Cited by

( “[W]hen the [evidentiary] ruling results in the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted” (quotat

When assessing alleged prosecutorial misconduct during a closing argument, “we lo ok to the closing argument as a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.” State v. Graham , (quotation omitted).

Improper Closing Argument Vacko argues that the “entirety of the State’s closing argument is rife with improper comments that belittle [her ].” In determining whether the state committed prosecutorial misconduct during a closing argument, this court looks to the “the closing argument as a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.” State v. Graham , (quotation omitted).

“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” State v. Graham

(“A defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense is not an unfettered right; it does not permit a defendant to compel a prospective witness to waive her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”).

When the district court’s evidentiary “ruling results in the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted.” (quotation omitted).

When a district court incorrectly excludes evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed if “there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted.” (quotation omitted).

(concluding that prosecutor did not make improper closing argument by “argu[ing] that the defense had not, based on the evidence, presented a solid case” through “statements directed at .

5 during a criminal trial, see, -50 (Minn. 2009), we have never considered a claim that a government actor interfered with a witness before or during a postconviction evidentiary hearing.3 In this case, we need not decide the exact form of assistance that due process requires in a postconviction proceeding.

Porter, d at 364 (stating that the state’s arguments must be based on evidence produced at trial, or reasonable inferences from that evidence, but need not be “colorless”); -57 (Minn. 2009) (rejecting argument that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by asking for justice for the victims, concluding that the state asked the jury to seek justice based on the evidence and not to inflame passions).

(holding that “convictions obtained by a prosecutor who was unlicensed to practice law at the time of the conviction should be set aside only when the defendant is able to show prejudice warranting reversal”).

we explained that we retain, under our supervisory power, the right to grant a new trial prophylactically or in the interests of justice.

is whether the government actor’s interference with a witness’s decision to testify was substantial.” (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

(“Ideally, a transcript of C.H.’s interview should have been prepared by the State, or, alternatively, the transcript made by defense counsel should have been provided to the State for verification, or the district court should have either ordered the State to verify the relevant parts of the transcri

(“Ideally, a transcript of C.H.’s interview should have been prepared by the State, or, alternatively, the transcript made by defense counsel should have been provided to the State for verification, or the district court should have either ordered the State to verify the relevant parts of the transcri

We must determine if the State committed any misconduct and, if it did, “we will grant a new trial when the misconduct impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have not yet decided whether this two-tiered approach set forth in Caron “remains viable.”