Cited by

at 215; - 49 (Minn. 2006) (“Generally, in the absence of an offer of proof, unless the substance of the evidence is apparent from the context, an appellate court cannot assess the significance of the excluded [evidence].”).

- 49 (Minn. 2006) (“Generally, in the absence of an offer of proof, unless the substance of the evidence is apparent from the context, an appellate court cannot assess the significance of the excluded [evidence].”); see also Minn. R. Evid.

d 844, 850 (Minn. 2006).

We have recognized that “ ‘[w]here one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction,’ rather than let the defendant 29 go free entirely.” (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)).

Unless the substance of the evidence is apparent from the context, or there is an offer of proof, “an appellate court cannot assess the significance of the excluded testimony.” d 844, 848-49 (Minn. 2006).

ues that this court “has no basis to review the claim of evidentiary error” because appellant “made no offer of proof.” Minnesota Rule of Evidence 103, subdivision a(2) provides that the substance of the evidence erroneously not admitted must be “made known to the court by” an offer of proof or must be “apparent from the context within which questions were asked.” (stating that “an appellate court cannot assess the significance of the excluded testimony” without “an offer of proof” or “the subst

In support of this contention, and State v. Leinweber

Unless the substance of the 12 evidence is apparent from the context, or ther e is an offer of proof, “an appellate court cannot assess the significance of the excluded testimony.” State v. Harris , d 844, 848-849 (Minn. 2006).

82) (same); (same); (same); (same), abrogated on other grounds, (same); d 315, 321–22 (Minn. 2003) (same); State v. Harris , , 850 (Minn. 2006) (same); Zumberge, d at 698 (same).

Minnesota appellate courts have declined to review error in the exclusion of evidence when an appellant has made an insufficient “offer of proof.” See, -49 (Minn. 2006) (discussing appellant’s failure to make offer of proof regarding excluded evidence and that the evidence was not apparent from context); (stating errors raised on appeal were not properly preserved by offer of proof).

See, (“That the jury convicted Harris of the greater offense, despite the availability of the lesser offense, or “third option,” indicates that Harris suffered no prejudice from the denial of the second-degree felony murder instruction.”).

(stating that in absence of an offer of proof, appellate court cannot assess the significance of the excluded testimony, unless it is readily apparent from the evidence).

103(a) 1989 comm, emt.; -49 (Minn.2006) (noting that if substance of excluded evidence is apparent from context, appellate court can assess significance in absence of offer of proof and claim is preserved).

(“That the jury convicted Harris of the greater offense, despite the availability of the lesser offense or ‘third option,’ indicates that Harris suffered no prejudice from the denial of the second-degree felony murder instruction.”).

Generally, “the decision to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the district court’s discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”

An instruction on a lesser-included offense should be given “ ‘if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.’ ” (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 , 93 S.Ct.

(stating that evidence offered under Minn. R. Evid.