Cited by

Shriner, –50 (Minn. 2008); Netland

In Lindquist, the supreme court did not consider whether a well-trained officer would have known in February 2011 were incorrect, based on Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).

At the time of the arrest, authorized the warrantless blood draw as a single-factor exigency.

At the time of 13 Lindquist’s arrest, this court’s permitted the warrantless blood draw.

Cibulka contended: (1) McNeely overruled Minnesota caselaw, which together held the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is a per se exigency that provides an exception to the search-warrant requirement; (2) the test-refusal statute is unconstitutional because it criminalizes a driver’s refusal t

5 not a “single-factor exigent circumstance.” See, e.g., State v. Shriner , (“We have described the test for single-factor exigent circumstances as one in which the existence of one fact alone creates exigent circ umstances.” (quotation omitted)); (explaining that “in certain situations a single factor alone can create ex

abrogated by McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165; d 202, 214 (Minn. 2009), abrogated in part by McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165.

at 877-78 ( abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)).

1552 ; abrogated by McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct.

The parties acknowledged that when Stavish’s blood was drawn, -50 (Minn.2008), abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct.

McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 n.2 (d 538, 545 (Minn. 2008)).

denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014); -50 (Minn. 2008), abrogated by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552.

See, –14 (Minn. 2009), abrogated in part by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, as recognized in Brooks, d at 567; abrogated by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552.

See, (affirming warrantless blood test performed outside implied-consent law when police have probable cause that suspect committed DWI, to preserve evidence because of single-factor exigency of dissipation of alcohol), abrogated by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)); Tyler, 368 N.W.

Before McNeely, Minnesota law held that the “rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw from a defendant.” –50 (Minn. 2008), abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013); abrogated in part by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, cert.

-50 (Minn.2008), abrogated by McNeely, 133 S.Ct.

1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) abrogated by McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct.

A warrantless chemical test is constitutionally reasonable if the police have probable cause to believe that the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle while chemically impaired because of the exigent circumstances created by “[t]he rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood.” -50 (Minn.2008); accord Netland, d at 212-13 .

Although the more common application of the term in the criminal context has limited relevance here, we note that in that context, exigent circumstances may be found based on certain single factors or under “a totality of the circumstances test.” -42 (Minn.2008).

at 213-14 (upholding war-rantless breath test); (upholding warrantless blood test).

“It is a basic principle of constitutional law that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.” ().

(“[T]he rapid dissipation of blood-alcohol content caused by the body’s natural processes is a single factor that creates the exigent circumstances in the case of criminal vehicular operation to justify a warrantless blood draw.”).