Cited by

Co., d 858, 861 (Minn. 2010).

It requires that a party must have sufficient personal interest in a legal dispute so that it is appropriate to allow that party to pursue litigation.”

Co., (stating that courts construe statutory language words and phrases “according to their most natural and obvious usage” (quotation omitted)).

Co. , -65 (Minn. 2010) (declining to find a private cause of action for third parties within a specific subdivision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act because the language of the statute was unambiguous and there was no implied cause of action); Becker, d at 207-08 (declining to find an implied cause of actio

at 692 (declining to find a cause of action within Minnesota’s Pharmacy Practice and Wholesale Distribution Act because it was not expressly or impliedly provided by the plain language of the statute ); Krueger v. Zeman Const r. Co. , –65 (Minn. 2010) (declining to find a private cause of action for third parties within a specific subdivision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act because the language of the statute was unambiguous and there was no implied cause of action ); Becker, d at 207–08 (decl

1, 2, as applied to LLC members), aff’d, .

Co., -63 (Minn. 2010) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim by an individual who had no right to sue under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, discussing the issue both in terms of “statutory standing” and as a question of whether the statute “provide[s] a cause of action”).

Co., (stating that we review the construction of the MHRA’s provisions de novo).

-64 (Minn. 2010), confirms this rule.

Co., (quotation omitted), aff’d

Co., (“[W]hen an individual or company violates a civil rights law, the act of discrimination itself constitutes sufficient injury for the law to provide a remedy, in the absence of statutory language requiring more.” (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted)).

Where the statutory language is “clear, explicit, unambiguous, and free from obscurity, courts are bound to expound the language according to the common sense and ordinary meaning of the words.” d 881, 885 (Minn. App. 2008), aff’d, (citations omitted); Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (“[W]ords and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage[.]”).

Co., 861-63 (Minn. 2010) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim of action by an individual who had no right to sue under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, discussing the issue both in terms of “statutory standing” and as a question of whether the statute “provide[s] a cause of action”).

Thus, when the words of a statute are “clear, explicit, unambiguous, and free from obscurity,” we expound the language “according to the common sense and ordinary meaning of the words.” aff’d

Thus, where the statutory language is “clear, explicit, unambiguous, and free from obscurity, courts are bound to expound the language according to the common sense and ordinary meaning of the words.” aff’d, (citations omitted); Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2014) (“[W]ords and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage[.]”).