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If the evidence presented against appellant was legally insufficient, “the only ‘just’ remedy is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.” (alteration omitted) (quotation omitted).

(explaining that any concerns regarding the prejudicial impact of the Spreigl evidence were minimized by the cautionary instruction on the permissible use of Spreigl evidence because we presume that jurors followed the court’s instructions).

The statute recognizes that accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, d 894, 898 (Minn. 2008), because of concern that an accomplice will offer self-serving, dishonest testimony

Accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, due to concern that an accomplice will offer self-serving, dishonest testimony

Accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, because of concern that an accomplice will offer self-serving, dishonest testimony

“‘[T]rial courts have a duty to instruct juries on accomplice testimony in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.’” (quoting Strommen, d at 689).

We conduct “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach their verdict.” (quotation omitted).

While the law does not prefer direct evidence to circumstantial evidence, see 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.05 (2006), a conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires that the circumstances proved be consistent with an appellant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other rational or reasonable hypothesis, (emphasizing that the state’s evidence need not exclude all inferences other than guilt but must exclude “all reasonable inferences other than guilt”).

(Minn. 3 The pattern jury instruction provides in part: You cannot find the defendant guilty of a crime on the testimony of a person who could be charged with that crime, unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to convict the d

(concluding that Spreigl evidence of a prior bank robbery was admissible in the appellant’s aiding and abetting first-degree-murder trial “for the limited purposes of showing absence of mistake or identity as joint actors”); (concluding that Spreig

(emphasizing that the state’s evidence need not exclude all inferences other than guilt but must exclude all reasonable inferences other than guilt).

The corroborating evidence must tend to affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to the defendant’s guilt to “some substantial degree,” and “evidence is sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony when it is weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s testimony.” –54 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted) (noting that corroborating evidence need not establish a prima facie case of guilt).

“A witness is considered an accomplice if she could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the accused is charged.” (quotation omitted).

A conviction will not be reversed if a jury could have found a defendant guilty of the charged offense, “giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotations and citations omitted).

The state must prove, however, that the defendant had “knowledge of the crime and intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotation omitted).