DocketDrift

Real-time tracking of state judicial trends.

Explore

Outcomes

Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Partlow, 321 N.W.2d 886.

45 citing documents.

  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
    (aggravating factors of particular vulnerability and invasion of zone of privacy); (aggravating factors of particular vulnerability and particular cruelty).
  • Minn. 2020
    5 n.1 (Minn. 1982) the victim was vulnerable and was subjected to multiple forms of penetration, the defendant broke the victim’s tooth and threatened to kill the victim, the offense happened in the victim’s zone of privacy, and the victim suffered serious psycholo
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
  • State of Minnesota v. President Pimping Austin Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • State of Minnesota v. President Pimping Austin Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    .’” Turrubiates, d at 180 ().
  • State v. Turrubiates 830 N.W.2d 173 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
  • State v. Turrubiates 830 N.W.2d 173 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
    A district court may evaluate the degree of cruelty inflicted on a child victim based on “the nature and extent of the physical damage and the treatment necessary to repair the injury.” see also Dillon, d at 591-92 (“The particularly cruel conduct of a defendant convicted of assault can be infeiTed from the nature and extent of injuries inflicted on the victim, supporting an upward durational departure from the presumptive sentence.”).
  • Dillon v. State 781 N.W.2d 588 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
  • Dillon v. State 781 N.W.2d 588 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
    We emphasize initially that the decision whether to reverse a challenged sentence ultimately reflects the answer to the more fundamental question of whether the sentence imposed is “excessive.” See Spain, d at 90 (reducing a sentence by four years because the imposed sentence was “disproportional to the severity of appellant’s conduct”); (Kelly, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that although substantial and compelling circumstances to depart existed, the sentence imposed was “excessiv
  • Taylor v. State 670 N.W.2d 584 Minn. 2003
  • Taylor v. State 670 N.W.2d 584 Minn. 2003
    we noted “the absolute vulnerability of the 2-year, 10-month-old victim” would justify “an aggravation of sentence.” Id.
  • State v. Herrmann 479 N.W.2d 724 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Herrmann 479 N.W.2d 724 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Dixon 415 N.W.2d 414 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Dixon 415 N.W.2d 414 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    (permanency of injuries may justify up to a tripling of the presumptive sentence).
  • State v. Steinhaus 405 N.W.2d 270 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Steinhaus 405 N.W.2d 270 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    Moreover, “[t]he cruelty practiced upon the child [may be] demonstrated by the nature and extent of physical damage.”
  • State v. Mortland 395 N.W.2d 469 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Edmison 398 N.W.2d 584 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Edmison 398 N.W.2d 584 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
    See, e.g., State v. O’Brien, pet.
  • State v. Mortland 395 N.W.2d 469 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Casady 392 N.W.2d 629 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Casady 392 N.W.2d 629 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. O'BRIEN 364 N.W.2d 901 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. O'BRIEN 364 N.W.2d 901 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
    See, (age 5 years); (age 34 months); (age of 12 year old victim cannot be used as aggravating factor where threshold age is 13).
  • State v. Johnson 359 N.W.2d 698 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Johnson 359 N.W.2d 698 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    Min *703 nesota Sentencing Guidelines II.D.2.b.(l) and (2)
  • State v. Cermak 350 N.W.2d 328 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Cermak 350 N.W.2d 328 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Udstuen 345 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Udstuen 345 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 1984
    Cases supporting the departure include:
  • State v. Cermak 344 N.W.2d 833 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Cermak 344 N.W.2d 833 Minn. 1984
    onsidered by the legislature in distinguishing intrafamilial sexual abuse in the first degree from intrafamilial sexual abuse in the third degree); (held, court sentencing defendant for violating section 609.342(a) could not consider fact that victim was only 12 as a departure factor because the offense contained an age element); (held, court sentencing defendant for violating section 609.342(a) could consider fact that victim was only 2 years and 10 months old as a departure factor); (held, alt
  • State v. Norton 328 N.W.2d 142 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Norton 328 N.W.2d 142 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Johnson 327 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Johnson 327 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1982
    A number of our cases, make it clear that, generally, the legislature has taken the vulnerability of the victims of rape, including their age, into account in distinguishing rape offense by degree.
  • State v. Van Gorden 326 N.W.2d 633 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Van Gorden 326 N.W.2d 633 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Morales 324 N.W.2d 374 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Morales 324 N.W.2d 374 Minn. 1982
    In three recent cases - -we have discussed the issue of when and to what extent departure is justified in sex cases.
  • State v. Herberg 324 N.W.2d 346 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Herberg 324 N.W.2d 346 Minn. 1982
    In three recent cases - -we have discussed the issue of when and to what extent departure is justified in sex cases.
  • State v. Profit 323 N.W.2d 34 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Profit 323 N.W.2d 34 Minn. 1982