Cited by

-32 (Minn. App. 2007) (“[I]t is not the role of this court to make a dramatic change in the interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution when the supreme court has not done so.”), aff’d

The role of this court is to identify and correct errors and “describe[] what we believe to be the current state of the law.” (), aff’d

d 324, 329-30 (Minn. 2016) (describing sentencing trials required under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)); -84 (Minn. 2008).

it does not fall to this court.” State v. Rodriguez , aff’d

As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, “Under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (quotation 23 omitted).

Safety, (), review denied (Minn. May 24, 1989); –32 (Minn. App. 2007), aff’d

The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial unless the declarant is “unavailable” and the defendant “has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 (2004); (holding “that the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment applies in jury sentencing trials ”).

When a district court relies on a combination of proper and improper aggravating factors in making a sentencing decision, “we must determine whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent reliance upon the improper aggravating factor.” (d 672, 682 (Minn. 2008)).

Appellant argues that Exhibit 9 “contains records that were inadmissible hearsay, were irrelevan t, and [were] highly prejudicial.” We agree: “[T]he Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply in jury sentencing trials.”

See Sanchez-Sanchez, d at 329-30 (holding that the Rules of Evidence apply during a Blakely court trial because such proceedings- are not mentioned in Rule 1101(b)(3)); -84 (Minn. 2008) (holding that because Minn. R. Evid.

(“[I]t is not the role of this court to make a dramatic change in the interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution when the supreme court has not done so.”), aff’d

“[T]he 10 Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply in jury sentencing trials.”

1101 we conclude that the rules of evidence apply in a Blakely court trial, but that such a conclusion was not previously clear or obvious.

(concluding there was sufficient evidence to prove aggravating factors), aff’d

P. 31.01; -84 (Minn. 2008) (applying harmless-error analysis to alleged errors in sentencing procedure).

“Further, it is not the role of this court to make a dramatic change in the interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution when the supreme court has not done so.” aff’d

Where the district court has erred in admitting evidence, and the error does not have constitutional dimensions, we consider whether there is a “reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (internal quotation marks omitted).

When deciding under these circumstances whether to affirm or remand, “we must determine whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent reliance upon the improper aggravating factorfs].” Stanke, d at 828 ().

tute so as to "effectively rewrite” it because that prerogative belongs to the legislature rather than the court); ("The policy-based argument advanced by the dissent regarding when to measure the endangerment to the child is not without merit, but such a determination belongs to the legis *438 lature, not to this court.”); (explaining that it is the province of the legislature, not the courts, to expand an accomplice corroboration statutory requirement to jury sentencing trials); Isles Wellness