Cited by

See, (stating that failure to file motion to suppress evidence was related to unreviewable trial strategy); (stating that failure to file motion on spoliation of evidence fell “squarely within tactical decisions properly left to the discretion of trial counsel” (quotation omitted)).

Smith also relies on State v. Nissalke, which provides that it is “‘improper for a prosecutor to refer to evidence in an opening statement without a good-faith basis for believing the evidence is admissible.’” (d 144, 150 (Minn. 1999)).

misconduct,” the appellate court “ask[s] whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” (quotations omitted).

(stating that “[appellate] courts do[] not review matters of trial strategy or the particular tactics used by counsel”); (stating that “the depth of .

To show that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel, appellant must demonstrate “(1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

See, -03 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that exclusion of alternative-perpetrator evidence was not error because defendant introduced other evidence relevant to that theory).

The trial court sentenced Nissalke to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, and we affirmed Nissalke’s

rict court “erred and violated the right to due process by restricting both the scope of cross-examination and closing argument based on an erroneous understanding of ‘alternative perpetrator’ evidence.” “Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the district court and we will not disturb those rulings on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” (quotation omitted).

3 proceedings would have been different.”

To show that he did not receive effective assistance, Dobson must demonstrate “that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

This “modified plain error test,” has not found expression at the United States Supreme Court.

(involving a prospective juror writing in the questionnaire that he “ ‘would favor the testimony of a police officer over a non-police officer’ ” and “ ‘give the cops a lot of leeway’ ”); (involving a prospective juror indicating that she knew various l

(applying rationale from Youngblood); -37 (Minn.2010) (same); (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct.

“We review prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether the conduct, ⅛ light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” ().

-90 (Minn.2011); -80 (Minn.2010); -95 (Minn.2010); (discussing that an inmate refused to testify at a trial because “living in prison as a snitch was worse than the possibility of a lon

To make this claim, Castillo-Alvarez must show that “(1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

“When assessing whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we conduct a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” (quotation omitted).

ANALYSIS I. “Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the district court[,] and we will not disturb those rulings on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” (quotation omitted).

Alternative perpetrator evidence is admissible only if the defendant makes a “threshold showing that the evidence the defendant seeks to admit has an ‘inherent tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator to the commission of the charged crime.’ ” (-37 (Minn.2010)).