Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Rieger v. Zackoski, 321 N.W.2d 16.

41 citing documents.

Alvin Glay, trustee for the next of kin of Unity McGill, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc., … Minn. 2026
Alvin Glay, trustee for the next of kin of Unity McGill, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc., … Minn. 2026
James R. Martin, Patrick S. Martin v. Mid-America Festivals Corporation Minn. Ct. App. 2023
James R. Martin, Patrick S. Martin v. Mid-America Festivals Corporation Minn. Ct. App. 2023
ustained by a minor who dove off a dock into shallow water and broke his neck); Aldes v. Saint Paul Ball Club, Inc., d 94, 96 (Minn. 1958) (stating that baseball park did not have a duty to protect patrons from the peril of being hit with a baseball if they were given the choice between screened-in versus open seats and assumed the risk of sitting in an open seat); -24 (Minn. 1982) (discussing whether management was negligent when an unauthorized spectator drove his own car onto a racetrack).
Daly v. McFarland 812 N.W.2d 113 Minn. 2012
Daly v. McFarland 812 N.W.2d 113 Minn. 2012
(“One of the few instances where primary assumption of risk applies is in cases involving patrons of inherently dangerous sporting events.”); (relieving amateur golfers of duty of care towards spectators); -24 (Minn.1982) (relieving duty of care towards patrons- at the track during a sanctioned auto race); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 450 , (relieving defendant of duty of care in ice skating collisions); Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 563 , (barring c
Thompson v. First State Bank of Fertile 709 N.W.2d 307 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Thompson v. First State Bank of Fertile 709 N.W.2d 307 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
And if the secured party has a privilege to enter another’s land to take possession of collateral after default, the entry is not a trespass because “a trespasser is ‘one who enters or remains on the [premises] without the express or implied consent of the possessor of land.’ ” (), review denied (Minn. April 13,1992).
Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television 584 N.W.2d 789 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television 584 N.W.2d 789 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Copeland, d at 405 ; (jury issue as to whether entrant became trespasser by exceeding scope of possessor’s invitation or permission).
Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. 526 N.W.2d 402 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. 526 N.W.2d 402 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
912, 913 (1915) (when consent given to cut mature *405 trees, cutting of immature trees exceeded scope of consent and constituted trespass); (court correctly instructed jury that lawful entrant may become trespasser by moving beyond scope of possessor’s invitation).
Doe v. Brainerd International Raceway, Inc. 514 N.W.2d 811 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
Doe v. Brainerd International Raceway, Inc. 514 N.W.2d 811 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
the supreme court concluded that the rambunctiousness at these same premises imposed upon BIR a high degree of care toward its patrons.
Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett 490 N.W.2d 108 Minn. 1992
Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett 490 N.W.2d 108 Minn. 1992
(quoting Kroeger v. Lee, 270 Minn. 75, 78 , -30 (1965)).
Reider v. City of Spring Lake Park 480 N.W.2d 662 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
Reider v. City of Spring Lake Park 480 N.W.2d 662 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
A trespasser is “one who enters or remains on the land without the express or implied consent of the possessor of land.”
Hassler v. Simon 466 N.W.2d 434 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
Hassler v. Simon 466 N.W.2d 434 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
State v. Buswell 460 N.W.2d 614 Minn. 1990
State v. Buswell 460 N.W.2d 614 Minn. 1990
Although not specifically involving illegal drugs, fireworks, or small motorized vehicles, the “flavor" of the type of conduct some patrons engage in after overuse of mood altering substances (there alcohol), thereby endangering not only themselves, but, as well, other patrons
Rusciano v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 445 N.W.2d 271 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
Rusciano v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 445 N.W.2d 271 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
(raceway operator must protect its patrons against harm from unauthorized vehicles on the track, a risk the operator created); (driver must operate vehicle with reasonable care so the danger assumed by the passenger is not increased).
Goodwin v. Legionville School Safety Patrol Training Center, Inc. 422 N.W.2d 46 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
Tuckner v. Chouinard 407 N.W.2d 723 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Tuckner v. Chouinard 407 N.W.2d 723 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Hille v. County of Wright 400 N.W.2d 744 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Hille v. County of Wright 400 N.W.2d 744 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
(specific conduct of third party need not be foreseeable).
Hoffman v. Wiltscheck 379 N.W.2d 145 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Hoffman v. Wiltscheck 379 N.W.2d 145 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
(action of racetrack spectator in moving from infield to track was not a superseding cause); Mikes v. Baumgartner, 277 Minn. 423, 430 , (school bus driver had a continuing duty, based on statute, to see that child passenger not only disembarked safely but safely crossed the h
Larson v. Larson 373 N.W.2d 287 Minn. 1985
Larson v. Larson 373 N.W.2d 287 Minn. 1985
Bushie v. City of Crookston 368 N.W.2d 424 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Bushie v. City of Crookston 368 N.W.2d 424 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
A jury will not be reversed unless the verdict or apportionment is “manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence.” ().
Danielson v. Johnson 366 N.W.2d 309 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Danielson v. Johnson 366 N.W.2d 309 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Anderson v. Blair 358 N.W.2d 708 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
Anderson v. Blair 358 N.W.2d 708 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
see, e.g., Campion v. Knutson, 307 Minn. 263, 269
Hafner v. Iverson 343 N.W.2d 634 Minn. 1984
Hafner v. Iverson 343 N.W.2d 634 Minn. 1984
Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 255 Minn. 201, 208