Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675.

181 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Thomas Raymond Struzyk 869 N.W.2d 280 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II 869 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II 869 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2015
In State v. Mahkuk, we identified two elements for determining whether a defendant’s presence “intentionally aids” another in committing a crime: (1) the defendant knew that the “alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime”; and (2) the defendant “intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.”
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Raymond Struzyk 869 N.W.2d 280 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Dale Allen Jones Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Dale Allen Jones Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Under the aiding and abetting statute, the state was required to prove that appellant “knew that his alleged accomplice[] [was] going to commit a crime and that [the defendant] intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” see Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.
State of Minnesota v. Nisius Dealvin McAllister 862 N.W.2d 49 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Nisius Dealvin McAllister 862 N.W.2d 49 Minn. 2015
hrase “intentionally aids” includes two “important and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were 4 going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’ ” ().
State of Minnesota v. Paul Richard Dehn Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Paul Richard Dehn Minn. Ct. App. 2015
We reverse the district court’s denial only if “there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different if the event that prompted the motion had not occurred.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Ricky James Bedell Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Ricky James Bedell Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“[T]he element of ‘intentionally aiding’ embodies two important and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” ().
Kpnx v. Hon. stephens/state 340 P.3d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Huber Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Huber Minn. Ct. App. 2014
To do so, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Huber knew Delbert Huber was going to commit a crime and that Huber “intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.”
State of Minnesota v. Dylan Micheal Kelley 855 N.W.2d 269 Minn. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Dylan Micheal Kelley 855 N.W.2d 269 Minn. 2014
Lincoln Lamar Caldwell v. State of Minnesota 853 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 2014
Lincoln Lamar Caldwell v. State of Minnesota 853 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 2014
To return a guilty verdict, the jury had to find, among other things: “(1) that [Caldwell] ‘knew that [Kirk] w[as] going to commit a criine,’ and (2) that [Caldwell] ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’ ” ().
State of Minnesota v. Charles Edward Love Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Charles Edward Love Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(quotation omitted) (“An erroneous jury instruction does not require a new trial if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
State of Minnesota v. William Harold Jones Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. William Harold Jones Minn. Ct. App. 2014
In re the Welfare of J.H. 844 N.W.2d 28 Minn. 2014
In re the Welfare of J.H. 844 N.W.2d 28 Minn. 2014
State v. Bahtuoh 840 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 2013
State v. Bahtuoh 840 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 2013
The phrase “intentionally aids” in the accomplice-liability statute includes two “important and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’ ” ().
State v. Watkins 840 N.W.2d 21 Minn. 2013
State v. Watkins 840 N.W.2d 21 Minn. 2013
Citing Mahkuk, and Hall, , the court of appeals concluded that the omission of the “knowingly” element of the charged offense affected Watkins’ substantial rights as a matter of law and therefore a new trial was required.
State v. Hicks 837 N.W.2d 51 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
State v. Hicks 837 N.W.2d 51 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
(quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 , 104 S.Ct.
State v. Kelley 832 N.W.2d 447 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
State v. Kelley 832 N.W.2d 447 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
The supreme court’s conclusion was principally based on its 2007
State v. Silvernail 831 N.W.2d 594 Minn. 2013
State v. Zornes 831 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 2013
State v. Zornes 831 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 2013
State of Arizona v. Marcus Deshaun Tucker, Clifton James Cuttler II and Andre Lavelle Armstrong 290 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State v. Hokanson 821 N.W.2d 340 Minn. 2012
State v. Hokanson 821 N.W.2d 340 Minn. 2012
is misplaced because unlike the alleged error in Mahkuk , the alleged error in this case does not involve the failure to instruct the jury on an element of the offense.
State v. Milton 821 N.W.2d 789 Minn. 2012
State v. Milton 821 N.W.2d 789 Minn. 2012
State v. Watkins 820 N.W.2d 264 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
State v. Watkins 820 N.W.2d 264 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
But shortly after issuing its opinion in Vance
State v. Brown 815 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 2012
State v. Infante 796 N.W.2d 349 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
State v. Infante 796 N.W.2d 349 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
(quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct.
State v. Edstrom 792 N.W.2d 105 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
State v. Edstrom 792 N.W.2d 105 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
(applying Minn. R. Evid.
State v. Anderson 789 N.W.2d 227 Minn. 2010
State v. Anderson 789 N.W.2d 227 Minn. 2010
A district court has considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions, and in selecting language for jury instructions