State v. Bluhm 676 N.W.2d 649 Minn. 2004
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State v. Bluhm
676 N.W.2d 649
Minn. 2004
‘“When it cannot be said with certainty that the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of a minimum term or an extended term in a particular situation, the presumption must be that the legislature did not intend to do so.’ ” ().
- McCollum v. State 640 N.W.2d 610 Minn. 2002
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McCollum v. State
640 N.W.2d 610
Minn. 2002
1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) (emphasis added); (“[D]ue process requires that criminal statutes be sufficiently clear and definite to warn a person of what conduct is punishable.”); (“[C]riminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable and how severe the punishment might be.”).
- State v. Ronquist 600 N.W.2d 444 Minn. 1999
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State v. Ronquist
600 N.W.2d 444
Minn. 1999
4 . (explaining that "criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable and how severe the punishment might be”).
- State v. Sheppard 587 N.W.2d 53 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
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State v. Sheppard
587 N.W.2d 53
Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Our courts have held that due process of law requires “that criminal statutes be sufficiently clear and definite to warn a person of what conduct is punishable.” ( (stating that “in the area of minimum and extended sentences the legislature has an obligation to state its intentions as clearly as possible”)).
- State v. Behl 564 N.W.2d 560 Minn. 1997
- State v. Davidson 481 N.W.2d 51 Minn. 1992
- State v. Davidson 481 N.W.2d 51 Minn. 1992
- State v. Davidson 471 N.W.2d 691 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
- State v. Lubitz 472 N.W.2d 131 Minn. 1991
- State v. Lubitz 472 N.W.2d 131 Minn. 1991
- State v. Brown 433 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
- State v. Brown 433 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
- State v. Lambert 388 N.W.2d 34 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
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State v. Lambert
388 N.W.2d 34
Minn. Ct. App. 1986
not contain guidelines or minimum sentences for misdemean- or offenses, and “[w]hen it cannot be said with certainty that the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of a minimum term * * * in a particular situation, the presumption must be that the legislature did not intend to do so.”
- State v. Mallory 329 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1983
- State v. Mallory 329 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1983
- State v. Jonason 292 N.W.2d 730 Minn. 1980
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State v. Jonason
292 N.W.2d 730
Minn. 1980
Even though sentencing statutes of this type must be strictly construed against the minimum term, we hold that the legislature has clearly mandated a minimum sentence without stay of execution or imposition for crimes involving firearms in every case specified under section 609.11, subd.
- State v. Hill 287 N.W.2d 918 Minn. 1979
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State v. Hill
287 N.W.2d 918
Minn. 1979
There are two different approaches which one could take to this issue: On the one hand, one could point to the general rule that “When it cannot be said with certainty that the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of the minimum term or an extended term in a particular situation, the presumption must be that the legislature did not intend to do so.”