Cited by

(referring to section 626.556 (2010) as RMMA), (referring to section 626.556 (2004) as CARA).

Because the difference between the “not willful or malicious” standard under official immunity, Brown, d at 465, and the “good faith and due care” standard under the RMMA is significant, we conclude that allowing a child protection worker to assert the defense of official immunity would be inconsistent with the purpose of the RMMA, see Radke v. C ounty of Freeborn, (stating that “it is manifest that the legislature intended to provide safety and protection for children in abusive and neglectful

appellant argues that, as mother’s next of kin, he has standing to bring a claim against respondent on mother’s behalf .

of Freeborn, –91, 793, 798 (Minn. 2005) (applying public-duty doctrine and concluding that “special duty” existed, where father alleged that county’s negligent investigation of child-abuse reports resulted in child’s murder by mother’s friend); 843 (Minn. 1986) (applying public-dut

On April 21, 2005, after the parties had filed their principal briefs with the court of appeals but before the Beckers filed their reply brief

Rule 12.02(e) permits dismissal on the basis of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” This court “will not uphold a rule 12.02(e) dismissal ‘if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.’ ” (quoting N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395 , ).