Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State, Department of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316.

218 citing documents.

Young v. Commissioner of Public Safety 420 N.W.2d 585 Minn. 1988
Young v. Commissioner of Public Safety 420 N.W.2d 585 Minn. 1988
Consequently, such laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and against the private interests of the drivers involved.” State
Whitman v. Commissioner of Public Safety 416 N.W.2d 476 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Whitman v. Commissioner of Public Safety 416 N.W.2d 476 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Abeln v. Commissioner of Public Safety 413 N.W.2d 546 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Abeln v. Commissioner of Public Safety 413 N.W.2d 546 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Dahlheimer 413 N.W.2d 255 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Dahlheimer 413 N.W.2d 255 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
§ 169.121 is a remedial statute which should be liberally construed in favor of “the public interest and against the private interests of drivers involved.” State
Lundquist v. Commissioner of Public Safety 411 N.W.2d 608 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Lundquist v. Commissioner of Public Safety 411 N.W.2d 608 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Woodward 408 N.W.2d 927 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Woodward 408 N.W.2d 927 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
See State, -79 (Minn.Ct.App.1984).
Young v. Commissioner of Public Safety 408 N.W.2d 212 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Vivier v. Commissioner of Public Safety 406 N.W.2d 587 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Vivier v. Commissioner of Public Safety 406 N.W.2d 587 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
In State, the supreme court noted the legislature had in 1978 modified the previous requirement that a driver be in “actual physical control” by deleting the word “actual.” The court found the legislature intended with this amendment that the statute be given the broadest possible effect.
Lindemann v. Commissioner of Public Safety 404 N.W.2d 909 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Lindemann v. Commissioner of Public Safety 404 N.W.2d 909 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Sens v. Commissioner of Public Safety 399 N.W.2d 602 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Sens v. Commissioner of Public Safety 399 N.W.2d 602 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Ledin v. Commissioner of Public Safety 393 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Butterfield v. Commissioner of Public Safety 393 N.W.2d 515 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Butterfield v. Commissioner of Public Safety 393 N.W.2d 515 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Ledin v. Commissioner of Public Safety 393 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
1 that a driver be in “actual physical control” of the car by deleting the word “actual.” See State
Schmidtbauer v. Commissioner of Public Safety 392 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Schmidtbauer v. Commissioner of Public Safety 392 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
see also Windschitl, d at 149 ; Sellers, d at 462 ; State
Haugen v. Commissioner of Public Safety 389 N.W.2d 222 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Haugen v. Commissioner of Public Safety 389 N.W.2d 222 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
The Commissioner argues that, under a liberal construction of the implied consent law, see State, the law should be interpreted so that the officer is required to offer a urine test only if the driver refused the blood test.
Bale v. Commissioner of Public Safety 385 N.W.2d 870 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Bale v. Commissioner of Public Safety 385 N.W.2d 870 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
See State, Pazderski, d at 88 .
State v. Vievering 383 N.W.2d 729 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
State v. Vievering 383 N.W.2d 729 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Hager v. Commissioner of Public Safety 382 N.W.2d 907 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Hager v. Commissioner of Public Safety 382 N.W.2d 907 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Meyers v. Commissioner of Public Safety 379 N.W.2d 219 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Meyers v. Commissioner of Public Safety 379 N.W.2d 219 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
McShane v. Commissioner of Public Safety 377 N.W.2d 479 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
McShane v. Commissioner of Public Safety 377 N.W.2d 479 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Ives v. Commissioner of Public Safety 375 N.W.2d 565 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Ives v. Commissioner of Public Safety 375 N.W.2d 565 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety 375 N.W.2d 99 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety 375 N.W.2d 99 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety 374 N.W.2d 577 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety 374 N.W.2d 577 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Fritzke v. Commissioner of Public Safety 373 N.W.2d 649 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Fritzke v. Commissioner of Public Safety 373 N.W.2d 649 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Zern v. Commissioner of Public Safety 371 N.W.2d 82 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Zern v. Commissioner of Public Safety 371 N.W.2d 82 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Berge v. Commissioner of Public Safety 370 N.W.2d 75 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Schumann v. State, Department of Public Safety 367 N.W.2d 688 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Schumann v. State, Department of Public Safety 367 N.W.2d 688 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
isions 4(a) through 4(d) of § 169.121 demonstrate the legislature’s intent that there be no time limit for the “fourth or subsequent offense on the record.” Laws that prohibit a person from driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated are “liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and against the private interests of the drivers involved.” State

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