Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459.

83 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Ian Blair Lindemyer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Ian Blair Lindemyer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: P. L. G., Parent. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: P. L. G., Parent. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(recognizing the diminished risk of unfair prejudice in a bench trial).
In the Matter of the Welfare of: P. D. H. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
In the Matter of the Welfare of: P. D. H. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The risk of unfair prejudice to a defendant in admitting evidence is “reduced because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion.”
Gregory Levon Spraggins, Jr. v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Gregory Levon Spraggins, Jr. v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Further, this case was a bench trial, and “[t]he risk of unfair prejudice to [a defendant tried by the court] is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion.”
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Charles Robert Schwartz Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Charles Robert Schwartz Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(“The risk of unfair prejudice to [the defendant] is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion.
State of Minnesota v. David Lester McHan Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. David Lester McHan Minn. Ct. App. 2015
al system presumes that judges are capable of setting aside collateral knowledge they possess and are able to approach every aspect of each case with 8 a neutral and objective disposition,” and this includes the ability to “disregard extraneous matters.” (quotation omitted); (stating that risk of prejudice from admission of evidence of other bad acts is reduced in a bench trial “because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use
State of Minnesota v. Jason Lamont Armstrong Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Jason Lamont Armstrong Minn. Ct. App. 2015
This distinction is important because “[t]he risk of unfair prejudice to [appellant] is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion.”
State of Minnesota v. Leslie Lindsey Treadwell Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Leslie Lindsey Treadwell Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(“The distinction between a jury trial and a bench trial is important.
State of Minnesota v. Donald William Laquier Jackson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Donald William Laquier Jackson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion.” (quotation omitted).
Myon Demarlo Burrell v. State of Minnesota 858 N.W.2d 779 Minn. 2015
Myon Demarlo Burrell v. State of Minnesota 858 N.W.2d 779 Minn. 2015
Because the sentence was improper, we remand for resentencing consistent with our direction in State v. Burrell (Burrell II)
State of Minnesota v. Lee Anthony Holmes Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Lee Anthony Holmes Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“The risk of unfair prejudice to [the defendant] is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion.”
In the Matter of the CIVIL COMMITMENT OF Gary George SPICER 853 N.W.2d 803 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
In the Matter of the CIVIL COMMITMENT OF Gary George SPICER 853 N.W.2d 803 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
The supreme court has stated that “excluding relevant evidence at a bench trial on the grounds of unfair prejudice is in a sense ridiculous” because “there is comparatively less risk that [a] district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Corey Lee Melde Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Corey Lee Melde Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(concluding that the risk of unfair prejudice is reduced in a bench trial because “there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason overcome by emotion”).
In re the Welfare of the Child of J.K.T. 814 N.W.2d 76 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
In re the Welfare of the Child of J.K.T. 814 N.W.2d 76 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
(recognizing that risk of unfair prejudice is diminished in bench trial); S.R.A., d at 838 (recognizing that erroneous admission of evidence is not prejudicial if it is cumulative to other evidence).
State v. Ferguson 804 N.W.2d 586 Minn. 2011
State v. SONTOYA 788 N.W.2d 868 Minn. 2010
State v. SONTOYA 788 N.W.2d 868 Minn. 2010
State v. McDaniel 777 N.W.2d 739 Minn. 2010
State v. McDaniel 777 N.W.2d 739 Minn. 2010
(concluding that admission of gang evidence that did not directly implicate the defendant, if erroneous at all, was harmless).