State v. Upton
Cited by
- State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. David Darnell Jones, Jr., Appellant/Cross-Respondent Minn. 2024
- State of Minnesota v. John Ishmael Bradley, III Minn. 2024
- State of Minnesota v. Zane David Foley Minn. Ct. App. 2024
- State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
- State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
- State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
- State of Minnesota v. Brock William Orwig Minn. Ct. App. 2016
- State of Minnesota v. Joel Asiago Nyansikera Minn. Ct. App. 2015
- State v. Weyaus 836 N.W.2d 579 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
- State v. Lund 474 N.W.2d 169 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
- State v. Gist 358 N.W.2d 664 Minn. 1984
- State v. Perkins 353 N.W.2d 557 Minn. 1984
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Mendoza 297 N.W.2d 286
- State v. Leecy 294 N.W.2d 280
- State v. Brouillette 286 N.W.2d 702
Opinion text
TODD, Justice. Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon, Minn.Stat. § 609.225, subd. 2 (1978), and was sentenced by the trial court to a maximum 5-year prison term. On this appeal from judgment of conviction, defendant contends that (1) his conviction should be reversed outright on the ground that the evidence of his guilt was legally insufficient, or (2) he should be given a new trial on the ground that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying a defense motion to prohibit the prosecutor from using a 1971 conviction for third-degree murder to impeach defendant’s credibility as a witness. We affirm. This prosecution arose from a barroom fight in Duluth between two Coast Guard petty officers, who had never been in the bar before, and two regular patrons of the bar, one being defendant. The state’s evidenceT — which included the testimony of the two petty officers and five patrons or employees of the bar — was (a) that defendant was the first to use force when he grabbed a pool cue by the thin end and, swinging it like a baseball bat, hit one of the officers in the head, causing a severe cut, and (b) that there was no reasonable justification for this act. This evidence was *118 more than adequate to support the conviction. The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in permitting the use of defendant’s 1971 conviction for third-degree murder to impeach defendant’s credibility as a witness. See State v. Mendoza, 297 N.W.2d 286 (Minn.1980); State v. Leecy, 294 N.W.2d 280 (Minn.1980); State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702 (Minn.1979). Beyond this, it is extremely doubtful that the jury would have acquitted even if it had believed defendant’s testimony because that testimony suggests to us that defendant acted unreasonably and without justification in striking the victim with a dangerous weapon. Affirmed.