Cited by

In support of that argument, the state cites

(holding that boisterous or noisy conduct may trigger punishment without offending the First Amendment because it is not the speech itself but the manner of delivery); see also Hensel, d at 176-77.

(noting that “or” is generally disjunctive); (noting that manner of speaking, independent of content, may 8 trigger disorderly conduct statute); cf. S.L.J., d at 419, n.6 (noting that conduct alone would have warranted disorderly conduct conviction in prior case).

1(3) (2016); and (“[T]he statute may be applied to punish the manner of delivery of speech when the disorderly nature of the speech does not depend on its content.”).

In response, the state cites in which we concluded that a person may, consistent with the First Amendment, be found guilty under the state disorderly conduct statute for verbal conduct that is not in the nature of fighting words.

In 6 re Welfare of T.L.S.

We have distinguished between the criminalization of “mere speech,” S.L.J., d at 420, or “words alone,” and the criminalization of actions that include but are not limited to speech, as follows: Although [under S.L.J.]

(quotation marks omitted).

Although “the disorderly conduct statute prohibits only ‘fighting words’ as applied to speech content, the disorderly shouting of otherwise protected speech or engaging in other ‘boisterous or noisy conduct’ may still trigger punishment under the statute without offending the First Amendment.” d 877, 881 (Minn. App. 2006).

The state basically relies on one case to support its position that appellants’ loud yelling is not protected by the First Amendment, -81 (Minn.App.2006).

-06 (Minn.1977) (finding arrest unjustified under rule 6.01); (same), review denied (Minn. June 18, 2000); -82 (Minn.App.2006) (upholding arrest *769 of expelled student who remained uncontrollable in officer’s presence).