Cited by

2 The parties agree that Christensen’s words combined with her act of placing her vehicle to 2 The mere content of speech is considered disorderly conduct only if it consists of “fighting words.” -06 (Minn. 2012).

committed an act of police misconduct, knowing that the information is false.” see also Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd.

But the content of speech is only considered disorderly conduct if it consists of “fighting words.” 105-06 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Muccio , (explaining that overbreadth challenges fail if a statute only proscribes unprotected speech); (explaining that content-based restrictions on unprotected speech are evaluated differently than similar restrictions on protected speech).

Subdivis ion 1(4) “is a content-based regulation of speech because whether a person may be prosecuted under the statute depends entirely on what the person says.” See State v. Crawley

See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (1989) (holding that newspaper had a First Amendment interest in publishing lawfully obtained “truthful information” revealing sexual assault victim’s identity (emphasis added)); d 94, 107 (Minn. 2012) (holding the unlawful-reports-of -police-misconduct statute constitutional under the First Amendment by construing it to punish only those who report information “knowing that the information is false”) .

A statute that regulates speech “must not be overly broad.” State v. Crawley

Hensel , d at 175 (citing State v. Crawley , , 105 (Minn. 2012) ).

State v. Crawley , , 102 (Minn. 2012).

“Fighting words” are words “that ‘have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to 15 whom, individually, the remark is addressed.’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573, 62 S. Ct. 766, 770 (1942)).

Fighting words are “words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” (quotation omitted).

Our primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to “give effect to the legislature’s intent.”

be predicated only on a person’s words unless those words are ‘fighting words,’” -11 (Minn. App. 2003) (), defined as “words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,’” State 4 v. Crawley, n.9 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769 (1942)).

If the statute does not reach speech that the First Amendment protects, but instead solely regulates speech undeserving of First Amendment protection, the statute is constitutional unless it results in “content discrimination unrelated to [its] distinctively proscribable content.” (quoting R.A.V.

“The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.”

(“we can uphold [the statute’s] constitutionality by construing it narrowly”).

(citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 , 130 S.Ct.

Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012); cert.

(citing Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2010)).

ommunicated to someone other than the plaintiff’; (2) the statement is false; (3) the statement tends to “harm the plain *730 tiffs reputation and to lower [the plaintiff] in the estimation of the community,” -20 (Minn.2009); and (4) “the recipient of the false statement reasonably understands it to refer to a specific individual.”