Cited by

(concluding that the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence was harmless “because the testimony was stricken and the jury cautioned to disregard it”).

is generally inadmissible at trial.”)

Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme C

-93 (Minn. 1979) (stating that the defendant opened the door to testimony “that defendant refused to give a written statement until he had talked to an attorney” because defense counsel “had elicited from other police officers that defendant had been courteous and cooperative with the police” and “[s]imilar tes

see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976) (stating “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used” as impeachment evidence).

We will not disturb a verdict “[i]f the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [the] defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We will not disturb a guilty verdict “ ‘if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [a] defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.’ ” -77 (Minn.2004) ().

We will allow the verdict to stand “ ‘if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [a] defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.’ ” -77 (Minn.2004) (alteration in original) ().

See, -10 (Minn.2006) (silence used as impeachment); (post-arrest failure to testify before grand jury); (post-arrest silence); (same); (post-arrest silence on advice of counsel); State v. Roberts, 296 Minn. 347, 349-53 , -48 (1973) (post-arrest silence).

We will not disturb the verdict “if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [a] defendant was proven guilty *477 of the offense charged.” (quoting State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 52 , ).

(quoting State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 52 , ).

kitchen, walked to the victims’ bedroom and stabbed them); (upholding jury’s finding of premeditation when the crime required the defendant to “procure the rifle from its location in the house, walk down the hallway to the [vie- *430 tims’] bedroom, raise the rifle, take careful aim, and pull the trigger three times”); (stating that the brutality of a killing may be considered by the jury as supporting premeditation).

Although premeditation 7 involves “more *763 than an intent to kill,” it, like intent, 8 is “subjective” and must be inferred from “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (); see also Bouwman, d at 705 .

(citing State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 52 , ).