Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d 160.

95 citing documents.

  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
    at 688 (emphasis added) ().
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
    d 160, 167 (Minn. 1977) (stating that the common-scheme- or-plan exception “has evolved to embrace evidence” of modus operandi).
  • State v. Hall 915 N.W.2d 528 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
  • State v. Hall 915 N.W.2d 528 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    State v. Forsman , , 164 (Minn. 1977).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    ( (other citations omitted)).
  • State v. Boecker 893 N.W.2d 348 Minn. 2017
  • In the Matter of the Welfare of: D.N.W., Child. Minn. Ct. App. 2017
  • In the Matter of the Welfare of: D.N.W., Child. Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    .” d 160, 164 (Minn. 1977).
  • State of Minnesota v. Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin 887 N.W.2d 257 Minn. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Demarcus Nasson Chaney Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • State of Minnesota v. Demarcus Nasson Chaney Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    The common scheme or plan exception “has evolved to embrace evidence of offenses which, because of their marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense, tend to corroborate evidence of the latter.”
  • State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II 869 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2015
  • State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II 869 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2015
    It is true that, in Bissell , we analogized evidence of prior convictions to Spreigl evidence and stated that “the trial court, on its own, should give a limiting instruction both when the evidence is admitted and as part of the final instructions to the jury.” Bissell, d at 283 ().
  • State of Minnesota v. Quince Raymond Campbell Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • State of Minnesota v. Quince Raymond Campbell Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    But this requirement becomes “mandatory only upon the defendant’s objection and/or request.”
  • State v. M.D.T. 831 N.W.2d 276 Minn. 2013
  • State v. Hayes 826 N.W.2d 799 Minn. 2013
  • State v. Hayes 826 N.W.2d 799 Minn. 2013
    But as we have stated, "[i]t is the exclusive province of the [LJegislature to define by statute what acts shall constitute a crime.”
  • State v. Crawley 819 N.W.2d 94 Minn. 2012
  • State v. Ness 707 N.W.2d 676 Minn. 2006
  • State v. Ness 707 N.W.2d 676 Minn. 2006
    This exception was “originally reserved for those offenses which could be described as preplanned steps in a larger scheme of which the charged offense was another step.” (citing cases).
  • State v. Babcock 685 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
  • State v. Babcock 685 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    (stating common plan or scheme exception “has evolved to embrace evidence of offenses which, because of their marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense, tend to corroborate evidence of the latter”).
  • Ture v. State 681 N.W.2d 9 Minn. 2004
  • Ture v. State 681 N.W.2d 9 Minn. 2004
    (discussing how the “common scheme or plan” exception has evolved to embrace offenses which tend, to corroborate the charged offense because of their marked similarity in mo-dus operandi).
  • State v. Jones 678 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2004
  • State v. Jones 678 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2004
    (citing State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488 , and State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174 , ).
  • State v. Anderson 654 N.W.2d 367 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
  • State v. Anderson 654 N.W.2d 367 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
    See, (shoplifting); (damage to property); (sale of narcotics); (sale of narcotics).
  • State v. Spears 560 N.W.2d 723 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
  • State v. Spears 560 N.W.2d 723 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
    § 645.16 (1996) (forbidding courts from disregarding plain statutory language); (recognizing courts cannot ignore language under pretext of pursuing purpose of law).
  • State v. Burrell 506 N.W.2d 34 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
  • State v. Burrell 506 N.W.2d 34 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
  • State v. Carithers 490 N.W.2d 620 Minn. 1992
  • State v. Carithers 490 N.W.2d 620 Minn. 1992
    this court ruled that a felony murder conviction under the general felony murder statute as it was then worded (it has since been changed slightly) may be predicated on distribution of heroin by direct injection by the defendant, since such a felony clearly is one “upon or affecting the person whose
  • State v. Branson 487 N.W.2d 880 Minn. 1992
  • State v. Branson 487 N.W.2d 880 Minn. 1992
    -65 (Minn.1977) (holding the distribution of heroin by direct injection into the body of another to be a felony “upon or affecting the person whose death was caused” but reiterating that, by using those words in the felony murder statute, the legislature “has ensured that a conviction for third-degree murder will
  • State v. Carithers 484 N.W.2d 435 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Carithers 484 N.W.2d 435 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Wermerskirchen 483 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Wermerskirchen 483 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Frisinger 484 N.W.2d 27 Minn. 1992
  • State v. Frisinger 484 N.W.2d 27 Minn. 1992
    where we said generally that while the trial court, even in the absence of a request, ought to give the cautionary instructions upon receipt of the other-crime evidence and as part of the final instructions, the failure of the trial court to give those instructions in the absence of a request is not
  • State v. Elvin 481 N.W.2d 571 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Elvin 481 N.W.2d 571 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Blair 474 N.W.2d 630 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
  • State v. Blair 474 N.W.2d 630 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
  • State v. Belssner 463 N.W.2d 903 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
  • State v. Belssner 463 N.W.2d 903 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
    The state had provided written notice of its intent to offer the Spreigl evidence, and consequently “the other Spreigl-Billstrom procedures became mandatory only upon the defendant’s objection and/or request.”
  • State v. Norris 428 N.W.2d 61 Minn. 1988