Cited by

e the allegations made by M.R.’s sisters about what father did to them are, as the district court noted, “similar to what [Rakowiecki] is alleged to have done to M.R.,” that father allegedly committed a similar crime against M.R.’s sisters—complainants in a different court file—-41 (Minn. 2005) (affirming a district court’s decision to exclude evidence that an alleged alternative perpetrator murdered a different person, but not the victim, because the murders were dissimilar).

412’s rape-shield provision ); d 430, 438 (Minn. 2005) (considering the admissibility of evidence under Minn. R. Evid.

2 (discussing the parameters of reverse-Spreigl evidence).

–46 (Minn. 2005) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of prior crimes evidence).

In determining whether alte rnative-perpetrator evidence is admiss ible, the district court “must determine whether the defendant laid a proper foundation for admission of such evidence by offering evidence that has an inherent tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator to the commission of the charged crime.” Atkinson, d at 590 ().

A foundational requirement for the admission of alternative-perpetrator evidence is that such evidence must “inherently conneet[] *308 an alternative perpetrator to the commission of the charged crime regardless of the strength of the State’s case.” Jenkins, d at 226 .

-38 (Minn.2005) (determining that the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial).

Jones, d at 16-17 ; , 436 n. 4 (Minn.2005) (explaining that clear-and-convincing standard is appropriate for revers e-Spreigl evidence).