Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227.
- In Re the Welfare of R.B. 369 N.W.2d 353 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
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In Re the Welfare of R.B.
369 N.W.2d 353
Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Although the psychologists were not allowed to express an opinion as to whether appellant personally had abused the children, see, they did state their opinions that the children did not fabricate the stories, and that some sexual abuse had occurred.
- State v. Huey 699 P.2d 1290 Ariz. 1985
- State v. Packard 366 N.W.2d 721 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
- State v. Packard 366 N.W.2d 721 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
- State v. Carlson 360 N.W.2d 442 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
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State v. Carlson
360 N.W.2d 442
Minn. Ct. App. 1985
The defendant made a motion in limine to prevent the use of any expert testimony concerning “child sexual abuse syndrome.” The court granted the motion on the ground that the testimony was inadmissible as a matter of law
- State v. Myers 359 N.W.2d 604 Minn. 1984
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State v. Myers
359 N.W.2d 604
Minn. 1984
we ruled inadmissible expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome because evidence of the typical reactions of a woman who has been raped does not assist the jury in determining whether or not the sexual act was consensual in a particular case and because the testimony furnishes no assistance to juror
- State v. Trotter 354 N.W.2d 539 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
- State v. Trotter 354 N.W.2d 539 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
- State v. Langley 354 N.W.2d 389 Minn. 1984
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State v. Langley
354 N.W.2d 389
Minn. 1984
does not require a different conclusion because the expert was not a physician and the case involved rape, a circumstance under which expert testimony is treated as sui generis.
- State v. Danielski 350 N.W.2d 395 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
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State v. Danielski
350 N.W.2d 395
Minn. Ct. App. 1984
*397 Rule 702, Minn.R.Evid.
- State v. Booker 348 N.W.2d 753 Minn. 1984
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State v. Booker
348 N.W.2d 753
Minn. 1984
Defendant’s is misplaced.
- State v. McGee 324 N.W.2d 232 Minn. 1982
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State v. McGee
324 N.W.2d 232
Minn. 1982
We hold that the introduction of this evidence was fundamental error and sufficiently prejudicial to require a