Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163.

125 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Joseph Alec Haefs Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Joseph Alec Haefs Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we independently review the facts to determine whether, as a matter of law, the [district] court erred in its ruling.”
Daniel Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, Vin 1GNEC13V23R143453, Plate 235JBM 852 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 2014
Daniel Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, Vin 1GNEC13V23R143453, Plate 235JBM 852 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 2014
(declining to reach whether suppression was required under the Minnesota Constitution because suppression was required under the United States Constitution).
State of Minnesota v. Donald William Carlson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Donald William Carlson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“[A]n application for a nighttime warrant under section 626.14 must establish reasonable suspicion that a nighttime search is necessary to preserve evidence or to protect officer or public safety.” –68 (Minn. 2007).
State of Minnesota v. La�Rog Daquan Meadows Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Cree Rae Larson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. La�Rog Daquan Meadows Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Moreover, permitting an officer to rely on a 911 operator’s reasonable but erroneous inference is not, as he suggests, the equivalent of relying on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which our supreme court has “consistently declined to adopt.” n.10 (Minn. 2007).
State of Minnesota v. Cree Rae Larson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
n.10 (Minn. 2007); (Stras, J., concurring) (“Although this court has yet to adopt the good-faith exception, this is an appropriate case for us to do 4 so.” (citation omitted)), cert.
State v. Brooks 838 N.W.2d 563 Minn. 2013
State v. Klamar 823 N.W.2d 687 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
State v. Klamar 823 N.W.2d 687 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
-78 (Minn.2007) ("Generally, evidence seized in violation of the constitution must be suppressed.”); ("If [the defendant] was seized at any point before the police officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize him, then he was illegally seized and any evidence
State v. Barajas 817 N.W.2d 204 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
State v. Barajas 817 N.W.2d 204 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
See Hardy, d at 217 (stating that “the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct” by eliminating temptation for police officers to proceed with less than constitutional prerequisites for search and seizure); , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (observing that Minnesota Supreme Court has “consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the [federal] ‘good faith’ exception” to the exclusionary rule).
McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing 816 N.W.2d 636 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing 816 N.W.2d 636 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Appellants acknowledge that Minnesota courts have usually looked first at history related to the Fourth Amendment
State v. Wiggins 788 N.W.2d 509 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
State v. Wiggins 788 N.W.2d 509 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
Harrison v. Commissioner of Public Safety 781 N.W.2d 918 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
Harrison v. Commissioner of Public Safety 781 N.W.2d 918 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
-78 (Minn.2007) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 , 34 S.Ct.
State v. Maldonado-Arreaga 772 N.W.2d 74 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Maldonado-Arreaga 772 N.W.2d 74 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Jordan 742 N.W.2d 149 Minn. 2007
State v. Jordan 742 N.W.2d 149 Minn. 2007